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Malta assumed the Presidency of the Council of the EU in January 
2017 with a list of priorities ranging from migration to social 
inclusion, security to the single market. In addition to the challenge 
the Presidency represents for any Member State, small states are 
particularly ‘stretched’ in meeting the myriad commitments the 
presidency involves. Therefore, from the outset, Malta’s Presidency 
represented a challenge for the Government and Public Service. In 
addition, Malta was also faced with several ‘external’ challenges 
beyond its control but which had the potential to complicate its 
task at the helm of the Council, including elections in key member 
states, the formal launch of the BREXIT process and the 
inauguration of the Trump administration in America; as Malta 
entered 2017 it truly found itself in the proverbial ‘eye of the storm’. 
After completing its Presidency the consensus in Malta and abroad 
was that the EU’s smallest state had scored highly in delivering on 
its priorities and that it had been a success. This book represents 
the first academic assessment of the Presidency and reflects the 
Institute for European Studies’ commitment to contributing to the 
body of academic knowledge on Malta and the European Union.
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Preface  
The Institute for European Studies was established in 1991 as a teaching and 
research centre within the University of Malta. In the ensuing 25 years, 700 
students have passed through the Institute and subsequently graduated with a 
Bachelors, Masters or Doctorate degree in European Studies. Our graduates 
have proceeded to populate the public service, managing the majority of 
Malta’s interface with the European Union, as well as being recruited by the 
EU institutions, international organizations, NGOs and media outlets. The 
Institute is justly proud of its contribution to having facilitated Malta’s 
membership of the Union with these highly trained graduates who have 
managed Malta-EU relations, whether as politicians, public servants or 
members of the general public who also have their role to play in the 
formation and operationalization of EU policy.  
Beyond our teaching commitment, the Institute has also maintained a strong 
research output, both in terms of its individual academic members as well as 
collectively; several series of publications have been issued throughout the 
years with a particular focus upon Malta and have contributed substantially 
to the body of academic knowledge. Recently, this included a 10-year 
anniversary series which analysed Malta’s experience of membership after 
the first decade. This paper series and others can be accessed through the 
Institute’s website. As with the Institute’s teaching success, the research 
output is testament to the unflagging commitment of two academics who 
created and nurtured this Institute, namely Prof. Roderick Pace (as Director 
of the Institute for 25 years) and Prof. Peter Xuereb (as Chairman of the 
Board until 2016). I would like to express a particular note of thanks to Prof. 
Pace. His name is synonymous with European Studies in Malta and his 
contribution to this volume a clear indication of his continued dedication to 
the Institute. 
This book represents the first in an annual series of publications which aim to 
focus attention on Malta and the EU, thus contributing to the body of 
academic knowledge and also providing a clear opportunity for the Institute 
to focus its research output in the light of important events both at a national 
and an EU level. It was therefore fitting that the first volume should provide 
the only academic assessment of the Maltese Presidency of the Council of 
the EU. I would like to express my thanks to Dr Stefano Moncada who, in 
cooperation with Prof. Pace, coordinated this exercise, my colleagues who 
contributed to this volume as well as the various academic contributors who 
peer-reviewed the chapters. 
Dr Mark Harwood 
Director 
Institute for European Studies 
University of Malta 
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Introduction 
A Successful Small Country Presidency  
Malta assumed the presidency of the Council of the European Union in the 
first half of 2017, almost 13 years after joining the Union. The Institute for 
European Studies of the University of Malta thought that it would be 
appropriate to assess some of the aspects of this presidency and to do so from 
a small state perspective. To set the basic conceptual context, it is important 
to highlight what Anders Wivel observes in his chapter to this volume, that 
lacking the resources to pursue power politics, small states have to rely on 
their diplomatic resources. Since the presidency’s main role is that of an 
“honest broker”, requiring untiring efforts to achieve concord between the 
member states on often difficult and divisive dossiers, it calls for attentive 
and patient diplomacy, an approach that fits well with a small state’s 
preferred methods in world politics. 
The resources of small states are inherently limited in many aspects: fewer 
information sources, a small pool of personnel qualified to take part in the 
Presidency’s work, including in-depth analysis of the issues on the table and, 
ultimately, restricted financial resources. At the start of the Presidency, 
Malta’s Minister of Finance was reported to have told journalists that the 
financial provisions to cover the Presidency’s expenditure had been set aside 
in two tranches in two annual budgets approved by Parliament. 
Notwithstanding these drawbacks, at the end of the Presidency Politico was 
able to report that Malta had been praised for its diplomatic prowess in 
managing to broker agreement on a range of issues. This is not a small 
achievement by the EU’s smallest member state. 
How did Malta manage to achieve this success? We attribute this success to a 
number of factors. Firstly, decision-makers in small states tend to have a 
much more holistic view of the process than those in large states who rely on 
the effort of several bureaucratic layers and narrowly specialized 
administrators. This advantage compensates in no small way for the 
disadvantages just mentioned. The space or distance separating decision-
makers in small states is much smaller than it is in large states. For this 
reason, they tend to be appraised of evolving situations directly and almost 
immediately, in the end enabling them to take quick decisions. Secondly, the 
political leadership from the Prime Minister down to several key ministers 
involved in the Presidency – and the running of the country – had a clear idea 
of how the EU operates and possessed a sense of what was feasible and 
which methods and approaches were likely to work in achieving the desired 
goals.  
The third element was that the small and tenacious Maltese diplomatic corps 
and support staff who were summoned to action two years before the start of 
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the Presidency also impacted positively on the final outcome. By and large 
they were able to successfully deal with the multitude of issues and Council 
meetings. But it will be wrong to overlook that behind this frontline of 
diplomats in the “battle field” stood a support army of administrators working 
from within the line ministries in Valletta most of whom travelled to Brussels 
almost every week. Similarly, one cannot ignore the services of the EU 
institutions and the support provided by the three presidency (trios) structure. 
In discussing Malta’s Presidency, we need to factor in that up to 2009, 
member states played a much bigger role in it then they do now. However, 
since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect in 2009, the EU presidency has lost 
some of its importance mainly for three reasons: the trios  obliges three 
member states to work together in an 18-month long programme which 
means that while each will have its six-month term in the presidency, their 
ability to take new initiatives is reduced considerably; the second point is that 
foreign affairs has been shifted to the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) chaired 
by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security and 
thus the presidency’s role has been reduced considerably; and thirdly the 
European Council has its own president appointed for a period of two and a 
half years, renewable once. Previously, the country holding the Presidency of 
the Council of the EU presided over the European Council meetings which 
took place during its tenure. In short the “agenda-setting” opportunities 
afforded by the rotating EU presidency have decreased since the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
The changes affected by the Lisbon Treaty as just pointed out, which 
effectively stripped the presidency of many of its most highly political roles, 
in particular the chairing of the European Council as well as Foreign Affairs, 
has led some to see it as a more ‘technical’ exercise and that running the 
presidency has become a low-key enterprise that can hardly go wrong. We 
disagree. The presidency can still fail to deliver and undermine the country’s 
reputation amongst its peers and this might be a consequence of a lack of 
preparation and also the reality of a presidency having to deal with events 
beyond its control. At its starting point Malta’s Presidency looked as if it was 
going to face strong turbulence. The EU was deeply divided on migration, as 
it still is, populism was on the rise across Europe and looming national 
elections in three key member states – The Netherlands, France and Germany 
– further heightened tensions between the member states. Additionally, the 
UK electorate had recently voted to leave the EU with the formal notification 
to start the BREXIT process being scheduled to be delivered by the UK 
government at the end of March 2017, as indeed happened, in the midst of 
Malta’s EU presidency. Beyond Europe’s shores, the Maltese presidency 
coincided with the inauguration of the Trump Administration in Washington 
with Trans-Atlantic relations set to deteriorate rapidly. It was truly a 
formidable set of events which the Maltese Presidency saw unravelling 
3 
 
 
before it as it sought to provide leadership of the Council in the first six 
months of 2017.  
All these events could have had two possible effects on the presidency: the 
optimistic scenario was that they could provide it with additional 
opportunities that would show in sharper contrast its leadership qualities; the 
pessimistic scenario was that these events could prove to be too big for the 
Presidency and derail its best laid plans. In the end the pessimistic scenario 
never materialized and Malta was able to carry out its programme up to the 
end and notwithstanding a surprise national election held on 3 June, in the 
last month of the Presidency.  
Turning once more to the objectives and agenda of this book, we need to 
stress that the intention was not to provide a comprehensive assessment of all 
the presidency’s actions and achievements. At its inception, it was decided to 
focus on the most important issues. Hence, in order to compile the work, the 
Institute for European Studies issued a general call for abstracts, following 
which the submissions were sifted in accordance with the criteria of quality 
and relevance to the priorities of Malta’s EU Presidency. Briefly, Malta’s 
priorities were:  
 Migration – with the twin objectives to swiftly implement previously 
agreed measures and to maintain migration’s importance at the top of 
the political agenda. 
 The Single Market – with emphasis placed on exploiting the single 
market, developing the Digital Single Market, completing the 
Internal Energy Market and giving due importance to the Capital 
Markets Union. 
 Security – centred on the aim to contribute towards concrete progress 
on proposals that addressed regional and global challenges. 
 Social Inclusion – where Malta hoped its experience would ‘rub off’ 
on its European partners so as to advance gender equality and the 
rights of minorities and vulnerable groups. 
 Europe’s Neighbourhood ‒ with a focus on EU engagement which 
stabilises the Union’s neighbourhood with the EU Global Strategy 
being an important reference point. 
 Maritime ‒ with an emphasis on the sustainable development of the 
maritime sector within the framework of the EU’s Integrated 
Maritime Policy.  
All six areas were key issues for the government and the sequence did not 
imply a hierarchy of priorities with migration being primus inter pares. That 
said, and to ensure continuity, the chapters of this book are arranged so as to 
follow the sequence listed above. 
By way of an introduction, the first chapter focuses on small states in the EU 
and after briefly tracing the treaty changes that have taken place in the EU 
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since the Maastricht Treaty, Anders Wivel asks a very provocative question 
as to whether the Presidency of the Council is making the small member 
states even smaller? Wivel shows that indeed small states run more risks in 
holding the presidency then do larger states. However, for small EU member 
states, the Council presidency offers a good chance for maximizing influence 
despite the challenges following from the nature of the presidency and the 
general developments of the EU.   
Migration, which has been the cause of much dissonance in the EU, is the 
focus of Berta Fernandez and Kristiina Lilleorg’s chapter on the EU’s 
Migration and Asylum policy in the aftermath of the 2016 migration crisis. It 
is also touched upon in the chapter on external relations by Roderick Pace. 
Berta Fernandez and Kristiina Lilleorg provide compelling evidence that the 
EU has still not been able to institute legal measures to protect refugees and 
asylum seekers in most need of protection. Though some progress was 
registered during the Maltese Presidency, there is still a long way to go. What 
is lacking in the efforts to manage migration are additional safe and legal 
pathways to the EU for persons entitled to international protection (as well as 
those seeking other forms of protection), i.e. humanitarian admission and 
private sponsorship.  As noted in their chapter, “the Valletta Summit between 
the EU and Africa was an important first step towards meeting migration 
challenges” while “the five clusters of the Valletta Action Plan taken together 
presented a blueprint for strengthening cooperation between both 
continents”.  
The single market was covered in the chapter written by Ivan Sammut who 
wrote a comprehensive overview of the legislative programme of the Maltese 
presidency laying special stress on the digital single market which was high 
in the Maltese agenda. Malta made satisfactory progress on this front as well 
by continuing where previous presidencies had left off, but also by ensuring 
that a number of dossiers were completed and closed.  Linked to Sammut’s 
chapter we find Claire Ciantar’s analysis focusing on the effects of 
unjustified geo-blocking on the functioning of the single market and how it 
affects cross-border trade over the internet. Although Malta failed to close 
the issue during its presidency, it nevertheless gave the legislative process a 
good push forward so it could then be concluded under the subsequent 
Estonian Presidency.  
The third priority of the Maltese Presidency of the EU Council was social 
inclusion. As Mark Harwood points out, this was the only Presidency 
objective in which Malta intended to lead the rest of the EU through its own 
experience with inclusion, particularly on LGBTIQ rights. Harwood says that 
the Maltese Presidency was in a way helped by The Netherlands’ activism in 
favour of LGBTIQ rights since 2013 and this has added relevance 
considering that The Netherlands formed part of the trio-presidency. From 
this angle the Maltese Presidency was helped in reaching its objective, but at 
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the same time it was hampered by the fact that the Commission’s attention 
was focused on other matters which led the Maltese government to adopt a 
more restrained agenda on LGBTIQ equality.  
Three chapters then focus on the Maltese Presidency’s aims in the 
Neighbourhood Policy. The first by Francesco Biagi dwells on constitutional 
developments in North Africa since the Arab Spring. North Africa and the 
Middle East constitute a vital aspect of the southern dimension of the EU’s 
neighbourhood Policy. To understand the constraints that the EU faces in the 
region, Biagi assess an important factor of stabilization namely the existence 
or lack of a political process leading to it – namely constitutional progress. 
His analysis focuses on Libya, Syria and Tunisia three countries that are 
constantly under the EU’s watch due to their impact on relations in the region 
and the Union itself. Biagi analyses the EU’s engagement in constitution-
making in these countries but cautions about the dangers that this poses, 
particularly premature constitution writing which might condemn such 
charters to oblivion.  
Roderick Pace then provides an assessment of the EU’s external relations 
during Malta’s EU presidency. The analysis shows that although the 
importance of external relations in the EU’s rotating presidency has 
diminished since the Lisbon Treaty reforms, Malta managed to play an 
important role particularly by chairing a scheduled meeting of the crucial 
EU-Tunisia Association Council. The chapter provides a comprehensive 
purview of all the main events that occurred on the external relations front 
during Malta’s presidency – and Malta’s role in them. 
Finally, Milan Pajic’s chapter assesses one of the most important successes 
of the Maltese Presidency namely the signing of the EU’s New European 
Consensus on Development (NCD) in the final days of the presidency.  The 
fact that Malta held the Presidency, gave it considerable influence in driving 
the process forward as the Chair of CODEV and penholder of the document. 
This is surprising considering that in the past, development policy had been 
neglected and Malta lacked expertise in the matter. This lacuna was filled by 
the high quality and competence of the negotiators. 
Maritime policy, another main objective of Malta’s EU Presidency was 
treated in a separate chapter by Pace. Noting that Malta has long had a keen 
interest in maritime policy, having itself proposed the Law of the Sea 
Convention at the United Nations in 1967, Pace goes on to discuss the Blue 
Economy, especially within the context of the Western Mediterranean. As 
noted by Pace “as a maritime state, an island state, Malta was able to transmit 
clearly, diligently and successfully its sensitivities toward the sector and 
using its first-hand knowledge of the issue it was able to overcome the 
drawbacks of smallness and lead”.  
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We conclude our book with two chapters which stand outside the context of 
the Maltese Government’s six priority areas but which help ensure a more 
holistic appraisal of the Presidency. The first, by Kenneth Curmi, analyses 
the parliamentary dimension of the Presidency. Surprisingly the 
parliamentary dimension is often side-lined in the rapportage on the 
presidency because the media focuses on the meetings of the heads of 
government and their ministers. This is rather odd considering the 
importance which national parliaments have gained since the Lisbon Treaty 
came into effect particularly because of their role as scrutinizers of draft EU 
law to establish whether it respects the principle of subsidiarity. According to 
Curmi, national parliaments have their own trio structure mirroring the trio-
presidency as well as a programme encompassing the three presidencies of 
the Council of the EU. Parliamentary activity during the presidency brought 
together national members of parliament from the EU member states and the 
European Parliament to discuss the salient Presidency objectives. Meetings 
were also held of the chairpersons of some key national parliamentary 
committees. 
The second, by Petra Bishtawi, addresses an issue which has been at the 
forefront of Maltese efforts in the area of migration, namely the promotion of 
burden sharing efforts at an EU level. By the start of the Maltese Presidency 
burden sharing had become a highly divisive issue amongst the Member 
States. Petra’s chapter analyses a concept that could facilitate a technical 
solution to relocation should the Member States decide at some stage to 
agree on internal relocation and therefore represents a contribution to a key 
issue for Malta and Malta’s Presidency. 
As can be seen from the chapters contained in this volume, the challenge of 
running the Presidency of the Council of the EU was a formidable one, 
especially for the EU’s smallest member state. The conclusion from this 
volume is that Malta managed the Presidency with robustness, meeting many 
of its targets, brokering compromise amongst the member states and in 
negotiations with the European Parliament as well as utilising its limited 
human and financial resources to their maximum capacity, thus embodying 
the “smart state strategy”. We hope that this publication will be treated as 
another contribution that helps unpack the nature of small country EU 
presidencies.  
Mark Harwood, Stefano Moncada, Roderick Pace 
Institute for European Studies 
University of Malta 
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Chapter 1  
Maximizing Influence by Leading the Council:  
Smart State Strategies for Small State Presidencies 
Anders Wivel 
Introduction 
How does a small state maximize their influence when leading the Council? 
This chapter argues that small states need to prioritize goals and means, 
network and accept their relative lack of power as the point of departure for 
their diplomatic efforts if they are to maximize influence when holding the 
Council presidency. 
A small state lacks relative and absolute capabilities and is by definition “the 
weaker part in an asymmetric relationship, which is unable to change the 
nature or functioning of the relationship on its own”.1 Small states “are not in 
command of power resources sufficient to pursue dominant power politics”.2 
Consequently small states rely on diplomatic means of influence and 
persuasion.
3
 They seek to affect or change events or policies in their external 
environment by use of diplomatic tools for achieving political objectives.
4
 
For this reason, international institutions play a key role in most small states 
efforts to maximize influence on international affairs. International 
institutions delimit the action space of the great powers by subjecting all their 
member states to the same rules and to the same sanctions, if they break the 
rules. International institutions do not negate power politics, and the most 
powerful member states may use their power to secure special treatment or 
continue to circumvent or break the rules, they have agreed to. Yet, 
institutionalization increases the cost for them to do so. The use (and abuse) 
of power is more visible with formal rules, and the strongest states need to 
argue why deviating from agreed norms and rules is legitimate.
5
 
Consequently, international institutions allow small states to reduce their 
dependence on individual great powers and to increase their action space,
6
 
                                                             
1 Wivel, A. et al. (2014) p. 9. “Smallness is, in this conception, a comparative and not an 
absolute idea” bringing to our attention a particular set of policy problems and policy 
dilemmas. Hanf, K. and Soetendorp, B. (1998) p..4. Thus, studying small states allow us to 
explore “the experience of power disparity and the manner of coping with it” Knudsen, O.F. 
(1996) p. 5; cf. Wivel (2005), p. 395. 
2 Kelstrup, M. (1993) p. 162. 
3 Keohane, R. (1969). 
4 Thompson, A. (2009) p. 17. 
5 Neumann and Gstöhl (2006) p. 20. 
6 Toje, A. (2011). 
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and for this reason, “small states generally prefer multilateralism as both a 
path to influence and a means to restrain larger states”.7 
Small states find no better place to do this than in the Euro-Atlantic area, 
where the fundamental problematic of small EU and NATO members has 
been transformed from a “survival problem” to an “influence problem”.8 
Their most important international challenge is no longer the threat of 
military attack from nearby great powers, but political marginalization in a 
complex network of European and Euro-Atlantic institutions For this reason, 
small states have a strong incentive to seek influence in the highly 
institutionalized European political space. No other organization offers as 
broad a package of policies (from low politics areas such as culture and 
education over health, transport and trade to foreign and security policy), as 
deep a level of cooperation (combining intergovernmentalism with 
supranationalism) and as diverse a combination of norms (like consensus 
decision-making) and formal institutions (like the Commission, Council and 
Parliament) as the European Union (EU). By providing a shelter against 
external shocks as well as intra-European great power rivalry and a platform 
for influence within and beyond Europe, the EU is central for any small 
European state seeking influence.  
This chapter zooms in on one aspect of small state influence seeking via the 
EU by discussing how small states may use the Council presidency to 
maximize influence on the development of the EU. The remaining part of the 
argument proceeds in three steps. First, I briefly outline the role of the 
Council presidency in small state EU policy-making. Second, I discuss the 
challenges of small states seeking influence in the EU, when holding the 
presidency. Third, I argue that that by pursuing so-called smart state 
strategies, small states may enhance their chance of agenda-setting when 
holding the presidency. Finally, I conclude the analysis. 
The Council Presidency and small EU member states 
The balance of power between the main institutions of the EU reflects a 
fundamental compromise between big and small EU member states. This 
compromise was initiated in the Paris Treaty of 1951 and reproduced in the 
Treaty of Rome, which served as the baseline for all subsequent revisions 
and produced a system combining weighted votes in the Council of 
Ministers, the independence of supranational institutions and avoidance of a 
permanent presidency.
9
 A series of enlargements gradually shifted the 
balance in favour of the small states despite changes to the voting weights in 
connection with the enlargements. Accordingly, the question of “small vs. 
                                                             
7 Steinsson, S. and Thorhallsson, B. (2017). 
8 Løvold, A. (2004). 
9 Magnette, P. and Nicolaïdis, K. (2004) pp. 3-6. 
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large states” remained high on the agenda in the debate on the future 
institutional design of the EU.
10
 
The Treaty of Nice (which entered into force on 1
st
 February 2003), and The 
Treaty of Lisbon (which entered into force on 1
st 
December 2009) were 
attempts at re-balancing the power of large and small member states in the 
EU. The two treaties also reflected the dual aim of reconciling concerns of 
democracy with institutional efficiency and avoiding on the one side the 
dominance of a few EU great powers over the majority of the member states 
and on the other side the “tyranny of the tiny” allowing a majority of small 
states to entrap big member states in policy developments that only the big 
would have the capacity to implement. Thus, even though Germany has 96 
seats out of 751 (12.8%) seat in the European Parliament and Cyprus, 
Estonia, Luxemburg and Malta only have 6 seats each (0.8%), there is one 
German seat in the Parliament for each 840,625 Germans, but one Maltese 
seat for each 69,572 Maltese citizens. In the Council, the Treaty of Lisbon 
mandated a change in voting rules from 1
st
 November, 2014, which abolished 
the previous voting weights and replaced them with a system where most 
decisions are taken by double majority qualified majority voting demanding 
each decision to be backed by at least 55% of member states (15 member 
states in the current EU) representing at least 65% of the EU’s population. 
The Treaty of Lisbon brought important changes to the Council presidency. 
The introduction of a European Council President to lead the work of the 
Council and represent the EU internationally in foreign and security policy 
reduced the importance of the rotating presidency as did the creation of a 
“High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” 
merging the Commission and Council expertise on the issue of foreign affairs. 
Also, the treaty formalized trio presidencies with close coordination among 
three consecutive presidencies and the Commission on presidency 
programmes. Historically, the EU presidency was not an integral part of the 
bargain between small and large EU member states. In contrast, “when the 
presidency was established in the 1950s it had been a complete afterthought – 
its creators having little more in mind than to share out the responsibility for 
chairing Council meetings in some orderly fashion”.11 However, it gradually 
came to be seen by small EU member states as a rare chance to agenda-set core 
priorities and showcase political and administrative competencies and 
therefore also to increase international influence and prestige and solidify 
domestic support for continued membership. As noted by Bengtsson, Elgström 
and Tallberg, the presidency can be “translated into normative power through 
the opportunity to launch and promote novel policy ideas or ideational 
frameworks and can thus be claimed to be a tool especially well-suited to 
                                                             
10.Bunse, S. (2009); Magnette, P. and Nicolaïdis, K. (2004); Moberg, A. (2002); Panke, D. 
(2015); Thorhallsson, B. and Wivel, A. (2006); Thorhallsson, B. and Wivel, A. (2018). 
11 Bunse, S. (2009) p. 2. 
10 
 
 
smaller states […] which lack traditional power resources”.12 In sum, the 
presidency of the Council of the EU historically developed from a practical 
solution to coordination and Council meeting management to a platform for 
small states to voice their priorities for the future development of the EU. 
Developments of the role and influence of the presidency should be seen in the 
light of the EU’s institutional balance in general, the balance between in the 
influence of small and large member states and the increased complexity and 
diversity within the EU following from the widening and deepening of EU 
integration. In this context, the most recent changes in the role of the 
presidency can be understood as “a Solomonic decision. It probably satisfied 
both the preference of the big Member States for more stable leadership in the 
Council and the wish of the small Member States to maintain the Presidency 
function as a vehicle for influence.”13 
Challenges: Is the presidency making small states even smaller? 
Small states seeking to maximize influence when holding the Council 
presidency face three clusters of challenges. The first cluster is related to the 
nature of the presidency itself and includes six related challenges to small 
state holding the presidency. First, the presidency is short-term. Six months 
is a very brief period of time to influence anything in an organization as big 
and complex as the EU, in particular for a member state with only limited 
resources. Second, agenda-setting opportunities were limited by the changes 
to the Council presidency in the Treaty of Lisbon leaving the presidency with 
mainly low politics issues. Even though, it may be argued that this had 
limited effect on small states as they were routinely ignored by bigger 
member states when it came to the high politics of foreign and security 
policy anyway,
14
 the presidency did at least hold a formal opportunity for 
influence before the changes. Third, holding the presidency demands 
administrative capacity and competencies that put a strain on many small 
states, in particular those states that are relative newcomers and therefore 
only have limited experience with the EU system. 
Fourth, while the lack of administrative capacity has to some extent been 
countered by the introduction of the trio presidencies, the introduction of the 
trios has simultaneously exacerbated another challenge for small states 
holding the presidency: the member state holding the presidency is only one 
among a number of potential agenda-setters. Agenda-setting for the six-
month presidency is a collaborative endeavor with the two other states in the 
troikas well as the Commission and other member state governments. Fifth, 
the presidency is costly in terms of staff and costs related to meetings and 
other presidency-related activities. All things equal, holding the presidency 
takes out a bigger chunk of small member state budgets than of big member 
                                                             
12 Bengtsson, R.; Elgström, O. and Tallberg, J. (2004) p. 314. 
13 Jensen and Nedergaard (2014) p. 1037. 
14 See the discussions in Wivel, A. (2005) and Duke, S. (2001). 
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states budget. Sixth, the combination of high costs and limited ability to 
influence the agenda of the presidency entails the risk that holding the 
presidency may backfire in domestic politics as well as in influencing 
international affairs. The presidency is often sold to domestic audiences as a 
unique chance to pitch the values and interests of the small state to European 
and international society, but if it is seen as inconsequential, national 
electorates may view it as simply a waste of money or even an embarrassing 
failure and attribute the lack of success to the government. 
These challenges are related to a second cluster of challenges related to EU 
decision-making in general. As noted in a recent analysis on small states in EU 
decision-making, “[s]maller states have not only fewer votes in the Council, but 
also considerably fewer financial, staff and administrative resources […] Size is 
an advantage in EU negotiations, since bigger states are simply in a position to 
do more”.15 In this context, the presidency may risk exacerbating existing 
structural disadvantages in the EU decision-making system. Small states may 
appear even smaller, when their weaknesses and limited influence are exhibited 
by the strains of holding the presidency, and they are often marginalized in times 
of crisis. For instance, in 2001 after the terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington on 11
th
 September 2001, the UK, France and Germany held a mini-
summit coordinating military support to the US without inviting other member 
states or the Belgian Presidency,
16
 and during the economic crisis in Europe 
from 2008, a series of small state presidencies were sidestepped by Germany, 
which took a leading role in defining the roots of the crisis and the remedies to 
ameliorate its consequences.
17
 
Finally, a third cluster of challenges centres around the recent developments 
of the EU. Over the past decade the EU has experienced a crisis which is 
unprecedented in its existential, multi-dimensional nature linking economic 
crisis with a crisis over migration and the continued implementation of the 
Schengen agreement, a political crisis of the EU following from the British 
Brexit decision, and increasing security challenges in the Eastern and 
Southern vicinities of the EU, “where any attempts to mitigate a particular 
crisis causes further crises”.18 These crises exacerbates the effect of a longer 
period of increasing acceptance of intergovernmentalism in the EU since the 
early 1990s. This has created a larger and more legitimate room for informal 
great power cooperation and delimited the influence of the Commission, 
which has typically been viewed as the small states’ “best friend”, because of 
its role as an independent, technocratic and supranational counterweight to 
                                                             
15 Panke, D. (2015) p. 62, 69. 
16.The Belgian presidency was invited for a follow-up dinner in addition to the leaders of 
Italy, Spain and the Netherlands joining the three leading powers, but only after political 
pressure, see Wivel, A. (2005), p. 403. 
17 See the analysis of Germany’s role as agenda-setter in Nedergaard, P. and Snaith, H. (2015). 
18 Dinan, D.; Nugent, N. and Paterson, W.E. (2017), p. 361. 
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the power politics of the member states.
19
 This development has also 
challenged the typical grand strategy of small states in Europe working 
towards a still more effective binding of the European great powers through 
institutionalization and formal safeguards against the abuse of power among 
European states.
20
  
Opportunities: Prioritization, networking and being small with a 
purpose 
How should small states meet these challenges and make the most of their 
EU presidencies? One answer is by use of a so-called smart state strategy.
21
 
A smart state strategy has three fundamental characteristics. First, small 
states need to prioritize goals and means and rank their policy priorities. 
What is the main aim of the presidency? What are the means to achieve this 
aim? What are the secondary aims? Are there any red lines/policy bastions 
that designate defensive aims, i.e. policy developments that should be 
avoided by use of the presidency? Small states must prioritize their 
resources and signal their willingness to negotiate and compromise on 
issues that are not deemed to be of vital importance. They lack the 
resources and competencies to pursue a broad political agenda with many 
different goals. 
Second, if you lack capabilities, you need friends. In military affairs, a 
distinction is often made between internal balancing (arms build-up) and 
external balancing (alliance formation). In diplomatic affairs, we can make a 
similar distinction between building capacity and competencies in a 
particular issue area and building a coalition. In diplomatic affairs, as in 
military affairs, the two are not mutually exclusive but most effective when 
used in combination, and in diplomatic affairs, like in military affairs, small 
states are particularly dependent on cooperation with others as their 
capabilities and competencies may be used effectively in a network but will 
rarely be sufficient to stand alone. Any goals of the presidency must be in 
accordance with the goals of the Union as a whole or at least a sizeable 
coalition within it, and avoid conflict with existing EU initiatives or political 
proposals from any of the big EU member states. Small states should not 
waste resources on picking fights that they cannot win. Instead, they need to 
identify the niches where they have special competencies and may contribute 
solutions to the general challenges of the EU. Fortunately, these niches will 
often coincide with small state interests as they build competencies in the 
issue areas, which are most important to domestic political actors and 
economic growth. Small states holding the presidency will need some 
common understanding with the two other members of the presidency trio in 
                                                             
19 Geurts, C. (1998). 
20 Wallace, W. (1999). 
21 On smart state strategies for small states, see e.g. Joenniemi, P. (1998) Arter, D. (2000) and 
Grøn, C. and Wivel, A. (2011). 
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order to build a workable coalition for their presidency agenda but they will 
need to build a strong network among likeminded states including some of 
the big member states if they are to succeed and effectively offset some of 
the challenges related to the lack of capacity and agenda-setting ability as 
well as increasing inter-governmentalism. 
Finally, holding the Council presidency is an opportunity for small states to 
take advantage of the agenda-setting powers not otherwise at their disposal. 
Small states may be in a particularly advantageous position to take on the 
role of mediator in negotiations. As noted in the introduction of this chapter, 
small states lack the capabilities for pursuing dominant power politics and 
must therefore rely on non-coercive diplomatic tools. Small states are 
structurally disadvantaged by their absolute and relative lack of capabilities, 
even in a highly institutionalized environment such as the EU, but they are 
privileged by the non-threatening international posture following from their 
lack of power, i.e. the soft power following from small state status. As 
argued by Nye, “soft power ‒ getting others to want the outcomes you want – 
co-opts people rather than coerces them”.22 In that sense, a small state 
strategy turns the binding strategy on its head. Rather than seeking “damage 
control” by limiting the action space of the great powers by binding them to 
institutional regulations and thereby seeking to curb the negative 
consequences stemming from small states’ lack of hard power capabilities, 
small states should aim to unleash the soft power stemming from being the 
weaker part in an asymmetric relationship. They will best do this in policy 
areas, where they have already built a strong forerunner reputation thereby 
underpinning their position as competent mediators and offsetting the 
challenges stemming from the short six-month period of holding the 
presidency. 
Conclusion 
As argued by Helen Wallace, “[i]t is a core objective of all member 
governments to exercise influence in support of their preferences within the 
EU system.”23 For small EU member states, the Council presidency offers a 
good chance for maximizing influence despite the challenges following from 
the nature of the presidency and the general developments of the EU. Rather 
than focusing on how to change the institutional set-up of the presidency, 
small states should focus on how to make the most out of it in its current 
form. In a highly institutionalized environment such as the EU knowing how 
to play the game may be almost as important as the cards you are dealt. A 
smart state strategy emphasizing prioritization, networking and taking 
advantage of the soft power stemming from being a small state will help 
                                                             
22 Nye, J. (2004) p. 5. 
23 Wallace, H. (2005) p. 36. 
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small states to take advantage of the Council presidency, maximizing their 
influence. 
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Chapter 2  
EU Migration and Asylum in the Aftermath of the 2016 
Migration Crisis 
Berta Fernandez and Kristiina Lilleorg 
Introduction 
The European Union (EU) initiatives aimed at regulating migration have 
recently enjoyed relatively broad and quick support by EU Member States 
(EUMS), while the facilitation of migration has been selective and either 
addressing few targeted countries, or small categories of migrants travelling 
to the EU – the most qualified ones. Migrants in vulnerable situations with 
specific protection needs and/or asylum-seekers requesting international 
protection – seeking access to the EU – are still awaiting legislative and 
policy reforms addressing their needs. Significant progress was made during 
the Maltese Presidency towards reaching agreement among EUMS on the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS) reform. However, the package 
of seven instruments and the key issues they seek to address remain work in 
much-needed progress.  
Given the 2016 ongoing migration flows to the EU via the Central 
Mediterranean route, the Maltese Presidency started with a clear 
determination to reduce arrivals from Libya and save lives, as well as to 
break the business model of smugglers along the route as stipulated in the 
European Agenda on Migration. A vivid sense of urgency to increase return 
rates and uphold the credibility of asylum systems was felt by EUMS and the 
Commission alike. The new return policy package was released in March 
2017, paving the way for a future revision of the Return Directive, with a 
view to building a Common European Return System (CERS). On the 
external front, making development aid contingent on cooperation on returns 
and readmission in the Migration Partnership Framework approach has been 
questioned by the European Parliament (EP) and others, arguing it represents 
a contradiction with aid effectiveness principles which for this reason risk 
losing ownership and engagement of partner countries. 
Politico gave the Maltese Presidency a high mark for its performance and 
negotiating ability on Migration and Neighbourhood issues (7 out of 10),
24
 
highlighting as achievements the European Travel Information and 
Authorization System (ETIAS), the new EU Agency for Asylum Regulation 
(EUAA), visa liberalization for Georgia and Ukraine, and the revamping of 
the EU Return Policy with a particular focus on Libya. Undoubtedly, these 
results are consistent with the leadership position that Malta acquired during 
                                                             
24 Politico (2017). 
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2015/2016 due to the relevance of the Valletta Summit
25
 after the approval of 
the European Agenda on Migration (EAM). However, the EU asylum acquis 
reform remains very much work in progress; a sensitive file to be dealt with 
by the next Presidencies. 
 
European Migration Agenda and Common European Asylum System: Work 
in Much-Needed Progress 
Following the priorities set out in the European Agenda on Migration (EAM) 
(May, 2015) and the subsequent first and second implementation packages – 
which brought about, among other measures, the Council Decisions on 
relocation (September, 2015) – the Commission Communication on the 
reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was published in 
April, 2016. 
On 4
th
 May 2016 and 13
th
 July 2016, the Commission submitted seven 
legislative proposals aimed at reforming the CEAS.
26
 During its Council 
Presidency, Malta led the examination of the seven proposals, initiated by the 
previous two Presidencies – those of The Netherlands and the Slovak 
Republic. The Maltese Presidency opted for a thematic approach for the 
revision, given that a number of issues included in many of those proposals 
were cross-cutting and closely inter-linked: namely, the Qualification 
Regulation (QR), Asylum Procedures Regulation (APR), Reception 
Conditions Directive (RCD) and Dublin IV Regulation (Dublin IV). At the 
same time, from what had started as a 2-package proposal in 2016, the 
Maltese Presidency inherited the packages somewhat reshuffled according to 
the progress achieved – with Dublin IV having moved from the first to the 
second package. This was not due to its reduced importance: quite the 
contrary, in fact, it was rather because of its importance as the corner stone of 
the CEAS that the discussions ‒ and also disagreements over it among 
Member States ‒ had significantly slowed down progress on the negotiation 
of Dublin.IV.  
The issue of solidarity and responsibility-sharing among Member States with 
regard to processing and hosting asylum-seekers remained at the core of the 
discussions – in other words, nothing has changed in the application of the 
Dublin regime, whose core principle is that the responsibility for examining 
an asylum claim lies with the Member State which played the greatest part in 
the applicant’s entry to the EU. In most cases this means it is the Member 
State of first entry.
27
 The Commission proposal to reform the Dublin 
                                                             
25 Fernandez, B. (2016).  
26.The recast of the Dublin Regulation (Dublin IV) and of the EURODAC Regulation, a 
proposal for a Regulation on the establishment of the European Union Agency for Asylum 
(EUAA), a proposal for a Regulation establishing a common procedure in the EU, a proposal 
for a Qualification Regulation, the recast of the Reception Conditions Directive and a proposal 
for a Regulation establishing a Union Resettlement Framework. 
 
27 European Commission (2017e). 
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Regulation did not revisit the responsibility criteria of the current Dublin III 
mechanism. The proposal, however, included a “corrective fairness 
mechanism” of relocation28 under which asylum seekers would be subject to 
a relocation scheme from the country in question only after the potential 
applicability of the “safe third country” concept has been ruled out in their 
case.  
Even though the proposal was subject to significant changes proposed by the 
EP during the Maltese Presidency as well as significant efforts towards 
cluster-agreements around themes – the file of this proposal was handed over 
to the Estonian Presidency without much overall progress achieved, most 
notably on the principle of solidarity. To date, the latter remains at the core 
of persisting differences in Member States’ discussions on the entire CEAS 
reform, impacting progress also on other instruments, especially the 
forthcoming APR.
29
 Reaching agreement on Dublin IV is thus urgently 
needed not only to unblock the stalemate on the related instruments, but also 
to allow for the institutionalization of the Emergency Relocation 
Mechanism.
30
 
At the furthermost end of the progress spectrum in terms of potential backing 
by EU Member States (EUMS) under the Maltese Presidency, was the draft 
Regulation on the establishment of the EUAA which found principle 
agreement on all its key tenants. The Commission proposed the 
transformation of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) into a full-
fledged agency, the European Union Agency for Asylum, with a wider 
mandate, putting the Agency in charge of operating the corrective fairness 
mechanism under the proposed Dublin IV, as well as ensuring greater 
convergence in decision-making and standards between Member States’ 
asylum systems. The text remains to this date, the most advanced among the 
seven instruments; its adoption will now primarily depend on the agreement 
reached by EUMS on the other instruments of the CEAS package.  
In its final report to the Council on the progress in the CEAS reform in June 
2017, the Maltese Presidency noted that “a consensus had emerged among 
Member States to support a comprehensive approach of which the reform of 
the CEAS was just one aspect”,31 adding that “policies tackling migratory 
flows outside the EU, external border management and a strengthened 
returns framework would need to be enhanced in parallel with the asylum 
law reform”.32 In the latter priority areas, important efforts were made and 
achieved under the Maltese Presidency, including, but not limited to, the 
                                                             
28 The mechanism needs to be triggered in Member States facing particular pressure.  
29 European Commission (2016b).  
30 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601. 
31 Presidency of the Council of the European Union (2017a). 
32 Ibid. 
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Action Plan on Measures to Support Italy,
33
 the most recent amendment to 
the Schengen Borders Code,
34
 as well as the Entry/Exist System and ETIAS 
proposals
35
 ‒   which were all adopted or significantly progressed towards 
regulating migration. On the EU external dimension, this was achieved 
through successful implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement,
36
 and the 
adoption of the Malta Declaration. On the migration “facilitation” side, 
notable successes include the progress made on the Blue Card Directive 
revision (for qualified professionals), and the successful conclusion of the 
visa liberalization negotiations with Ukraine and Georgia – essentially 
allowing visa free travel for the nationals of the two countries in exchange 
for readmission from the EU.  
Meanwhile, migrants in vulnerable situations with specific protection needs 
and/or asylum-seekers requesting international protection – seeking access to 
the EU – are still awaiting legislative and policy reforms addressing their 
needs, most notably through the Schengen Visa and Borders Code reform. 
Furthermore, the above-mentioned Maltese Presidency June 2017 progress 
report also noted a general understanding that the reformed CEAS should 
ensure the right balance between responsibility and solidarity. In other 
words, “Member States would need to fully implement the acquis, the 
asylum system should be efficient, avoiding pull factors and discouraging 
secondary movements, and it should deliver solidarity effectively and 
efficiently when needed, in particular when a Member State finds itself under 
disproportionate pressure or adversely affected by unforeseen events”.37 This 
line was expanded on and reinforced in the Conclusions of the Council 
meeting held later that same month.
38
  
EU Return, Readmission and Development Policies:  
Complementary or Contradictory? 
During 2016, the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU return system and 
policy were under serious scrutiny. Even if EU return rates (i.e. enforced 
return rates as a percentage of the number of removal orders) to third 
countries increased from 37% (2015) to 46%,
39
 it was still not seen as good 
enough considering the inflows. The European Migration Network (EMN) 
identified a number of challenges that EUMS encountered in the return of 
                                                             
33 European Commission (2017c). 
34 Council of the European Union (2017b).  
35 ETIAS Europe (2017). 
36.For more info see https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/ european-agenda-migration/background-
information/eu_turkey_statement_17032017_en.pdf  
37 Presidency of the Council of the European Union (2017a). 
38 European Council (2017a). 
39 Eurostat.  
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rejected asylum seekers that are affecting the effective enforcement of return 
decisions.
40
 In brief, the current obstacles are four-fold:  
(a).practical (identity determination in the absence of travel documents, 
individual resistance to return, volatile security situation in some 
countries of origin.);  
(b).legal (procedural safeguards allowing for late-stage appeals and judicial 
reviews, impossibility for EUMS to establish contact with the authorities 
of the country of origin before the asylum procedure is closed.);  
(c).medical (greater prevalence among asylum seekers than other returnees); 
and  
(d).political (national pressure not to implement removals, and unpopularity 
of readmission in third countries). Currently, the EUMS are coordinating 
the implementation of their national return programmes via the AMIF 
funded European Reintegration Network (ERIN), to reduce costs and to 
establish common approaches for the provision of reintegration 
assistance to returnees, whether voluntary or forced. This is in line with 
what IOM has been advocating for: more harmonization in the field of 
assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) as a means of 
limiting situations where migrants returning to the same country of origin 
under different programmes would receive different assistance 
packages.
41
 Furthermore, this will reduce the so-called “return 
shopping”, whereby rejected asylum-seekers and irregular migrants seek 
those EUMS with the most beneficial return package schemes. 
After the Malta Summit,
42
 the EU Return Policy was reviewed to analyse the 
application of the legal, operational, financial and practical tools available at 
EU and national levels, in order to identify how to increase return rates. A 
month later, the Commission adopted a Recommendation for EU Member 
States on “making returns more effective when implementing the Directive 
2008/115/EC”, and a Communication on a Renewed Action Plan on Return 
(RAPR). According to that Communication of 3
rd
 March 2017,
43
 “competent 
national authorities in the Member States need to apply the standards and 
procedures set out in the Return Directive in a more effective and direct way 
when carrying out returns in full respect of fundamental rights and 
safeguards for a dignified return in line with the Recommendation.” The 
Communication outlines two areas where action is required: making national 
                                                             
40 EMN (2016). 
41 IOM has developed an integrated approach to reintegration assistance together with 
Member States and development actors with a view to offer needs-based reintegration 
assistance to returnees and communities of return, in order to ensure high quality assistance 
towards dignified return and reintegration. More info at: 
http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/DMM/AVRR/Towards-an-Integrated-
Approach-to-Reintegration.pdf  
42 European Council (2017). 
43 European Commission (2017a).  
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administrative systems and return procedures more effective, and 
overcoming the challenges of readmission.
44
 In order to tackle the former, the 
Recommendation includes a series of practical measures aimed at improving 
the return system through a more uniform implementation of the Return 
Directive by EUMS. The Renewed APR proposed increased financial 
support to EUMS (EUR 200 million in 2017) for national return efforts 
(including assisted voluntary return and reintegration programmes) as well as 
specific European return and reintegration activities. It also proposed  
improved information exchange to enforce return using the Integrated Return 
Management Application (IRMA); increased exchange of best practices to 
ensure reintegration packages are consistent among all EUMS; and  the offer 
of full support to EUMS by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
on pre-return assistance, including the strengthening of its return support unit 
and setting up commercial flight mechanisms for financing return (by June 
2017) as well as training for third country authorities on return (by October 
2017). In this context, there is concern that the Return Directive’s procedural 
safeguards will be reduced, while detention will increase. In preparation for 
the negotiations leading to the Global Compacts on Migration
45
 and 
Refugees, civil society and International Organizations are advocating for 
alternatives to detention (especially for children
46
), which they believe are 
linked to higher uptake of assisted voluntary return and reintegration 
(AVRR),
47
 as well as multidisciplinary best interest assessment in return 
decisions for unaccompanied children. The International Organisation for 
Migration’s (IOM) experience has regularly shown that the use and 
implementation of AVRR programmes has generally improved the 
cooperation and dialogue with all countries involved along the return 
spectrum and thus facilitated administrative aspects such as the provision of 
travel documents.  
The RAPR builds on the 2015 Action Plan on Return, which announced that 
EU assistance and policies should be used as incentives to stimulate the 
partner countries’ willingness to cooperate and thus increase the EU's 
leverage on readmission. This translated into the Migration Partnership 
Framework approach proposed in June 2016, which aims at achieving joint 
management of migration with countries of origin and transit, with an initial 
focus on Ethiopia, Senegal, Mali, Nigeria and Niger. Following a series of 
high level dialogues, cooperation on readmission obligations is now an 
integral part of the EU's renewed political dialogue with third countries. 
                                                             
44.Readmission is the act by a State accepting the re-entry of an individual (own national, 
third-country national or stateless person), who has been found irregularly entering or being 
present in another State. Readmission can only happen after a return decision has been made, 
in accordance with the procedural guarantees set by the Return Directive and the relevant EU 
asylum rules. 
45 IOM (2017a). 
46 OHCHR (2012). 
47 International Detention Coalition (2017). 
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While some countries of origin cooperate on the readmission of their 
nationals (e.g. Georgia), in line with their obligation under international law 
(and for ACP countries also under Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement), 
many others do not cooperate in a way that is satisfactory for the EU.  
The Directorate General on Migration and Home Affairs of the Commission 
(DG Home) and EUMS try to use tailor-made approaches, identifying the 
interest, incentives and leverages at stake with a third country in order to 
achieve targets and commitments, and to offer specific support measures – 
such as effective reintegration of returnees ‒ so as to ensure better 
management of migration. However, this approach has been widely 
criticized. Along with the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) active in 
the migration and development fields, the EP opposes aid conditionality 
dependent on partner countries cooperating on return and readmission. The 
Joint Way Forward (JWF)
48
 on migration issues between Afghanistan and the 
EU, an informal readmission arrangement, is a case in point.  The EP is 
concerned that these kinds of arrangements are being used to avoid 
democratic scrutiny of the negotiation process, the actual operationalization 
of returns, and the impact on returnees when the country is not safe, while 
institutional structures to receive and reintegrate returnees are lacking.
49
  
Migration Governance in Partnership with Africa 
Addressing the current migration challenge without jeopardising development 
policy achievements and objectives, subordinating it to foreign policy goals on 
security and migration control was one of the key issues of the revision of the 
European Consensus on Development (ECD).
50
 Specifically, the EP has 
repeatedly suggested the use of need and efficiency based criteria for the 
allocation of conditionality-free development assistance linked to migration, 
while focusing on promoting inclusion and economic opportunities, democracy 
building and good governance.
51
 In June 2017 the new ECD
52
 acknowledged 
                                                             
48.The Joint Way Forward (JWF) was signed in October 2016 after six months of dialogue 
between the EU and Afghanistan. It is a non-binding document that does not create obligations 
since it is a declaration of intent. The Commission believes that “it represents a joint political 
engagement to manage a complex phenomenon via a structured dialogue, since it has a 
comprehensive approach (facilitate return, awareness raising campaigns, reintegration 
assistance, and support to Afghan Government in breaking smuggling business model), and 
does not cover refugees but those irregular migrants without a valid claim to stay.” 
49.With the Lisbon Treaty, the EP has an essential role in the conclusion of readmission 
agreements since it has the right to veto these. The LIBE (Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs) Committee of the EP regularly calls for a detailed examination of the situation in 
the countries with which such agreements are negotiated. It demands to be informed and 
consulted regularly from the beginning of the legislative process to the actual granting of 
the mandate to the Commission by the Council. 
50 European Parliament (October 2016). 
51 European Parliament (April 2017). 
52.Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States Meeting with the Council, the European Parliament, and the European Commission (8 th 
June 2017). 
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the central role of migrants as drivers of the global economy, but most 
importantly it reiterated that short- and long-term cross-sectoral interventions, 
policies and legal frameworks that meet the needs of both migrants and host 
populations, and ensure their safety, are essential elements of migration 
management. In this area, significant steps were made at the Valletta Summit 
(November 2015), with the adoption of an ambitious action plan that would 
step up efforts to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced 
displacement. Since then, the EU has made an effort to consolidate migration 
as a key part of EU foreign policy dialogue, building on the lessons learned in 
2016, and focusing on “migration partnerships” in the political governance of 
international migration.  
 
Malta contributed €250,000 towards the EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF), 
which was divided between two specific windows: the Horn of Africa and 
North of Africa.
53
 The EUTF is funding a joint EU-IOM Initiative for 
migrant protection and reintegration in Africa along the Central 
Mediterranean migration routes covering 14 countries, including Libya.
 54
   
In addition, the Commission launched a new European External Investment 
Plan (EEIP) in September 2016, and its regulation was developed during 
2017. The EEIP will provide a long-term holistic approach to improve 
investment in Africa and the EU Neighbourhood in order to promote 
sustainable investment and tackle some of the root causes of migration. 
Ultimately, it will link financial assistance (EUR 1.5 billion), technical 
cooperation, and policy dialogue with countries of origin.  
 
Conclusions 
This article did not touch upon the creation of much-needed additional safe 
and legal pathways to the EU for persons entitled to international protection 
(as well as those seeking other forms of protection), i.e. humanitarian 
admission and private sponsorship. Clearly, it is paramount that progress is 
made on all the aspects of the CEAS. This would testify to the integrity of 
the Union Project when it comes to the protection of those not only in need 
of it, but entitled to it by the mere application of existing international law. 
The Valletta Summit between the EU and Africa was an important first step 
towards meeting migration challenges in a spirit of mutual responsibility. 
The five clusters of the Valletta Action Plan taken together presented a 
blueprint for strengthening cooperation between both continents. A balanced 
partnership with genuine co-ownership and mutual trust must consider the 
                                                                                                                                                
The ECD is in line with the Sustainable Development Agenda, which clearly recognizes the 
positive contribution of migration and mobility to inclusive growth and sustainable 
development. 
53 European Migration Network (2016). 
54 European Commission (2017d). 
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needs and interests of countries of origin, transit and destination, as well as 
the migrants themselves in order for migration governance to work. 
Increasing the legal pathways into the EU beyond the Blue Card Directive 
will be the natural next step for a European Commission and an EEAS that 
have experienced first-hand the chaotic effects of ad hoc emergency 
measures.  
On a diplomatic level, it will be essential that cooperation moves beyond the 
current focus on return and readmission and progresses further toward 
enacting shared commitments on development, mobility and protection 
issues in support of comprehensive approaches to migration governance both 
within and outside the European Union. Making aid delivery contingent on 
returns and readmission could potentially undermine efforts to address 
underlying drivers of irregular migration and forced displacement such as 
poverty and state fragility.  
As for the EU asylum reform, the CEAS package remains an urgent pending 
negotiation task. In order to make headway, the EUMS would need to 
consider the concept of solidarity not only in the context of this notion 
among EUMS, but also in relation with the global community of those 
countries hosting refugees and asylum-seekers, invoking International Law 
on responsibility-sharing
55
 as well as recalling the global commitments made 
under 2016 New York Declaration for Migrants and Refugees. Finally, 
EUMS would need to balance “solidarity in regulation” with “solidarity in 
facilitation and protection”, since the least contentious place to start is by 
ensuring a system facilitating access, reception and protection of refugees.  
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Chapter 3 
Developments in the Internal Market during Malta’s 
Presidency  
Ivan Sammut 
Introduction 
The single market, referred to in the EU treaties after the Maastricht 
amendments as the “Internal Market”, is one of Europe’s major 
achievements encompassing the so called four freedoms. It is an engine for 
building a stronger and fairer EU economy among the peoples of Europe. By 
allowing people, goods, services and capital to move more freely it opens up 
new opportunities for citizens, workers, businesses and consumers. This 
leads to the creation of jobs and growth in Europe which the EU urgently 
needs. The more integrated and deeper capital markets are the more they can 
channel more funding to companies, especially SMEs, and infrastructure 
projects. Better worker mobility allows people to move more freely where 
their skills are needed further contributing to the concept of a peoples’ 
Europe. Combatting tax evasion and tax fraud ensures that all contribute 
their fair share of tax to the EU’s coffers. This paper seeks to highlight the 
main achievements towards the evolution of the EU Internal Market during 
2017 and in particular during the six months of Malta’s presidency of the 
EU Council of Ministers between January 2017 and June 2017. The 
evolution of legislation that happens during a six-month presidency is not 
necessarily due to the direct input of the presidency itself, and hence the 
achievements or the lack of them as discussed below, should not be 
considered as a judgement on the presidency itself.  The aim of this paper is 
simply to discuss what has happened in the mentioned period rather than 
argue from a legal point of view the successes or failures of the rotating 
presidency in question.  This paper also focuses on some of the main areas 
of the Internal Market and does not seek to provide a comprehensive 
overview of all the developments that have occurred. 
The deepening of the EU’s Internal Market has been one of highest priorities 
for Malta, with the presidency pushing for more EU legislation to address 
the challenges faced by SMEs and consumers. Also high on the list was the 
end of roaming charges on mobile phones. Developing a digital internal 
market and an internal market for energy would benefit the economy, 
businesses, and families.
56
 The first part of the paper focuses on the Digital 
Single Market. Malta’s presidency gave priority to the e-commerce package 
as well as the proposed Regulation on cross-border portability of online 
content services in the internal market. Also reference is made to the 
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discussions on copyright reform.  The second part of the paper focuses on 
the work done on cooperation between the national authorities responsible 
for the enforcement of consumer protection laws with the aim of reaching a 
General Approach.  The final part of the paper covers the framework of the 
Single Market strategy and the debate to upgrade SOLVIT and the Single 
Market Information Tool which are part of the Enforcement Package 
together with the Single Digital Gateway. The above are the three main 
issues tackled during the last six months of 2017 and so the paper explores 
and discusses Malta’s contribution to the formulation of legislation in this 
field during this period.  
The diagram below shows the main objectives of the legislative 
programme for the Internal Market during the Maltese presidency in 2017 
and the progress made on this issue by all the three legislative bodies 
during this period.
57
 The data and the text for the table below is obtained 
from the Malta’s presidency’s website and from DG Markt’s website 
where it indicates the legislations’ current position at the end of 2017. The 
text on the right column is reproduced ad verbatim from DG Markt’s 
website.
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Diagram 1 - Main Objectives of the Legislative Programme of the Internal Market 
(January to June 2017) 
What was said in the Maltese pre-Presidency 
Programme 2017  
Appraisal of what was/was not Achieved 
Ending roaming charges throughout the EU, 
so that citizens can stay in touch when they 
travel; 
Achieved - Malta signed off on some of 
the easier files, already largely negotiated 
by the Slovak presidency before them. 
Agreements on ending mobile phone 
roaming charges and portability of online 
content, like Netflix subscriptions, were 
among these. They stewarded negotiations 
beefing up cooperation among consumer 
protection bodies and free public Wi-Fi to 
the finish line. 
Making progress towards ensuring that 
consumers seeking to buy products and 
services in another EU country, be it online 
or in person, are not discriminated against 
based on nationality or country of residence 
in terms of access to prices, sales or payment 
conditions (geoblocking); 
Achieved ‒ Geo-blocking is a 
discriminatory practice that prevents online 
customers from accessing and purchasing 
products or services from a website based 
in another member state.  
In order to remove this barrier, the Council 
is working with the European Parliament 
on a geo-blocking regulation. 
On 29th November 2017, EU ambassadors 
confirmed an agreement between the 
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Estonian presidency of the Council and the 
Parliament to ban unjustified geo-
blocking. This was thanks to the work 
carried out during the first half of the year.  
The draft regulation, which needs to be 
adopted by the two institutions, aims 
to remove discrimination based on:  
 Customers’ nationality 
 place of residence 
 place of establishment  
The ban on geo-blocking is an important 
element of the digital single market 
strategy.  
Once it takes effect, the geo-blocking 
regulation will supplement other landmark 
achievements such as the end of roaming 
charges for mobile phones and the 
introduction of cross-border portability for 
online subscriptions.  
Ensuring a sharper focus in EU legislation in 
addressing the challenges faced by small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by 
enabling the development of a wider range of 
funding sources through action on the Capital 
Markets Union; 
Progress was made but discussions are still 
on going. The Single Market Strategy is 
the European Commission’s plan to 
unlock the full potential of the Single 
Market. The Single Market is at the heart 
of the European project, but its benefits do 
not always materialise because Single 
Market rules are not known or 
implemented, or they are undermined by 
other barriers. So the Commission has 
decided to give the Single Market a boost 
by improving mobility for service 
providers, ensuring that innovative 
business models can flourish, making it 
easier for retailers to do business across 
borders, and enhancing access to goods 
and services throughout the EU. 
Growth and jobs remain an overarching 
priority for all EU Member States and for the 
EU as a whole. The extension in time and 
financial capacity of the European Fund for 
Strategic Investment will be a priority file 
during the Maltese Presidency to help 
mobilise private investment while making 
smart use of scarce budgetary resources; 
Progress was made but this is an on-going 
process. The European Fund for Strategic 
Investment (EFSI) is one of the three 
pillars of the Investment Plan for Europe 
and aims to overcome current market 
failures by addressing market gaps and 
mobilising private investment. It helps to 
finance strategic investments in key areas 
such as infrastructure, research and 
innovation, education, renewable energy 
and energy efficiency as well as risk 
finance for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). 
Reviewing the Energy Efficiency package 
aimed at reducing energy consumption in 
Progress was made.  On 30th November 
2016 the Commission proposed an update 
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residential buildings and industry through 
improved energy efficiency;  
to the Energy Efficiency Directive 
including a new 30% energy efficiency 
target for 2030, and measures to update the 
Directive to make sure the new target is 
met. 
Strengthening security of energy supply for 
all EU citizens, particularly in times of 
crises; 
Progress was made. On 18th May 2017 the 
European Commission, together with 14 
EU countries (Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain, and 
Sweden) signed a political declaration to 
launch the new 'Clean Energy for EU 
Islands' initiative. Aimed at accelerating the 
clean energy transition on Europe's more 
than 2,700 islands, this initiative will help 
islands reduce their dependency on energy 
imports by making better use of their own 
renewable energy sources and embracing 
more modern and innovative energy 
systems. This will help reduce energy costs 
and at the same time improve air quality 
and lower greenhouse gas emissions. 
Signed in Valetta in the margins of the 
Informal Energy Council, which brings 
together EU energy ministers, the initiative 
will provide opportunities to compare notes 
on common problems that different islands 
face, building on best practices and 
experience from pilot projects. Part of the 
scheme is also intended to make it easier to 
access new energy technologies and 
sources of funding. The initiative was 
originally announced as part of the 
Commission’s “Clean Energy for All 
Europeans” package of proposals in 
November 2016. 
 
Marking this new initiative, European 
Commissioner for Climate Action and 
Energy Miguel Arias Cañete said: "Due to 
their location, many of our islands have 
expensive oil-based energy structures 
which mean that they are still dependent on 
costly fossil fuel imports. The “Clean 
Energy for EU Islands’ initiative will help 
them to access the support, expertise and 
funding they need to go local and generate 
their own clean, low-cost energy from 
renewable sources.” 
 
The initiative will create a forum for all 
those with an interest in the clean energy 
transition on EU islands to share best 
practice and support the creation of a long-
term framework to promote funding and 
technical assistance. 
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At the meeting of the Informal Energy 
Council, ministers also looked at the 
proposal for a revised Energy Efficiency 
Directive included in the 'Clean Energy for 
All Europeans' package, including the 
Commission's proposal to move to a 
binding 30% energy efficiency target for 
the EU as a whole by 2030. 
 
The Informal Council was followed by an 
Informal High Level Meeting on Energy 
Efficiency in the Mediterranean. Ministers, 
along with representatives of the 
Commission, private sector and regional 
bodies, discussed how to increase energy 
efficiency in the Mediterranean's buildings 
and the tourism sector. 
Allowing EU consumers to continue 
enjoying their “home” subscription to Audio 
Visual online content when visiting 
another Member State; 
Progress was made. The Council agreed on 
a general approach on a draft regulation 
aimed at ensuring the cross-border 
portability of online content services in the 
internal market. 
The agreement enables the Council to start 
negotiations with the European Parliament, 
once the Parliament has set its negotiating 
position, under the ordinary legislative 
procedure. 
The president of the Council and minister 
for economic affairs of the Netherlands, 
Henk Kamp, made the following 
comments: “This initiative will make life 
easier for European citizens when they 
travel, by allowing them to keep accessing 
online content they have legally acquired or 
subscribed to in their home member state 
when they are temporarily in another 
member state. This means that citizens who 
are in another member state for purposes 
such as holidays or business trips can enjoy 
for example music, films, games or 
sporting events just like at home”. 
Reassigning the high speed 700 MHz band 
(694-790 MHz) currently used for digital 
television broadcasting and wireless 
microphones, to wireless broadband services, 
thus allowing this band to be used for 5G; 
Progress was made on what has started 
during the previous Slovak Presidency. 
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The Digital Single Market 
The internet and digital technologies are transforming our world as we know 
it, but existing barriers online mean citizens miss out on goods and services, 
internet companies and start-ups have their horizons limited, and businesses 
and governments cannot fully benefit from digital tools. The EU’s Internal 
Market’s legislative framework as explained in the opening paragraph of this 
paper has to be improved to make it fit for the digital age – tearing down 
regulatory walls and moving from twenty-eight national markets to a single 
one. This could contribute €415 billion per year to our economy and create 
hundreds of thousands of new jobs.
59
 
One of the objectives of the EU throughout 2017 and beyond is to boost e-
commerce by tackling geo-blocking and making cross-border parcel delivery 
more affordable and efficient. The proposed regulation on geo-blocking has 
an objective to provide more opportunities to customers. It addresses the 
problem of customers not being able to buy products and services from 
traders located in a different Member State, or being discriminated against in 
accessing the best prices or sales conditions compared to nationals or 
residents. This shows how the current existing legal framework is not 
sufficient to cater for e-business. The EU’s Commission seeks to modernise 
copyright rules to fit the digital age as a well as update EU audio-visual rules 
and work platforms to create a fairer environment for everyone, promote 
European films, protect children and tackle hate speech.
60
 
The e-commerce package is composed of legislative proposals to address 
unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality, residence or establishment. There is also a legislative proposal 
on cross-border parcel delivery services to increase the transparency of 
prices and improve regulatory oversight. The package also includes a 
legislative proposal to strengthen enforcement of consumers’ rights and 
guidance to clarify, among others, what qualifies as an unfair commercial 
practice in the digital world. The proposed regulation on geo-blocking 
intends to provide more opportunities to customers. It addresses the problem 
of customers being stopped from buying products and services from traders 
located in a different Member State, or being discriminated in accessing the 
best prices or sales conditions compared to nationals or residents. Online 
sales of products are growing by 22% per year.  The main elements of the 
proposal include the sale of products and services, access to websites, and 
non-discrimination in payments. 
High prices and the inconvenience of cross-border parcel delivery plus 
different legislation in Member States are one of the biggest obstacles for 
consumers and retailers who would like to buy and sell online across the EU. 
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The regulation proposed by the Commission on 25
th
 May 2016 will increase 
price transparency and regulatory oversight of cross-border parcel delivery 
services. This means that consumers and retailers can benefit from 
affordable deliveries and convenient return options even to and from 
peripheral regions. The main elements of the proposal include increased 
regulatory oversight of all parcel delivery services providers and price 
transparency through the publication of domestic and cross-border prices for 
a set of basic services. There is also the requirement of universal service 
providers to offer transparent and non-discriminatory third party access to 
multilateral cross-border agreements in the EU.
61
 
In line with the above proposals the Commission also proposes a review of 
the Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) Regulation. This is intended to 
give more powers to national authorities to better enforce consumer rights. 
Relevant authorities will be able to check if websites geo-block consumers 
or offer after-sales conditions not respecting EU rules (e.g. withdrawal 
rights) as well as order the immediate take-down of websites hosting scams. 
The Proposal wants to empower national authorities to request information 
from domain registrars and banks to detect the identity of the responsible 
trader. The Commission is also publishing updated guidelines on unfair 
commercial practices. This is intended to respond to the challenges 
presented by the digital world. The revised guidance also incorporates two 
sets of self-regulatory principles agreed among stakeholders. For the geo-
blocking proposal to deliver its intended benefits, enforcement is needed. 
Once adopted, the proposal on geo-blocking would be enforced by the 
consumer protection authorities in the framework of the CPC Regulation 
regulating business-to-consumer transactions.
62
 
Another important development is the scaling up of Europe’s response to 
cyber-attacks by strengthening ENISA ‒ the EU cybersecurity agency. This 
is complemented by creating an effective EU cyber deterrence and criminal 
law response to better protect Europe's citizens, businesses and public 
institutions.
63
 ENISA is the European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security and it has a key role to play but is constrained by its 
current mandate. The Commission presents an ambitious reform proposal, 
including a permanent mandate for the agency to ensure that it can provide 
support to Member States, EU institutions and businesses in key areas, 
including the implementation of the NIS Directive. It will also contribute to 
stepping up both operational cooperation and crisis management across the 
EU.
64
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The growth of the EU cybersecurity market in terms of products, services 
and processes is held back in a number of ways, but most of all because of 
the lack of a cybersecurity certification scheme recognized across the EU. 
The Commission is therefore putting forward a proposal to set up an EU 
certification framework with ENISA at its heart. A joint Commission-
industry initiative will also be launched to define a “duty of care” principle 
to reduce product and software vulnerabilities and promote a “security by 
design” approach for all connected devices. 
Another important development deals with the NIS directive. It is necessary 
to swiftly implement the NIS directive (Directive on security of network and 
information systems), adopted in July 2016. This is facilitated thanks to the 
Commission’s guidance on how the Directive should operate in practice and 
additional interpretation of specific provisions included in the September 
2017 package.
65
 
Other initiatives seek to unlock the potential of a European data economy 
with a framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the EU. This 
ensures that everyone in the EU has the best possible internet connection, so 
they can fully engage in the digital economy, the so-called “connectivity for 
a European gigabit society”. This is complemented by the adaptation of e-
Privacy rules to the new digital environment. This helps SMEs, researchers, 
citizens and public authorities to make the most of new technologies by 
ensuring that everyone has the necessary digital skills, and by funding EU 
research in health and high performance computing. 
During the Maltese Presidency, in June 2017 a Digital Assembly 2017 was 
held.  The key priorities discussed were: a) Data economy; b) New digital 
opportunities; c).Cybersecurity and Internet of Things; and d) Digital 
transformation. One of the matters discussed was e-Privacy. The e-Privacy 
Directive and the General Data Protection Regulation provide the legal 
framework to ensure digital privacy for EU citizens. The European 
Commission has reviewed the Directive to align it with the new data 
protection rules.  Common EU rules have been established to ensure that 
personal data enjoy a high standard of protection everywhere in the EU. 
Currently, one can mention two main pillars of the data protection legal 
framework in the EU are the e-Privacy Directive (Directive on Privacy and 
Electronic communications), and the General Data Protection Regulation, 
adopted in May 2016.   
The EU General Data Protection Regulation ensures that personal data can 
only be gathered under strict conditions and for legitimate purposes. Bodies 
and authorities that collect and manage one’s personal information must also 
protect it from misuse and respect certain rights.  The e-Privacy Directive 
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builds on the EU telecoms and data protection frameworks to ensure that all 
communications over public networks maintain respect for fundamental 
rights, in particular a high level of data protection and of privacy, regardless 
of the technology used. The European Commission adopted a proposal for a 
Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications to replace the 2009 
Directive on 10
th
 January 2017. 
The e-Privacy Directive requires Member States to ensure that users grant 
their consent before cookies are stored and accessed in computers, 
smartphones or other device connected to the Internet. The draft 
Regulation introduces the concept of “privacy by design” whereby users 
opt for a higher or lower level of privacy. Telecom operators and Internet 
Service Providers possess a huge amount of customers’ data, which must 
be kept confidential and secure. Sometimes sensible information can be 
stolen or lost, or illegally accessed so the e-Privacy Directive ensures that 
the provider reports any “personal data breach” to the national authority 
and informs the subscriber or individual directly of any risk related to 
personal data or privacy. No specific provisions on personal data breaches 
are included in the draft Regulation. One needs to rely on the relevant 
provisions of the General Data Protection Regulation.  
Another initiative discussed during the June 2017 Valletta Conference was 
the European Commission wish to promote free Wi-Fi connectivity for 
citizens and visitors in public spaces such as parks, squares, and do on. The 
idea is to have Wi-Fi everywhere in Europe through WiFi4EU.  Other 
discussions focused on the Next Generation Internet, International 
connectivity, the Digital Single Market mid-term review, the European 
Broadband Fund and Data economy. 
Enforcing Consumer Laws 
During Malta’s presidency of the Council of the EU, a boost was given to the 
Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) which is a network of authorities 
responsible for enforcing EU consumer protection laws in EU and EEA 
countries. It allows any authority in a country where consumers' rights are being 
violated, to ask its counterpart in the country where the trader is based to take 
action to stop a breach of law. The Consumer Protection Cooperation (CPC) 
Regulation sets a list of minimum powers which each authority must have to 
ensure smooth cooperation. These include power to obtain the information and 
evidence needed to: a) tackle infringements within the EU; b) conduct on-site 
inspections; c) require cessation or prohibition of infringements committed 
within the EU; and d) obtain from traders’ undertakings. Authorities can also 
alert each other to malpractices that could spread to other countries. With the 
Commission's support, they can also coordinate their approaches in the 
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application of consumer protection law to tackle widespread 
infringements.
66
 
On 25
th
 May 2016, the European Commission launched a proposal for the 
reform of the Consumer Protection Cooperation. The reform addresses the 
need to better enforce EU consumer legislation, especially in the fast 
evolving digital sphere. During 2017, progress was made in this regard. 
Enforcement authorities will get the powers they need to work together in 
a quicker and more efficient manner. They will be able to request 
information from domain registrars and banks to detect the identity of the 
responsible trader. They can also carry out mystery shopping to check 
geographical discrimination or after-sales conditions, and order the immediate 
take-down of websites that host scams. The Commission will eventually be 
able to launch and coordinate common action by consumer protection 
authorities in the Member States to address EU-wide problematic practices. A 
one-stop-shop approach to consumer law is being proposed. Enforcement 
authorities in the Member States will notify the businesses concerned of the 
issues, asking them to change their bad practices.
67
  
To detect market problems earlier, organizations with an interest in 
consumer protection such as consumer organizations and European 
Consumer Centres will be able to signal bad cross-borders practice to 
enforcers and to the European Commission. Finally, one can mention the list 
of laws to which this modernized framework applies. This will be updated to 
ensure that all the relevant consumer protection rules are included, 
especially in the transport and retail financial services sectors. The 
Commission’s proposal is being discussed by the European Parliament and 
Council and this was an important objective during both the Maltese and 
Estonian presidencies during 2017. 
The reform addresses the need to better enforce EU consumer legislation, 
especially in the fast evolving digital sphere. Enforcement authorities will 
get the powers they need to work together in a quicker and more efficient 
manner. The new shared enforcement approach, first applied to the in-app 
purchases initiative launched by the CPC and coordinated by the 
Commission in 2014, has also been used to resolve problems encountered by 
consumers when renting a car (2016). In 2017/2018, the focus is on social 
media operators requesting them to modify terms that appear to infringe 
consumer law and create a mechanism for removing frauds and scams 
misleading consumers. An E-enforcement academy was set up to boost the 
CPC and product safety networks' ability to conduct online investigations. 
The CPC projects have used the CPC knowledge exchange platform, an IT 
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tool developed in 2014-2015, to support collaborative work and share results 
with the wider CPC network.
68
  
The Single Market Strategy 
The Single Market Strategy is the European Commission’s plan to unlock 
the full potential of the Single Market called the Internal Market by the 
Maastricht amendment. Efforts are already underway to improve companies’ 
access to private finance through the Investment Plan and the Capital Market 
Union. The Commission is bringing forward proposals to create a European 
venture capital fund-of-funds supported by the EU budget and open to others 
to attract private capital. The Commission will also simplify VAT 
regulations, reduce the cost of company registration and put forward a 
proposal on insolvency to give a second chance to entrepreneurs who 
become insolvent.  
Information on regulatory requirements can be accessible through a simple 
digital gateway. It has also been suggested for the Commission to push for 
high quality, online public services, to reduce the administrative burden and 
make Europe a more attractive destination for innovators. The Commission 
should also work on clear and SME-friendly intellectual property rules. The 
Commission should also take the final steps needed for the unitary patent to 
become an attractive and affordable way for European companies, including 
SMEs, to capitalize on their ideas.
69
 Unitary Patents will make it possible to 
get patent protection in the EU Member States by submitting a single request 
to the EPO, making the procedure simpler and more cost effective for 
applicants. 
The Commission wants to be able to take legislative and enforcement 
actions in order to ensure that consumers seeking to buy services or products 
in another EU country do not face differing prices, sales conditions or 
delivery options, unless this is justified by verifiable reasons. Without this 
the Internal Market cannot function properly. This applies to purchases both 
online and in person. The approach is similar to the geo-blocking initiative 
in the Digital Single Market Strategy and is part of the approach to further 
increase fairness in the Single Market.  
To speed up investment and avoid protracted litigation, the Commission 
intends to help EU Member States with a voluntary, ex-ante assessment 
mechanism of the procurement aspects of certain large-scale infrastructure 
projects. The Commission seeks to promote networking between first 
instance review bodies and provide legal and technical assistance to the EU 
member states to set up fast and fair remedy bodies. The Commission and 
the Member States working together want to establish contract registers 
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covering the life cycle of contracts. This improves the transparency and the 
quality of national procurement systems, and support the development of a 
data analytics and anomaly-detection tool. The Commission supported by 
the Council also intends to push through the final steps to make the unitary 
patent a reality and clarify how it will interact with national patents and 
national supplementary protection certificates. As already announced in the 
Digital Single Market Strategy, the Commission will seek to review the 
enforcement of EU intellectual property rules (IPRs).
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Despite the overall success of the Internal Market, significant obstacles 
remain for citizens and businesses to make the most of it. EU citizens 
interested in moving to another Member State and businesses wanting to sell 
products or provide services across borders still encounter problems. 
Currently, people and companies wanting to live, work or do business in 
another EU country find it difficult to find online the information they need 
to meet local requirements which remain different in each Member State and 
hence a daily reminder that the economic union is far from complete in 
practice. Even when existing national and EU services offer information and 
assistance, it is fragmented, incomplete and of uneven quality.  Procedures 
that are online in some member states are not accessible to users from 
another member state. As a result, users cannot exercise their rights in the 
same way as locals. 
Another reason why many of the opportunities offered by the Internal Market 
are not realized is caused by the lack of enforcement or implementation of EU 
law. In mid-2015, around 1,090 infringement proceedings were pending. Non-
compliance weakens the Single Market’s potential and lowers citizens’ 
confidence in it. Enforcement of the Single Market includes national authorities 
ensuring that products are safe and compliant with the rules. There are still too 
many unsafe and non-compliant products sold in the EU market, which puts 
compliant businesses at a disadvantage and endangers consumers. In several 
areas, the principle of mutual recognition which ensures that goods that are 
lawfully marketed in one EU country enjoy the right to free movement and can 
be sold in another EU country, is not being applied. This prevents companies, 
especially SMEs, from selling their products elsewhere in the EU.
71
  
The Commission with the support of the Council is taking important steps to 
encourage a culture of good governance, compliance and enforcement by 
improving services and assistance for citizens and businesses interested in 
grasping the opportunities available in the biggest market in the world. In May 
2017, the Commission adopted a package of measures to make it easier for 
                                                             
70 Ibid. 
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people and companies wanting to work, live or do business in another EU 
country, and to help ensure that commonly agreed EU rules are respected.
72
  
The Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation to establish a Single 
Digital Gateway. This initiative will make it easier for anyone interested in 
living, working or doing business in another EU country to find information 
about rules, procedures and assistance services, and also access national 
procedures through one user-friendly interface in a language they can 
understand. Feedback on the service will be used to constantly improve it. 
This will save citizens and businesses considerable time and money. To this 
one can add the proposal for the Single Market Information Tool (SMIT), 
which will allow the Commission to obtain, in clearly framed cases, timely, 
comprehensive and reliable information from selected market players in 
specific instances, and as a last resort, where there are indications of serious 
difficulties with the application of EU Single Market legislation. The 
information is to be handled subject to strict confidentiality requirements.
73
 
Conclusion 
It is difficult to gauge the legislative success of a presidency of the Council 
of the EU for EU legislation is not its sole domain but requires an equal 
input from both the European Commission and the European Parliament. 
More than this, it is not just a six-month effort but a continuous effort by all 
the three legislative institutions to achieve a better legal framework for the 
better functioning of the EU’s Internal Market. From the above one can see 
that more or less, 2017 and the Maltese presidency for the first part of the 
year achieved a number of pre-established goals and progress was made in 
the legislative framework of the EU’s Internal Market.  Naturally, more 
progress is needed, but one can say that the main achievements towards the 
evolution of the EU Internal Market during 2017 and in particular during the 
six months of Malta’s presidency of the EU Council of Ministers between 
January 2017 and June 2017 were satisfactory. 
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Chapter 4 
Geo-Blocking in the European Union and the Maltese 
Presidency  
Claire Ciantar 
Introduction 
The Single Market is at the core of the European Union’s (EU) integration 
and economic structure, and can be billed as one of the greatest achievements 
of post-war Europe. Since its establishment in 1992, the Single Market has 
guaranteed the free movement of goods, people, services and capital. Over 
the years, a number of changes have been introduced to facilitate these 
freedoms even more, allowing consumers and traders to buy and sell freely 
within the Single Market. 
The Single Market has broadened the opportunities for consumers to have 
wider choice to goods and services across the EU. Consumer choice was 
further strengthened with the creation of the Internet. More than 250 million 
Europeans make daily use of the Internet among which 66% of these Internet 
users ordered goods and services online during the period of 2017.
74
 As a 
result of this, the digital economy is growing seven times as fast as the rest of 
the economy with much of this growth being fuelled by the Internet.     
Seeing this success, the EU saw the need to create a Digital Single Market ‒ an 
area where free movement of goods and services is also ensured in the digital 
world. This allows access to online activities under fair competition irrespective 
of the country of residence of the consumer.
75
 The intention of the EU in 
promoting the Digital Single Market was to bring more benefits to the EU by 
ensuring its position as a global leader in the digital economy, and providing 
help for businesses in the EU to grow and succeed worldwide.
76
  
This article sets out to explore the phenomenon of geo-blocking practices in 
the EU’s e-Commerce sector. It will seek insight into how these practices are 
actually impacting the EU’s small Member States. It will analyse the action 
taken by the European Commission (CION) in ending unjustified geo-
blocking practices through its adoption of a geo-blocking proposal. Since this 
proposal was mainly discussed during the Maltese Presidency of the Council, 
this article will assess the work undertaken by the Maltese Presidency during 
its mandate of the Presidency of the Council in 2017.   
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Statement of the Problem 
The Internet has created new opportunities for international trade.
77
 
Irrespectively, consumers are still faced with barriers that prevent them from 
buying goods and services using the online world. This is the case when 
traders refuse to sell goods online to consumers residing in another country, 
or decide to change prices depending on the country where consumers reside. 
This is usually implemented by using a consumer’s Internet Protocol (IP) 
address that provides a rough indication of the consumer’s location whenever 
connecting to the Internet. Thus traders can decide to block consumers from 
freely accessing online goods and services.  Such territorial limitations are 
known as geo-blocking and contribute to the Single Market’s fragmentation; 
Geo-blocking is defined by Kra-Oz “as limiting the user’s access to digital 
content, by the content distributor, based on the user’s geographical 
location.”78 In practice, geo-blocking segments consumers on the basis of 
their residential location through the recognition of their IP address. 
In its Digital Single Market Strategy, the CION made a distinction between 
what it described as “unjustified” and “justified” geo-blocking. According to 
the CION, geo-blocking can “sometimes” be justified, especially when 
traders have to comply with particular legal obligations. However, the CION 
emphasises that “in many cases online geo-blocking is not justified”. The 
practice of geo-blocking is mostly common in situations where traders apply 
higher prices or different conditions to consumers depending on their place 
of residence. As a consequence, such a practice deprives consumers from 
having access to the best offers, thus discriminating against them in an 
unjustified manner.
79
  
The digital content referred to earlier by Kra-Oz can be of many types, 
including audio-visual, software, portability of content, or e-Commerce. The 
most common form of unjustified geo-blocking occurs in the latter, which 
involves the practice of using electronic means to do business.
80
 As defined 
by the CION, the geo-blocking practice in e-Commerce can occur in three 
forms, namely:
81
  
 Denial of the right to conclude a contract by electronic means via a 
website;  
 Redirecting (re-routing) to other websites of the same commercial 
organization; or  
 Automatic adjustment of the offered transaction terms (including 
prices) depending on the consumer’s location.   
                                                             
77 Kommerskollegium (2012) p. 1.  
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79 European Commission (2016a) p. 2-3.  
80 Chaffey, D. (2007) p. XIV  
81 European Commission (2015) p. 21.   
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Therefore, in order to provide a more focused and coherent study, this article will 
focus on geo-blocking within the context of unjustified practices in the e-
Commerce sector.  
This article will also look at unjustified geo-blocking practices from an EU-
level perspective mainly focusing on the work done on geo-blocking by the 
2017 Maltese Presidency of the Council of the EU. The Maltese Presidency 
had six main priorities on its agenda with the second priority focusing on the 
Single Market. The aim was to work to “fully exploit the Single Market and 
develop the Digital Single Market ... and improving protection and access to 
services for consumers.”82 A number of concrete objectives fell within this 
second priority, with one concrete objectives solely focusing on “making 
progress towards ensuring that consumers seeking to buy products and 
services in another EU country, be it online or in person, are not 
discriminated against based on nationality or country of residency in terms of 
access to prices, sales or payment conditions (geo-blocking).”83  
Digital Globalisation vs. Geo-graphical Filtering  
The Internet has connected the world more than ever before.
84
 As explained 
by Berners-Lee et al. the Internet has managed to create a powerful new tool 
for humanity that facilitates the finding, integration and sharing of 
information.
85
 This increase in integration of flows of data and information is 
defined by Lund and Manyika as digital globalisation.
86
 While digital 
globalisation may be seen as an opportunity to develop an integrated digital 
world, Crenshaw and Robison point out that digital globalisation is 
threatened by various obstacles. Such obstacles include the requirements of 
data localisation, market restrictions, and geographical discrimination. This 
may threaten the disruption of the flow of data globally, thus leading to an 
increase in costs for business and consequently consumer harm.
87
  
The impact of digital globalisation on businesses and on consumers is of 
major importance since consumer use of the Internet is growing 
substantially.
88
 Consumers are nowadays searching for and buying goods and 
services online from businesses operating across borders. According to 
Meltzer, this is providing traders with the possibility of selling goods online, 
participating in international trade and becoming involved within the global 
economy in new ways.
89
 However Zittrain and Palfrey point out that the rise 
                                                             
82 Government of Malta (2016) p. 3.  
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85 Berners-Lee, T. et al. (2006) p. 769. 
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87 Crenshaw, E. and Robison, K. (2006) p. 191.   
88 Meltzer, J. (2016) p. 6.   
89 Meltzer, J. (2015) p. 97.   
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of digital globalisation “puts pressure on the strategy of control”.90 This 
refers to the idea of controlling the information environment within the 
borders of different countries.
91
 This therefore creates complexity among 
different geographically-situated countries, traders and consumers, resulting 
primarily in the blocking of access to information as the basic form of 
control.
92
  
Blocking access to information over the Internet by enabling distributers to 
correctly identify the geographical location of Internet users with great 
accuracy, is defined by various scholars as geographical filtering. This is 
usually achieved through the filtering of Internet traffic over a proxy server.
93
 
It can be argued that geographical filtering is contradictory to the concept of 
digital globalisation as it primarily blocks the integration of flows of data and 
information. This therefore acts as a barrier to the widening of digital 
globalisation.  
Geographical filtering was initially created in order to enhance security, to 
tailor advertising based on the customer’s location, or to provide the best 
suited content for consumers.
94
 However, today geographical filtering has 
become more complex and has led to the creation of barriers in an “otherwise 
borderless environment”.95 Therefore, this has created a situation where 
whenever users try to access a geographically filtered site, their access is 
denied.
96
  
This geo-blocking situation is even more relevant in the Single Market since 
the Single Market’s main aim is to remove barriers to the movement of 
services, goods, labour and capital amongst all EU Member States.
97
 Thus, 
Pelkmans points out that, regardless of the Single Market’s aim of creating a 
community with no borders and barriers, the problem of market segmentation 
created by geo-blocking is still acting as an obstacle for online traders and 
consumers to practise the freedoms of goods and services.
98
 As a result, 
Bauer and Erixon emphasise how geo-blocking is leaving a negative impact 
on the EU as it is creating “fragmentation” within the whole Union which 
goes beyond the Single Market’s main aim.99  
                                                             
90 Zittrain, J. and Palfrey, P. (2008) p. 32.  
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92 Kerr, J. (2014) p. 4.   
93.This refers to a server that clients connect to in order to request some kind of service 
including web page and connection.  
94 Young, B. (2014) p. 2.  
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In their technical report, Duch-Brown and Martens examine the impact
100
 of 
removing geo-blocking restrictions in the EU and conclude that both 
consumers and traders are being impacted negatively by geo-blocking, and 
both would gain if these restrictions were removed. The report also points out 
that small Member States suffer the most from geo-blocking as consumer 
choice is limited in such countries and price competition is lower due to the 
limited size in market. Therefore the removal of geo-blocking restrictions 
would be of particular benefit to small EU Member States.
101
   
The Impact of Geo-Blocking on EU Member States 
This research was conducted in order examine the impact of geo-blocking 
practices on consumers purchasing goods and services in other Member 
States. It sought insight into how these practices are actually impacting the 
EU’s small Member States with particular focus on Malta. In order to have a 
comprehensive understanding of this argument, Malta’s case study will be 
seen in the light of other small EU Member States by comparing the impact 
that geo-blocking is having on countries like Cyprus, Luxembourg and 
Slovenia. Cyprus is a small island similar to Malta and is geographically 
situated away from the larger Member States on the periphery of the EU. 
Comparison with Cyprus will therefore help the researcher establish any 
similarities between the two countries since they both have similar 
characteristics given the size of their population,
102
 geographical position, 
and that both are islands. On the other hand, while Luxembourg is considered 
as a small State,
103
 it is surrounded by some of the large EU Member States, 
thus creating a contrast between Malta, which is geographically more distant 
from most of the larger Member States. Finally, Slovenia provides an 
interesting comparison since its population
104
 is larger than the other 
mentioned Member States but it still seems to be highly impacted by geo-
blocking.
105
 
                                                             
100.Duch-Brown and Martens used a database on sales of four electronics products 
(smartphones, tablets, laptops and desktop computers) in 10 EU countries. The database 
contained information on prices, sales volumes and product characteristics. They firstly 
estimated a consumer demand model with product differentiation to capture preferences and 
substitution patterns. They secondly added an oligopolistic supply side to recover marginal 
costs and profits. They thirdly performed a series of simulations to analyse the equilibrium 
described by the data and some counterfactuals where they recreated a world without geo-
blocking. They fourthly computed the welfare effects of removing geo-blocking in terms of 
consumer and producer surplus. They finally extrapolated the results of these four product 
categories to all e-commerce and the 28 EU states. 
101 Duch-Brown, N. and Martens, B. (2016) p. 18. 
102 Cyprus has a population of 1.17 million inhabitants.  
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practices in e-Commerce, 63% of EU traders do not sell cross-border in at least one product 
category in Slovenia. 
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The research was based on a qualitative case study structure and adopted an 
inductive approach. This study generated primary data from twelve semi-
structured interviews conducted with selected international and local trade 
and consumer organisations. The interview sample consisted of seven 
consumer organisations and four trader organisations from local, other 
Member States and EU wide representative bodies, and one Member of the 
European Parliament currently involved in the European Parliament 
Committee tackling geo-blocking (IMCO Committee). Most of the 
interviewed persons participating in this study were directors, legal officers 
or heads of policy. The local trade sector was represented by the Malta 
Business Bureau (MBB), Malta Chamber of Commerce, Enterprise and 
Industry and the Malta Communications Authority (MCA), while the EU 
business sector was represented by European e-Commerce and Omni-
Channel Trade Association (EMOTA). On the other hand, the local 
consumer sector was represented by the European Consumer Centre, 
Consumers’ Association, and Malta Competition and Consumer Affairs 
Authority (MCCAA), while the EU consumer sector was represented by the 
Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC), Union 
Luxembourgeoise des Consommateurs (ULC), Cyprus Consumers’ 
Association (CCA) and Slovene Consumer’s Association (SCA). The study 
also made use of secondary sources which complemented the data generated 
from the interviews.  
Through the conducted research, a number of views emerged on the impact 
of geo-blocking on EU Member States.  In the first instance it was noted how 
the idea of having a completely integrated Single Market must first be 
completely supported by the individual EU Member States, since one cannot 
expect the removal of geo-blocking practices if Member States do not 
perceive the importance of having a unified Single Market.  
This geo-blocking situation is especially present in Malta. According to the 
2015 Eurostat data, 44% of Maltese consumers made cross-border 
transactions over the Internet. This is a relatively high rate of online 
purchases when compared to the rate of larger EU Member States such as 
Italy (11%), Germany (13%) and France (21%).
106
 However, even though 
Malta is ranked as the country with the second highest number of purchases 
of goods over the Internet, interviewees reported that geo-blocking is having 
a big impact on Maltese consumers. Seeing this situation at a local level, the 
Maltese Presidency saw the need to focus on geo-blocking as one of its main 
priority objectives.    
This issue is even more challenging when looking at it from a trader’s 
perspective. Contrary to what consumer organisations believe, trader 
organisations seem to view geo-blocking practice as an unimportant situation 
                                                             
106 European Commission (2016b) p. 8.  
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that barely impacts consumers in Malta. So who is actually correct? The 
reality attests that, according to the study held by the European Parliament’s 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) Committee on 
“Combating Consumer Discrimination in the Digital Single Market”, Malta 
is classified as one of the countries mostly affected by geo-blocking 
practices. According to this study, more than 30% of Maltese consumers 
were exposed to geo-blocking practices in 2016.
107
 This obviously questions 
the views expressed by trader organisations, as it can be clearly affirmed that 
the geo-blocking situation in Malta is not mere “hype”, but is actually a 
reality that needs to be tackled in short order.  
One can argue with some conviction that a similar situation does exist in 
other small Member States. This situation in Malta can be compared to other 
‘small’ countries within the EU that are also negatively impacted by geo-
blocking. Luxembourg tops the list of most online purchases made out of all 
EU countries with 68% of individuals making cross-border purchases over 
the Internet. Conversely, although the study’s interviewees emphasised the 
importance of e-Commerce in both Cyprus and Slovenia, the Eurostat survey 
showed that only 20% and 17% of Cypriots and Slovenes respectively 
purchase cross-border over the Internet.
108
 Additionally Luxembourg, 
Slovenia and Cyprus are also ranked amongst the Member States most 
impacted by geo-blocking practices
109
 with Slovenia and Cyprus having a 
low rate of cross-border purchases. In such situations, Cypriot and Slovene 
consumers may be reluctant to buy online goods because of the constant 
geographical blocking in their regard.  
So why are small Member States mostly impacted by geo-blocking 
practices? Small Member States are generally the countries suffering from 
less choice and limited internal demand, which makes these states less 
attractive for traders operating from other Member States.
110
 Considering 
this, interviewees mentioned two main reasons why small Member States are 
mostly impacted by geo-blocking, namely, small market size of a state, 
coupled with the periphery location of the state.   
The “small and periphery state syndrome” is the most obvious, yet more 
complex issue that small States are constantly facing. Panke explains how 
small States face “structural disadvantages” when compared to the larger 
                                                             
107.http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/587315/IPOL_STU(2016)58731
5_EN.pdf Simonelli, F. (2016) p. 14. 
   
108 European Commission (2016b) p. 8.  
109.http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/587315/IPOL_STU(2016)58731
5_EN.pdf Simonelli, F. (2016) p. 14. 
110.Ibid. 
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States due to limited financial and economic capacities.
111
 It therefore comes 
as no surprise that geo-blocking practices affect “consumers from smaller 
and peripheral Member States to a greater extent”.112 Island states, in 
particular, face this problem to a greater degree since such countries have no 
land borders and traders have to cope with greater logistical issues. 
Interestingly, however, this study notes how interviewees had two 
contrasting views as to why they believe their countries are being faced with 
geo-blocking. On one hand, the interviewees from Malta and Cyprus blame 
the size of their country and their peripheral isolation with no land borders 
for complicating the situation for traders from other Member States selling 
goods in these countries. On the other hand, because Slovenia
113
 and 
Luxembourg are practically land-locked countries surrounded by larger 
Member States, it is more viable for traders to sell goods and services 
elsewhere. This contradictory situation leads to the conclusion that the 
peripheral positioning of a country is not the real cause of geo-blocking, but 
rather the smallness of the state embeds the true problem.         
This argument tied to the small size of a country can thus contribute to other 
aspects that are conducive to geo-blocking in so far as small Member States 
are concerned. A small country will most likely have a small domestic 
market when compared to larger States, which makes it impossible to benefit 
from economies of scale.
114
 This will create a situation of higher unit cost of 
goods and services when compared to the bigger Member States. 
Additionally, the small size of a country’s domestic market will also 
constrain competition. Due to their small domestic markets, a number of 
these countries are generally “undiversified in their production”.115 Therefore 
traders might not see any potential in a small State but instead opt for selling 
goods cross-border to larger Member States.  
The study has therefore concluded that small Member States are the countries 
mostly impacted by geo-blocking practices. This problem has been reflected 
in the Maltese Presidency’s decision to focus on geo-blocking as one of its 
main priorities.  
 
 
                                                             
111 Panke D (2008) p. 3-5.    
112Simonelli, F. (2016) 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/587315/IPOL_ 
STU(2016)587315_EN.pdf p. 14. 
113 Slovenia has a small coastline but otherwise has land borders with Austria, Croatia, Italy 
and Hungary.  
114.This occurs when more units of goods and services are produced on a bigger scale with less 
costs of input. 
115 Commonwealth/World Bank (2000) p. 11.  
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Geo-Blocking Proposal and Discussions during the Maltese Presidency 
Efforts have been made by various Member States to raise consumer 
awareness on price discrimination and geo-blocking practices.
116
 However up 
to the date of the writing of this article, no Member State has changed its 
national rules and practices as a follow-up to these efforts. Additionally, all 
interviewees claimed that no national legislation tackling geo-blocking 
practices has been put into place in Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia or Luxembourg. 
However, according to CION, Malta is the only country out of all the 
Member States that has issued its own guidance on discrimination. 
Nevertheless, this has not had any noticeable results. The CION therefore 
decided to act in order to end unjustified geo-blocking practices and 
ultimately eliminate discrimination amongst EU consumers. 
Regardless of the present non-discrimination principle in Article 20(2) of the 
Services Directive,
117
 European consumers are still facing different 
conditions when buying goods or services over the Internet. Therefore, on the 
25
th 
May 2016, the CION launched a proposal on addressing geo-blocking in 
the EU.
118
 This proposal aims at prohibiting “the blocking of access to 
websites and other online interfaces and the rerouting of customers from one 
country version to another”.119 The proposal, however, does not address 
pricing, since traders are left at liberty to set their own prices.  
Discussions on this draft Regulation were initiated during the 2016 second 
rotation of the Presidency of the Council of the EU led by the Slovak 
Presidency. By the end of 2016, the Council had adopted its negotiating 
position on the draft Regulation. This dossier was then taken on by the 
Maltese Presidency during the first half-year mandate of the Presidency of 
the Council in 2017. During this period, the Maltese Presidency prioritised 
this dossier and aimed at finalising negotiations on the geo-blocking 
proposal. 
Considering that geo-blocking became one of the most debatable topics of 
the CION’s Digital Single Market initiative, this was not an easy task for the 
Maltese Presidency. Although progress moved fast, a final agreement could 
not be reached by the Council and the European Parliament on the final text 
of the draft Regulation by the end of the Maltese Presidency. Thus, the 
Council and the Parliament resumed trilogue negotiations under the Estonian 
Presidency.  On 29
th
 November 2017, the EU Member States approved the 
informal agreement reached by the Council and the European Parliament on 
the final text of the regulation.  
                                                             
116 European Commission (2016a) p. 22.  
117.Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12th December 
2006 on services in the internal market. 
118 European Commission (2016c). 
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Several points of disagreement arose between the European Parliament and 
the Council during the Maltese Presidency term. The first main disagreement 
was related to the inclusion of the scope of non-audio-visual copyright 
related services in the draft Regulation, such as music streaming and e-books. 
The CION’s proposed draft Regulation did not include audio-visual and 
electronic communications services; however, there was no unanimity on 
some of the proposals contained in this draft Regulation. Hence, the 
European Parliament, on one hand, was in favour of the inclusion of non-
audio-visual copyright related services, while on the other hand, the Council 
was insisting on not factoring these services within the scope of the draft 
Regulation.  
The second major disagreement was related to the relationship of the draft 
Regulation with competition law. While the European Parliament wanted the 
draft Regulation to take priority over selective distribution agreements,
120
 the 
Council wanted competition rules to take precedence. These disagreements 
prolonged the process of achieving an agreement and finalising the draft 
Regulation. Therefore, the Maltese Presidency did not fulfil its aim of 
finalising negotiations on the geo-blocking proposal during the term of its 
presidency. 
The final agreed text of the Regulation was however achieved under the 
Estonian Presidency. The approved text prohibits online traders from 
discriminating between consumers within the EU based on their place of 
residence. However, the rules will only apply in three narrowly-defined 
situations. In the first instance it will apply when traders refuse to sell based 
on the consumer’s country of residence but the Regulation does not impose 
an obligation to deliver goods. Secondly, it will apply when traders provide 
electronically supplied services such as cloud services and data warehousing. 
However, services consisting of the provision of copyright-protected content 
are excluded from the Regulation. Finally, it will apply when traders provide 
services that are supplied in a country different to that of the consumer. 
Additionally, the final agreed text annuls any obligations imposed on traders 
in relation to the priority over selective distribution agreements since this is 
generally considered anticompetitive and would infringe EU competition 
rules.  
Therefore, the Regulation was formally adopted by the European Parliament 
and the Council and was published in the Official Journal of the EU in 
February 2018. This will enter into force by the end of 2018.  
Conclusion 
This study set out to explore the phenomenon of unjustified geo-blocking 
practices on consumers purchasing goods and services in other Member 
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States. It sought insight into how these practices are actually impacting the 
EU’s small Member States and how these practices are contributing to the 
fragmentation of the Single Market.  Additionally, by providing an insight of 
the proposed Regulation on the elimination of unjustified geo-blocking 
practices, this article provided an analysis of the work done by the Maltese 
Presidency of the Council of the EU during the first six months of 2017. 
Irrespective of the effort put by the Maltese Presidency to reach an 
agreement in this area, the Regulation was ultimately finalised under the 
Estonian Presidency. However, although this proposed Regulation is a step 
forward in terms of limiting geo-blocking practices, there still seems to be 
areas that remained out of the scope of the finalised Regulation. This 
includes the exemption of the audio-visual service which will still allow 
consumers to be geo-blocked out of certain sites.   
For Malta, the EU’s smallest country, its first chance of taking on the rotating 
presidency of the Council of the EU was overall quite successful. Tasked 
with leading discussions on such an important dossier on geo-blocking, 
Malta managed to push this Regulation forward, even though it failed to 
strike a compromise between the Council, Commission and Parliament. 
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Chapter 5 
The Maltese Presidency and Social Inclusion:  
Malta’s Push for LGBTIQ Rights  
Mark Harwood 
When Malta launched its Council of the EU Presidency in January 2017, the 
Government outlined its intention “to contribute”, “to focus” and “to deliver” 
in various sectors but it was only in the area of social inclusion where Malta 
intended “to lead” with the aim that “we hope our experiences can rub off on 
our European partners”.121 This statement reflected the reality, both domestic 
and European, of the state of social inclusion (and LGBTIQ
122
 rights in 
particular) across Europe; on one side, it showed that Malta had made 
significant advances in the area of civil rights and felt able to lead while the 
EU’s track record was more mixed, reflective of its limited competence in 
this area and, some would argue, a lack of political will from the member 
states to allow the Union to be involved in this area of civil rights.  
The Maltese government listed its 3 objectives under social inclusion as the 
improvement of female participation in the labour market, efforts to combat 
gender-based violence and, finally, LGBTIQ issues, primarily the holding of 
a “Ministerial-level Conference on LGBTIQ issues in order to further 
explore the Commission’s roadmap on this area”.123 With LGBTIQ rights a 
cornerstone of the Maltese Government’s domestic policy (gay marriage was 
introduced as the first legislative act of the Labour Government after winning 
the 2017 general election), the importance of this presidency priority rested 
in the fact that it represented the first time a Member State had included 
LGBTIQ issues in a Presidency’s list of priorities. In this way, Malta entered 
its Presidency keen to build on its track record which placed the country first 
in Europe for LGBTIQ rights but restricted in what it could hope to achieve 
due to the Union’s limited competence.124 Therefore, the aim of this chapter 
will be to see what was achieved and whether its inclusion as a Presidency 
Priority will have a long-term legacy. In addition to press releases issued by 
the Maltese Government, reports by ILGA-Europe on the state of LGBTIQ 
rights across Europe and the opinions of MEPs as reported in the press, the 
primary source of information came from a series of interviews conducted in 
                                                             
121 Government of Malta (2016) p. 5.  
122.Acronyms are particularly problematic in this area of social rights. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender, Intersex, Questioning (LGBTIQ) is the acronym which is used by the Maltese 
Government though some prefer LGBT or LGBTI – when referenced in the context of a law, 
institution or person, the acronym used in that context or by that actor is the acronym used in 
the text. 
123 Government of Malta (2016) p. 5.  
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the summer of 2017. Those interviewed included the Minister for EU Affairs 
and Equality (Dr Helena Dalli), the Director of the Human Rights and 
Integration Commission (Dr Silvan Aguis), the Head of MEUSAC (Dr Vanni 
Xuereb), the Chairperson of the Malta Gay Rights Movement (Ms. Gabi 
Calleja) and other LGBTIQ activists.   
The EU and LGBTIQ Rights 
European states have been at the forefront of the granting of civil rights to 
the LGBTIQ community, however, this is at odds with the work of the 
European Union where the promotion of equality has been limited by the 
EU’s lack of competence in this area.125 While the European Parliament 
adopted a resolution on equal rights for lesbians and gays in 1994, going on 
to declare in 1998 that it would block accession of new member states to the 
Union which “violated the human rights of lesbians and gay men”, the 
Union’s milestone contribution to LGBT civil rights was the 1999 Treaty of 
Amsterdam which included articles to combat discrimination based on sexual 
orientation as well as the Charter of Fundamental Rights, legally binding 
from 2009 onwards, which also prohibits any discrimination based on any 
grounds, including sexual orientation. However, since then progress has been 
limited, especially regarding the proposed anti-discrimination law (Equal 
Treatment Directive) outlawing discrimination in areas of social protection, 
education, access to the supply of goods and social advantages which 
remains stalled in the Council. In 2016 the Commission issued a list of 
actions to advance LGBTI equality, the roadmap referenced by the Maltese 
Government in its priorities. The “List” is divided into 6 priority areas and 
covers: 
1. Improving rights and ensuring legal protection of LGBTI people and 
their families in key areas of EU competence (including approval for 
the Equal Treatment Directive). 
2. Strong monitoring and enforcement of existing rights of LGBTI 
people and their families under EU law. 
3. Reaching citizens, fostering diversity and non-discrimination. 
4. Supporting key actors responsible to promote and advance equal 
rights for LGBTI people in the EU. 
5. Figure and facts for policy makers on LGBTI challenges at the EU: 
data collection and research activities. 
6. External action: LGBTI issues in Enlargement, Neighbourhood and 
Third Countries.
126
 
However, while the 28 member states agreed, in 2016, to a Dutch backed 
initiative to fight “any discrimination” against LGBT people and to ramp up 
                                                             
125.Interview with Evelyne Paradis, Executive Director of ILGA-Europe. ”Gay rights 
organisation: The EU no longer leading on LGBT rights”, Euractiv, 16/12/15.  
126 European Commission (2015).  
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efforts on equality, some argued that the conclusions, which included 
reference to “fully respect … member states’ national identities and 
constitutional traditions” would be used to stop progress in this area as a 
member states need merely indicate that a proposal undermined national 
identity or constitutional tradition to halt its adoption, a Trojan horse which 
legitimised homophobia according to the EP’s Intergroup on LGBTI Rights 
Co-President, Ulrike Lunacek.
127
 
Such concerns would appear to be justified. While the EP has been 
vociferous in calling for LGBTIQ rights, the Commission has been accused 
of hiding behind the member states and reflected a shift in recent years to 
view equality issues in terms of subsidiarity, an issue to be tackled by the 
national governments.
128
 Further to this, there has been extensive opposition 
to certain rights being given to the LGBTIQ community, primarily from the 
Central and Eastern European member states. An earlier declaration on 
LGBTIQ equality, due in 2015, had been blocked by Hungary while Poland 
was also notable in declaring its opposition. In this way, the EU’s 
involvement in LGBTIQ rights has been important in ensuring anti-
discrimination laws are adopted in the member states, but does not go 
significantly beyond that and does not advocate rights such as marriage, 
surrogacy or adoption. It was against this backdrop that Malta adopted its 
priority in terms of social inclusion and the LGBTIQ community. 
Malta and LGBTIQ Rights 
As a colony of the UK, Malta had adopted the British penal code where 
homosexuality was a criminal act but in 1973 the Socialist Government of 
Dom Mintoff decriminalised homosexuality. However, no progress was seen 
subsequently with homosexuality remaining a morality issue heavily 
influenced by the teachings of the Catholic Church. With global shifts in the 
1990s seeing a greater acceptance of the civil rights of the LGBTIQ 
community, Malta saw the founding of the Malta Gay Rights Movement 
(MGRM) in 2001 and with it, a more organised lobby petitioning for the 
community’s civil liberties. Malta, with a Westminster/Whitehall political 
system is dominated by two political parties, namely the Social Democrats 
(Labour Party) to the centre-left and the Christian Democrats (Nationalist 
Party) to the centre-right and the parties seemed relatively hesitant to 
prioritise LGBTIQ rights during the 2008 general election campaign. In 2009 
ILGA-Europe, the primary LGBTIQ umbrella group in Europe, held its 
annual conference in Malta and by this time, a shift had started to emerge 
within the parties with the socialists establishing an LGBT wing in 2009, and 
the ruling Nationalists promising a bill to regulate cohabitation (irrespective 
of sexual orientation) in 2010. In 2011 the country was rocked by the 
                                                             
127 European Parliament (2016).   
128 LGBTIQ activist interview by the author (02/06/17). 
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decision to hold a referendum on divorce, often seen as a morality issue on 
an Island where the Constitution gives the Catholic Church the obligation to 
teach what is right and wrong. While not politicised by the parties, the vote 
in favour of divorce appeared to precipitate change within the Church 
(undermining its ability and willingness to involve itself in public debates), 
within the ruling Nationalist party (creating a schism between its right wing 
and more moderate factions) and the Labour party which appeared 
emboldened to push a progressive social agenda as it pursued the youth vote 
in the 2013 general election.
129
 Subsequently, the Labour party promised 
civil unions for same-sex couples as part of its electoral manifesto, amongst 
other promises, and went on to win a land slide victory, passing the Civil 
Union Bill in April 2014.  
Malta has, in the last 5 years, become a world leader in LGBTIQ rights.
130
 In 
addition to the Civil Union Act (and gay marriage in 2017) the country has 
also provided full adoption rights to same-sex couples (as well as LGBTIQ 
individuals), passed legislation amending the Constitution in 2014 to protect 
against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity as well 
as banning conversion therapy and outlawing sterilisation and invasive 
surgery on intersex people as part of the Gender Identity, Gender Expression 
and Sex Characteristics Act of 2015. While surrogacy remains unlawful, IVF 
access for female same-sex couples was to be introduced in 2017 while the 
government also announced its intention to remove the ban on gay and 
bisexual men donating blood (with restrictions) as well as the introduction of 
non-binary X gender passports and ID cards for transgender or intersex 
individuals. In opening the “Ministerial-level Conference on LGBTIQ 
issues” Minister Helena Dalli also announced that further developments 
being taken by the Government included  a  trans/intersex  policy in  schools,  
a  policy  for  trans  prisoners,  and  gender  neutral  toilets across all 
ministries, Parliament, and the law courts.
131
 In this way, Malta has seen a 
transformation in the civil rights of the LGBTIQ community with much of 
those changes being attributed to the political will of the Socialist 
Government, a change in popular sentiment regarding gay rights, a 
diminished capacity for those opposing such rights to influence the debate as 
well as the committed work of NGOs like MGRM and other individuals who 
constitute the LGBT Consultative Committee which has helped the 
Government in drafting much of its LGBTIQ civil rights laws. It is therefore 
not surprising that the Government would include the LGBTIQ agenda as 
part of its Presidency Priorities and to outline its intentions to lead in this 
sector. 
                                                             
129 For a more detailed analysis of the significance of the 2011 Divorce referendum see Pace 
(2012). 
130 Ranking according to ILGA-Europe (2017).   
131 Government of Malta (2017a).  
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The Presidency 
The decision to include LGBTIQ issues as part of the Presidency agenda 
was made early on in the planning of the Presidency. Minister Helena Dalli 
noted in her speech to the Ministerial-level Conference held in Malta in 
February 2017 that The Netherlands had been consistently pushing 
LGBTIQ equality from 2013 with the organisation of the first IDAHO 
congress to mark the International Day Against Homophobia. As part of the 
trio (The Netherlands, Slovakia and Malta), the Dutch continued to push 
LGBTIQ issues, as with the 2016 Council declaration against the 
discrimination of LGBT people, a first in terms of agreement amongst the 
28. As Malta’s trio partner it was therefore easy for Malta to continue this 
work though the Maltese were less interested in securing Council 
declarations on the issue but sought to normalise the issue (namely the 
rights of the LGBTIQ community) as well as raise its visibility.
132
 At the 
core of this was to be the Ministerial-Level Conference, an event fully 
funded by the Maltese government and therefore costed at an early date, 
indicating that the Government had always planned to give prominence to 
this initiative.
133
 
The Conference 
The High Level Ministerial Conference on LGBTIQ Equality Mainstreaming 
was held in Malta on 22
nd
 and 23
rd
 February 2017 with the stated aim ‘to 
provide a platform for ministers, European Union officials, policy makers 
and civil society representatives to take stock of the current situation, share 
experiences and best practices and learn from one another for better LGBTIQ 
equality mainstreaming in all policy spheres’.134 The Conference was spread 
over 2 days, the first day being open to the general public and included 
speakers from the Maltese Government, DG Justice and Consumers, the EP’s 
Intergroup on LGBTI Rights as well as specialised panels on LGBTIQ 
equality mainstreaming and education, healthcare and public safety. On the 
second day the Minister indicated that the delegations held an informal 
discussion of various issues relating to the LGBTIQ community, especially 
the need for education to tackle intolerance as well as the cultural dimension 
of attitudes towards the community. For the Minister, the important point for 
Malta was to show that change could happen and happen rapidly if there was 
the political will.
135
 The Conference was used by the Commission to launch 
the 2016 Annual Report on the List of Actions to Advance LGBTI Equality.  
Beyond the Conference the Government’s priority was to drive home the 
normalisation message with the 2016 Malta Pride being given prominence in 
the Presidency launch video first aired in November 2016 while all publicity 
                                                             
132 Dr Silvan Agius, interviewed by the author (01/06/17).  
133 Hon. Minister Helena Dalli interviewed by the author (27/07/17).  
134 Letter of invitation sent to delegates. 
135 Hon. Minister Helena Dalli, interviewed by the author (27/07/17).  
59 
 
 
material related to the Presidency included reference to the LGBTIQ 
community. Malta placed special emphasis on marking the International Day 
Against Homophobia (17
th
 May) and cooperated with authorities in having 
the rainbow flag painted on zebra crossings outside the Berlaymont in 
Brussels. Groups took the opportunity afforded by the importance given to 
LGBTIQ issues to launch key initiatives during the events organised by the 
Maltese Presidency including Transgender   Europe (TGEU) which launched 
its second edition of the Human Rights and Gender Identity Best Practice 
Catalogue on the margins of the Ministerial Conference. The Report featured 
Malta prominently following the adoption of the Gender Identity, Gender 
Expression and   Sex Characteristics Act which the group held to be best 
practice for legal gender recognition. Richard Kohler, Senior Policy Officer 
at TGEU said, “Since the publication of the  first  best  practice  catalogue  in  
2011,  trans  rights across  Europe  have  advanced  in  leaps  and  bounds.  It  
is  actually  very fitting  to  launch  this  edition  in  Malta,  whose  progress  
in  this  area  of human  rights  has become  an  inspiration  for  other  
countries  to  follow, and a beacon of hope for trans people across the 
continent”.136 With this in mind, what was the impact of the Government’s 
initiative in terms of this Presidency Priority?  
An Assessment 
The Maltese Presidency was clear from the inception that it did not seek 
binding declarations or new road maps with which to lead in this area, 
allocating, within this Priority area, relatively limited goals, primarily to lead 
through example. This limited agenda reflected several realities, the first 
being that the Commission appeared to have lost the energy to lead in the 
promotion of civil rights. Faced with opposition from some member states as 
well as a Commission focused on the European economy and migration as 
well as a Commission less keen on road maps (which are difficult to push 
forward), the Maltese Government could only hope to maintain focus on the 
LGBTIQ agenda and to show that change and progress, at the national level, 
was possible. As noted by the Minister in her address to the Conference, “us 
politicians are here to help shape public opinion and not be led by it.  
Countries  that  are  often  discounted  as  not  ripe  for  progress  can change, 
and can change fast the moment that there is the political will and a strong 
civil society”.137 This sentiment was reflected by the Vice-President  of  the  
European  Parliament  and  Co-President of  the European Parliament’s 
Intergroup  on  LGBTI  Rights,  Ulrike  Lunacek,  who praised  Minister  
Dalli  and  the  Maltese Presidency for putting LGBTIQ rights on the agenda, 
saying “what you are doing here, with the successes you have had and you 
have fought for, and with  civil  society  here,  is  really  something  that  I  
strongly  appreciate  and  thank  you  for, especially  coming  from  a very 
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Catholic  country  myself Austria, that has  not  achieved  as much as you 
have been doing during the past years”.138 
The limited goals of the Presidency in this area also reflected the concerted 
opposition from several member states to advance the road map and, in 
particular, to accept the Equal Treatment Directive. With many states from 
Central and Eastern Europe adamantly opposed to LGBTIQ rights, the 
Maltese Government had to contend with the reality that there was limited 
enthusiasm for binding resolutions on this topic. While gay and lesbian rights 
have become more accepted, those of transgendered people as well as 
intersex, where Malta leads, are especially lacking. Therefore, for Malta, the 
key was the normalisation drive as well as showing that transformation is 
possible and that societies were more open to LGBTIQ rights than previously 
thought (the Labour Party went on to win a 2
nd
 landslide victory in the 2017 
general election, based on a booming economy as well as its civil rights 
platform, showing that the promotion of LGBTIQ rights was not a vote-
loser). 
For those attending the conference in Malta, the impact was positive with 
MEP Viotti noting that Malta’s engagement was important for the EU.139 
Silvan Agius, Director of the Human Rights and Integration Commission, 
noted that the event was key for showcasing best practice and for enabling a 
heavy press influx which allowed local activists to see how their work was 
appreciated abroad, giving a boost to these groups as well as giving hope to 
other groups in other MSs that change can happen and can happen rapidly. In 
an interview with Minister Dalli, she noted how delegates took the 
opportunity to approach the Maltese delegation about best practice, 
especially in the area of transgender rights. Of particular note was a request 
from the Greek delegation for Malta to visit Greece to show best practice in 
this area.
140
  
In this way, the Maltese Government adopted a limited agenda under its 
priority for LGBTIQ equality. Hampered by the realities of a Commission 
focused elsewhere, a Union with limited competence in this area as well as a 
group of member states unwilling to push for further civil rights (and 
especially in the area of transgendered and intersex people), the Maltese 
Government sought primarily to raise the profile of this issue, to ensure it 
stayed on the Union’s agenda as well as focusing energy on normalising a 
sector of the population which, in some member states, remain on the fringe, 
unseen. In that respect, the Presidency can be assessed to have met its limited 
agenda in this area. However, the hope that this would have a lasting legacy 
is too early to state. With Malta followed by two Central and Eastern 
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European states, it is unlikely that any more leadership will be seen from the 
Council in the next few years. The next Presidency from a country in the top 
10 of LGBTIQ rights in Europe (according to the ILGA-Europe Rainbow 
Map), Finland, will not take place before the end of 2019 though the Malta 
case has shown that things can change rapidly if there is the political will and 
a shift in popular sentiment. While LGBTIQ rights do not appear to be an EU 
priority, for many states like Malta, they are and the Union is, ultimately, 
constituted by its member states. United in diversity, Malta’s efforts in this 
area remain centred on the hope that the 28 become less diverse on the civil 
rights of the LGBTIQ community in the future.  
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Chapter 6 
Constitutional Developments in the MENA Region 
during Malta’s EU Presidency 
Francesco Biagi 
Introduction 
Since the beginning of the Arab uprisings, the European Union has supported 
the constitutional reform processes taking place in the MENA region, thus 
following the strategy provided for by Article 3(5) of the Treaty of the 
European Union, which stipulates that the EU “shall uphold and promote its 
values and interests” in “its relations with the wider world”.141 This support 
to the democratic transitions in North Africa and the Middle East continued 
during the semester of the Maltese presidency of the Council of the European 
Union, i.e. from January 1
st
 to June 30
th
 2017. Indeed, the priorities of the 
Maltese presidency for the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood included 
“ensuring that the democratic transition in Tunisia remains on track”, “the 
stabilisation of Libya through a peaceful transition”, and “contributing to the 
EU and international efforts to address the Syrian conflict”.142 As will be 
discussed in this short paper, the semester of the Maltese presidency (and the 
days which immediately followed that period) saw significant constitutional 
developments in all these three countries. In Tunisia some important organic 
laws implementing the 2014 Constitution were adopted, in Libya the 
Constitutional Drafting Assembly approved a new draft Constitution, and in 
Syria the Russian Government presented its draft proposal for a new Syrian 
Constitution. 
Tunisia: The Implementation of the 2014 Constitution 
Seven years after the beginning of the “Arab Spring”, most countries in the 
MENA region have remained either authoritarian or “hybrid” regimes.143 It 
seems that the only State that has thus far managed to mark a clean break 
with its illiberal past is Tunisia, especially thanks to the adoption – on 26th 
January 2014 – of a Constitution which is often rightly considered as one of 
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the most democratic Constitutions (or the most democratic Constitution) in 
the Arab world.
144
  
In order to measure the sincerity of the innovations introduced by this 
Constitution, the process of implementation is extremely important. The 
European Union, which has supported the democratic transition in Tunisia 
since 2011, reiterated its commitment to continue to support the process of 
reforms – and in particular the process of implementation of the Constitution 
– even during the Maltese presidency of the Council of the European Union. 
For example, in the thirteenth session of the Association Council of the 
European Union and Tunisia, which took place in Brussels on 11
th
 May 
2017, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malta, George Vella, and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Tunisia, Khemaies Jhinaoui, issued a joint 
statement in which the EU “welcomed the unprecedented nature of the 
Tunisian democratic experience, renewed its resolute commitment to 
continue to support the process of reforms undertaken by the Tunisian 
authorities with a view to ensuring the effective implementation of the 
Constitution […]” (emphasis added).145  
During the semester of the Maltese presidency there were some relevant 
developments with respect to the enforcement of the 2014 Constitution. In 
the first place it is important to mention the adoption of the Organic Law no. 
2017-17 of 14
th
 February 2017, which amended and completed the Organic 
Law no. 2014-16 of 26
th
 May 2014, regarding elections and referendums. 
Among the most significant innovations of this new Organic Law, which 
regulates municipal and regional elections, one has to mention the fact that 
the right to vote in these elections has been extended to the military and the 
members of internal security forces (Art. 117 septies). This issue was 
extremely sensitive and caused months of political deadlock. The main fear 
was that the involvement of the military and the police in the elections would 
have undermined a tradition of political neutrality.
146
 The parliamentary 
majority, however, decided to grant them the right to vote in municipal and 
regional elections. 
Furthermore, the new Organic Law has strengthened the principle of equality 
between men and women. Indeed, since 2011 the electoral law has provided 
for the principle of “vertical” equality, according to which “lists shall be 
established in such a way to alternate between men and women”.147 Although 
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the adoption of the principle of alternation was undoubtedly extremely 
important so as to ensure a significant representation for women in 
Parliament (at present, 31% of the seats are held by women), it was not 
immune to criticism. Indeed, the law does not specify which position women 
must have in the electoral lists, with the consequence that only a few parties 
placed women in the highest positions. Therefore, small parties that only won 
one seat did not have any female representative in Parliament. In order to 
reinforce equality between men and women in municipal and regional 
elections, the new Organic Law has adopted the principle of “horizontal” 
equality (Art. 49 nonies par. 3), according to which “political parties will be 
obliged to respect the equality of sexes, not only in the same list but also 
between the lists that they present in different constituencies in such a way 
that if in Constituency A the lead candidate of a list is a man, the lead 
candidate in Constituency B must be a woman.”148 Furthermore, Organic 
Law no. 2017-17 promotes the participation of young people and disabled 
people. Indeed, each electoral list has to include among its first three 
candidates a candidate who is not older than 35 years (Art. 49 decies, par. 1), 
and among its first ten candidates a candidate affected by disability (Art. 49 
undecies, par. 1). 
Another important organic law adopted during the semester of the Maltese 
presidency is Organic Law no. 2017-10 of 7
th
 March 2017, concerning the 
procedures for the denunciation of corruption in the public and private sector 
and the protection of those who denounce it. The public institutions affected 
by this Organic Law are the following: the presidency of the Republic, the 
Assembly of the Representatives of the People, the presidency of the 
Government, the Supreme Judicial Council and all judicial authorities, the 
Constitutional Court, independent constitutional bodies, ministries and 
secretariats of state, the Central Bank of Tunisia, public institutions and 
enterprises, credit institutions, public financial institutions, local authorities, 
and independent public institutions. Complaints of corrupt practices have to 
be submitted before the Good Governance and Anti-Corruption 
Commission.
149
 In addition to this Law, Parliament recently adopted Organic 
Law no. 2017-59 of 24
th
 August 2017, on the Good Governance and Anti-
Corruption Commission, which is an independent institution responsible for 
“contribut[ing] to policies of good governance, and preventing and fighting 
corruption” (Art. 130 Const.). The abovementioned Organic Laws are 
important measures in the fight against corruption, which has long been one 
of the scourges of Tunisian society. 
Parliament also adopted the Organic Law no. 2017-58 of 11
th 
August 2017, 
on the elimination of violence against women.
150
 This Organic Law 
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represents the latest link in the chain of measures aimed at promoting gender 
equality in the country. Indeed, as is well known, Tunisia has been for a long 
time at the forefront of the Arab world with respect to women’s rights and 
the recent constitutional developments – including in particular the adoption 
of the 2014 Constitution – continue to move in this direction. Among the 
most relevant innovations, the Law imposes harsh sanctions for sexual 
harassment in public spaces and makes it easier to prosecute domestic 
violence (Arts. 15 and 16). Moreover, it calls for the Ministries of Education, 
Religious Affairs, Health, Social Affairs, Justice and Interior to organise 
trainings on how to prevent and handle cases of violence against women 
(Arts. 7 ff.), and stipulates that young generations should be educated about 
human rights and gender equality (Art. 7). Last, but certainly not least, 
Tunisia has joined a movement across the Arab world to get rid of the so 
called “marry your rapist laws”, which allow rapists to escape prosecution if 
they marry their victims. Thus, Article 227bis(4) of the Tunisian Criminal 
Code, which contemplated this “escape route” for rapists, has been repealed 
(see Art. 15 of Organic Law no. 2017-58). Despite the fact that in a number 
of Arab countries similar provisions are still in force, in the past few years 
there has been a trend towards their abolishment. Indeed, Egypt and Morocco 
repealed their laws respectively in 1999 and 2014, and in 2017 (in addition to 
Tunisia) Jordan and Lebanon also joined this group of countries.
151
  
The adoption of the new Organic Law on the elimination of the violence 
against women is extremely important in a country where women very often 
experience domestic and public violence. In 2016, the Tunisian Ministry of 
Women, Family and Childhood reported that 60% of Tunisian women were 
victims of domestic violence, and 50% of women declared that they 
experienced aggression in a public area at least once in their lives.
152
 
Furthermore, in 2016 the Centre for Research, Study, Documentation and 
Information on Women, a Tunisian research centre that works closely with 
the United Nations, reported that from 70% to 90% of women had been 
victims of sexual harassment between 2011 and 2015.
153
 
The adoption of the abovementioned organic laws represents an important 
step in the process of constitutional implementation and a positive 
contribution to the democratic transition that Tunisia is currently 
experiencing. All in all, the path followed by the country thus far seems to be 
the right one.
154
 Having said that, one should not forget that several 
innovations provided for by the 2014 Constitution have still remained “on 
paper” (the most evident example is probably given by the fact that the 
Constitutional Court has not been established yet), and that the country is 
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facing a number of complicated challenges from a political, social, and 
economic standpoint. Moreover, terrorism continues to represent a major 
threat, which explains why the state of emergency has been in place since 
November 2015. Therefore, the positive outcome of the process of transition 
should not by any means be taken for granted.
155
  
Libya: The Adoption of a New Draft Constitution 
Seven years after the death of Muammar Gaddafi Libya is still in the middle 
of an extremely complicated process of stabilisation. Current Libya 
comprises several different local realities trying to exist and prosper within a 
highly anarchical context. The country has a UN supported Government of 
National Accord – led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj – which is based in 
Tripoli, while the eastern part of the country is de facto ruled by General 
Khalifa Haftar and his army. Moreover, part of the south and the far south of 
the country are lost to any central authority and are controlled by different 
local tribes. The extremists of ISIS, which have lost much of their territory 
(including the city of Derna in July 2015, and their stronghold in the city of 
Sirte in late 2016), are now regrouping in rural areas. In addition to that, the 
state of human rights and the rule of law in the country is bleak, and the 
scourge of human trafficking has not been eradicated yet.
156
 
In this highly problematic context, Libya is also facing a very important 
challenge, namely drafting a new Constitution.
157
 A Constitutional Drafting 
Assembly was elected on 20
th
 February 2014, and on 21
st
 April of the same 
year it started its activities in the city of Al-Baydha, in the eastern part of the 
country. It should be noted that the European Union has often called on the 
Assembly to complete its mandate as soon as possible, and this support for 
the constitution-making process continued also during the semester of the 
Maltese presidency. On 23
rd
 May 2017, for example, the EU, the African 
Union, the League of Arab States, and the United Nations (i.e. the so-called 
“Quartet”) issued a joint communiqué commending “the efforts by the 
Constitutional Drafting Assembly to finalize a draft constitution” and 
expressing their “appreciation for the work made so far”. They also “called 
for the constitution-drafting process to be concluded as soon as possible to 
pave the way to general and presidential elections.”158 
The latest draft of the Libyan Constitution was approved by the 
Constitutional Drafting Assembly on 29
th
 July 2017, without broad 
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consultation or public debate.
159
 As far as the form of government is 
concerned, the draft provides for a bicameral legislature (the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, which are both directly elected) and an 
executive branch which consists of the President of the Republic and his 
appointed Prime Minister and Ministers. On the one hand, the President of 
the Republic enjoys wide (and in some cases excessive) powers (Arts. 104 
ff.), thus making the draft Constitution very similar to the majority of the 
new (or recently amended) Arab Constitutions,
160
 but on the other hand the 
independence of the judiciary has been reinforced (Arts. 118 ff.) and the 
Constitutional Court has been granted a number of significant prerogatives 
(Art. 139).
161
 
An entire chapter of the draft Constitution (Chapter 6) is devoted to 
decentralisation and local government, which has been for a long time a very 
sensitive issue in the country. Article 143, in particular, makes reference to 
the “principle of expanded decentralisation […] within the unity of the 
State”. The draft states that the country will be divided into governorates, 
municipalities and other administrative levels directly elected by the people. 
Despite the fact that the draft seems to grant them a certain degree of 
autonomy (also from a financial standpoint), the real degree of independence 
that these local government units might achieve is hard to predict, also in the 
light of the fact that the regulation of some important issues (including the 
competences of the local government units) is left to ordinary legislation.  
The draft Constitution (like many other Arab Constitutions, particularly those 
from oil and gas-rich countries)
162
 also includes some provisions regarding 
natural resources. Although certain aspects are far from clear (in particular 
the management structure and the distribution of revenues), the draft contains 
some provisions that are in line with comparative best practices. Article 172, 
for example, stipulates that a law has to allocate a proportion of the revenues 
deriving from the exploitation of natural resources for the benefit of future 
generations. 
There is one aspect in the draft Constitution that stands out, namely the 
special recognition granted to Islam and sharia and the lack of specific 
provisions guaranteeing the free exercise of religious practices.
163
 This 
Islamic-oriented approach can be found, first of all, in Article 6, which 
stipulates that “Islam shall be the religion of the State, and Islamic sharia 
shall be a source of legislation”. Furthermore, the President of the Republic, 
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the Prime Minister, the Ministers, and the members of the House of the 
Representatives and the Senate must be Muslim (see Arts. 99, 113, 69 and 
76). The President of the Republic must also be born to Muslim parents (Art. 
99). Islamic principles and values also inform the establishment of the family 
and the right to education. Indeed, Article 27 states that “The family that is 
established on sharia based marriage between a man and a woman shall be 
the foundation of society. It shall be founded on religion, ethics, 
complementary roles between its members, as well as on affection and 
mercy […]” (emphasis added). Article 52 stipulates that “educational 
curricula” are based, among other things, on “the teachings and values of 
the Islamic religion”. Nor is the National Council for Human Rights 
immune from this approach, as its task is to reinforce and promote the 
culture of human rights and public liberties “provided for in Islamic sharia 
and international conventions” (Art. 159). The draft Constitution also 
provides for a Sharia Research Council, responsible for expressing opinions 
on matters referred to it by State authorities, addressing religious issues and 
issuing fatwas (Art. 161). 
It goes without saying that some of the provisions mentioned above are not in 
line with international standards and comparative best practices. It must also 
be stressed (as mentioned above) that in the draft Constitution specific 
provisions guaranteeing the free exercise of religious practices are lacking. 
Furthermore, it is emblematic that Article 7 does not include religion among 
the grounds on which discrimination is prohibited. All this raises serious 
concerns for religious minorities and stands in sharp contrast not only with a 
number of Islamic Constitutions, but also with the current Libyan 
Constitution, namely the 2011 Constitutional Declaration. The latter, indeed, 
stipulates that “The State shall guarantee for non-Muslims the freedom to 
practice their religious rituals” (Art. 1) and that “Libyans shall be equal […] 
without distinction on the grounds of religion, belief, language, wealth, 
gender, kinship, political opinions, social status, or tribal, regional or familial 
adherence” (Art. 6) (emphasis added).  
According to the draft Constitution, Parliament has 90 days after the entry 
into force of the Constitution to approve the laws governing the elections of 
the President of the Republic, the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
These elections would then be held within 240 days from the approval of 
those laws (Art. 183). Thus, over one year, this roadmap would give Libya a 
new Constitution, an elected President, and two houses of Parliament, which 
might contribute to strengthen the legitimacy of State institutions.
164
 Things, 
however, are much more complicated, also in the light of the fact that the 
destiny itself of this draft Constitution is very uncertain. Indeed, the new 
Constitution will only enter into force following its ratification in a popular 
referendum. However, on 17
th
 August 2017, the appeal court in the city of 
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Al-Baydha invalidated the vote of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly 
approving the draft Constitution. As a consequence, the notifications to the 
House of Representatives to draft a law authorising a referendum and to the 
Elections Commission to prepare such a referendum were considered null 
and void. This case will be probably examined by the Supreme Court, but 
this might take months.
165
  
Libya is currently facing a number of very serious and complicated 
challenges. The priority should be to address the concrete needs of the 
population, such as guaranteeing public services to the people, addressing the 
economic and liquidity crisis, rebuilding destroyed cities, working to 
withdraw heavy weapons from urban centres, guaranteeing greater security 
to the people, and reinforcing the protection of human rights: “Without this 
broader strategy, a constitution born with such a flawed process risks [doing] 
little to stabilize Libya.”166 
Syria: The Russian Draft Proposal for a New Syrian Constitution 
In November 2011, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad appointed a committee 
to draft a new Constitution to replace the one introduced in 1973. The new 
Constitution – that continues to grant the President extremely broad powers – 
was approved by popular referendum in February 2012. In the past two 
years, the reform of this Constitution has started to be considered crucial by 
the international community in resolving the still on-going conflict in the 
country. In particular, on 18
th
 December 2015, the United Nations Security 
Council passed Resolution 2254 that – inter alia – outlines the UN’s support 
for a Syrian-led political process that “establishes credible, inclusive and 
non-sectarian governance and sets a schedule and process for drafting a new 
constitution” within six months. The resolution also recommends “free and 
fair elections, pursuant to the new constitution, to be held within 18 months” 
under UN supervision
. 
However, the numerous peace talks held in Geneva 
under the auspices of the United Nations
 
(and strongly supported by the 
European Union) between the Syrian government and the opposition
 
have not 
thus far achieved the above-mentioned aims. 
Since the start of 2017 the role played by the UN and the EU in the conflict 
has been partially overshadowed by the initiatives of the Russian 
Government, which has increasingly begun to play a prominent role in the 
Syrian crisis. In particular, Moscow set up its own Syria peace talks in 
Astana, Kazakhstan, with Iran and Turkey, and on 23
rd‒24th January 2017, it 
officially presented its draft proposal of a new Syrian Constitution,
167
 which 
Konstantin Kosachev, the head of the Russian Senate’s Foreign Relations 
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Committee, referred to as Moscow’s “contribution to catalyse the peace 
process”.168  
The content of this draft Constitution has caused some perplexity. Indeed, it 
has been rightly stressed that “this document stands as an important example 
of a non-liberal constitutional model put forward as a solution to one of the 
world’s most intractable conflicts.”169 In the first place, the draft Constitution 
– by relying heavily on the constitutional model of the Eurasian countries170 
– continues to provide for a strong concentration of powers in the hands of 
the President of the Republic, who is the leader of the executive branch. 
According to the draft Constitution, the President, inter alia, appoints the 
Prime Minister and the Ministers (Art. 64), issues decrees, edicts and 
instructions (Art. 57), concludes international treaties (Art. 58), may call for 
a referendum on important issues which affect the strategic interests of the 
country (Art. 59), and is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (Art. 
60). Moreover, whilst the draft Constitution states that the same person 
cannot hold the office of the President for more than two consecutive terms, 
still it provides for a very long term in office, i.e. seven years (Art. 49). In the 
light of the fact that Assad’s current term ends in 2021, the draft Constitution 
would then allow him to remain in office until 2035.  
Furthermore, there are certain constitutional provisions that go “beyond 
executive power and wield power to supervise and unify all branches of power in 
the state.”171 In fact, the President is the “guarantor of independence, unity, and 
territorial integrity of the country”, ensures the “continuous operation of public 
authorities”, and acts as an “intermediary for the state authorities, and between 
the state and the society […]” (Art. 55). 
On a positive note, the draft Constitution contains some provisions 
specifically dealing with the Kurdish question. This is per se a step forward, 
especially if one considers that in the current 2012 Constitution “the 
existence of Kurds in Syria is completely ignored,”172 despite the fact that 
they form the largest ethnic minority in the country, constituting an estimated 
10% of the population. Article 4 of the draft Constitution stipulates that 
Syrian citizens have the right to “educate their children in their native 
language” and that “government agencies and institutions of Kurdish 
Cultural Autonomy shall use both Kurdish and Arabic equally.” Moreover, 
Article 15 states that Syria consists of “constituent parts”, and that the 
organization of the local authorities is based on the principle of 
decentralization. On the other hand, however, the draft contains some 
questionable points. In particular, it stipulates that the relationship between 
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the central government and the regional authorities, their mandate, financial 
revenues, control over their work, the appointment or election of their 
representatives, as well as the status of the Kurdish Cultural Autonomy are 
regulated by law (art. 15), thus leaving the possibility for the central 
government to significantly limit the scope of autonomy of the Kurds. 
Only time will tell if and to what extent the draft Constitution released by the 
Russian Government will influence the content of a new Syrian Constitution. 
In any case, at the moment the adoption of a new Constitution can hardly be 
considered a solution to the conflict, also in the light of the fact that in the 
recent negotiations held “both in Astana (where the [draft constitution was] 
presented) and in Geneva (where this issue has been recently evoked), the 
[Syrian] government and the opposition showed very little interest in serious 
discussion about a new constitution.”173 
Conclusion 
By supporting the constitutional processes in North Africa and the Middle 
East during the semester of its presidency of the Council of the European 
Union, Malta followed the path of its “predecessors”. In the case of Tunisia, 
the hope is that the EU will continue to support the process of 
implementation of the 2014 Constitution, as the latter is of the utmost 
importance for a successful outcome of the transition. This process of 
implementation, however, must be accompanied by structural reforms that 
are necessary to put the economy on track. Indeed, the riots that took place in 
many Tunisian cities and villages at the beginning of 2018 are due to the dire 
economic situation of many parts of the country.
174
 
In the cases of Syria and Libya, the European Union is supporting the 
constitution-making processes that are taking place in both countries. The EU 
should push more for the adoption of constitutions which are in line with 
international standards and comparative best practices and make clear that any 
deviation from these democratic standards will have negative consequences for 
future relations.
175
 This is particularly important in the cases of Syria and 
Libya, where the constitution-making processes are taking place in times of 
conflict. Indeed, the risks of drafting a constitution in these contexts are 
numerous and different in nature, including where they touch on the 
consolidation of the position of those who are in power, the exclusion of 
women and minority groups, and the lack of consensus within the society on 
its shared values and vision of a common future: “Premature constitution 
writing risks condemning the constitution to oblivion, as it will neither reflect 
any such vision nor be able to keep pace with changes on the ground.”176 In 
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other words, the risks are so serious that one may even question the utility of 
the adoption of a constitution in times of conflict. In any case, an unconditional 
support for the constitutional reform processes (which sometimes seems to be 
the approach adopted by the European Union) does not help the democratic 
development of Arab countries and is not in the interests of the EU itself. 
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Chapter 7 
Malta’s Presidency of the EU Council:  
External Relations in the Presidency of a Small State 
Roderick Pace 
On the 4
th
 July the European Parliament in Plenary met to discuss the report on 
Malta’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The Prime Minister 
Joseph Muscat and the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude 
Juncker both addressed the meeting.  The session was very poorly attended by 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and this led to an altercation 
between Juncker and the President of the European Parliament Antonio Tajani. 
Addressing the Chair, Juncker said, “Monsieur le Président, Monsieur le 
Premier ministre, le Parlement européen est ridicule, très ridicule. Je salue ceux 
qui se sont donné la peine de se déplacer ici, mais le fait qu’une trentaine de 
députés seulement assiste à ce débat démontre à suffisance que le Parlement 
n’est pas sérieux, et je voulais le dire aujourd’hui. Si M. Muscat était Mme 
Merkel difficilement imaginable – ou M. Macron – plus imaginable ...We would 
have a full House. The Parliament is totally ridiculous.” Mr Tajani asked the 
President of the Commission to moderate his tone, reminding him that though 
Juncker could criticize the Parliament, it is not “la Commission qui doit contrôler 
le Parlement. C’est le Parlement qui doit contrôler la Commission”.177 Juncker 
pressed the point further: “There are only a few Members in the plenary to 
control the Commission. You are ridiculous! I wanted to pay tribute to the 
Maltese Presidency ... I will never again attend a meeting of this kind. The 
Commission is under the control of the Parliament, but the Parliament has to 
respect even the presidencies of smaller countries” concluded Mr Juncker.178 
The absence of the MEPs from the Plenary does not reflect on the performance 
of Malta’s Presidency, but the episode brings to light in a very clear and 
concrete way an important constraint within which small EU Member States 
have to work, namely that they are considered as “unimportant” despite the 
lack of evidence to back this argument. Small States suffer from lack of human 
and financial resources and the cost of running the Presidency are 
comparatively larger in comparison to their economic size. However, broadly 
                                                             
177.Free Translation: “Mr President, Prime Minister. The European Parliament is ridiculous, 
very ridiculous. I welcome those who have taken the trouble to be here. But they are just thirty 
in all who are here to follow the debate and this shows well enough that the European 
Parliament is not serious. Had Joseph Muscat been Angela Merkel or Emanuel Macron, it is 
difficult to imagine – we would have a full house…” President Tajani replied that “it is not the 
Commission which has the duty to control Parliament but Parliament which has the duty to 
control the Commission …” 
178 European Parliament (2017). 
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speaking they do make an effort at completing as many dossiers as they can. 
Diana Panke (2010) observes, that although small EU Member States have 
fewer resources in order to participate in argumentative-based or bargaining-
based policy shaping strategies, they are not unimportant for the dynamics and 
outcomes of EU negotiations per se. Small States can concentrate their 
contributions and efforts on issues of higher relevance and ably apply a variety 
of shaping strategies. 
This is exactly what Malta managed to do during its Presidency of the 
Council of the EU as will be shown in this chapter by reference to Malta’s 
Presidency and the external policies of the EU. 
A Focus on the Essentials 
At the start of the Malta’s Presidency, The High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini (henceforth the 
High Representative) held bilateral talks with Foreign Minister George Vella, 
where they agreed that “Migration” and the “Situation in the Mediterranean” 
were to be the main objectives of the foreign policy initiatives to be pursued 
by the EU during Malta’s Presidency of the Council of the EU. With respect 
to the Mediterranean two countries were to particularly occupy the EU’s 
attention, namely: Syria, and the EU Regional Initiative for that country, and 
Libya.
179
 The other priority, Migration, had an “internal EU aspect” 
characterized by deep divisions among the Member States and an external 
aspect concerned with saving lives at sea (a humanitarian concern as well), 
stopping the irregular flows of migrants and strengthening the EU’s borders 
in collaboration with partner countries. 
At the start of Malta’s Presidency, the EU was facing a few uncertainties 
which are discussed in the next section. Each one of them could potentially 
rock the Union in a serious way and conditioned the decision-making 
environment surrounding Malta’s Presidency. However, not all of them were 
in the Presidency’s sight or it’s “to do list”. Correctly, and in line with small 
state capabilities, and the short duration of the Presidency (six months is not 
a life time), Malta’s Presidency adopted a pragmatic approach and decided to 
focus on Migration and the Mediterranean. Maritime policy was another 
priority objective of the Presidency with external policy ramifications. Of 
course, Malta had also to operate within the parameters of the three 
Presidency programme (Malta, Slovenia and the Netherlands), and work 
together with the High Representative in building diplomatic bridges to 
facilitate agreement on matters already on the CFSP/external relations 
agenda. It also sought to coordinate its efforts with the informal 
“Mediterranean Group” or Club Med. i.e. the EU Mediterranean Member 
states in advance of key EU meetings and summits. 
                                                             
179 European External Action Service (2017). 
 
77 
 
 
The EU and the World at the start of 2017 
At the start of Malta’s Presidency of the Council of the EU, there were 
several external relations issues that promised to mark the Presidency as 
one of the most interesting in recent times. Of most immediate concern 
were the Ukraine crisis and relations with Russia, the situation in Syria as 
well as the challenge it posed to the post-conflict stabilization of that 
country and the adjoining sub-region. Turbulence in the EU’s 
neighbourhood was also unrestrained: Turkey was still unsettled after the 
2016 failed coup attempt; stability in Libya had not been achieved; the 
Middle East crisis was still simmering. Irregular migration was testing the 
EU’s resolve, internal unity and cohesion. Migration had long been an 
important internal EU and foreign policy issue but the 28 Member States 
were nowhere near resolving it in a definite way. In 2015, EU consensus 
had jelled around the notion that apart from strengthening its borders and 
cooperating with its immediate neighbours such as Turkey and Libya, which 
were themselves “transit countries”, the EU needed to speak with the 
neighbours of its neighbours, mainly the countries of the Sahel and beyond in 
order to deal more effectively with the problem. Shaping external policy on 
migration looked relatively easier than approving internal measures such as 
the EU asylum policy, the reform of the Dublin regulation and the thorny 
issue of intra-EU relocation. 
The start of the Trump administration in the USA coincided almost exactly 
with the start of Malta’s Presidency. It led to several uncertainties foremost 
among which were doubts (later allayed) about Washington’s continuing 
support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the future of 
the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) which is still at 
a stalemate and mired in controversy on both sides of the Atlantic, and of 
course climate change and the US pledge to pull out of the Paris agreement. 
Then there was BREXIT which was lumped on Malta’s Presidency agenda 
when the 23
rd
 June 2016 referendum decided in favour of Britain leaving the 
EU. London’s announcement that it would trigger Article 50 by the end of 
March, as indeed happened, meant that the BREXIT process would begin in 
the middle of Malta’s Presidency. This would add another complication to a 
small country running the EU Presidency for the first time. Important 
national elections due in the first half of 2017 in France and the Netherlands 
and later in Germany also cast their shadows on the Presidency. The main 
concern here was whether Europhile parties would manage to hang on to 
power in these countries and give the EU a breathing space to sort itself out 
on the aftermath of the recession and the divisions on migration or whether 
Eurosceptic parties would enter government and unravel the Union. This 
uncertainty about the future of the EU coincided with the 60
th
 anniversary of 
the Rome Treaties which also fell during the term of Malta’s Presidency. 
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The calling of a snap election in Malta on 1
st
 May 2017 can perhaps be 
considered as the only bolt from the blue originating from domestic politics. 
It was only the second time in EU history that a national election was called 
during a Member State’s Presidency, but then this was due to a constitutional 
requirement. Malta’s Presidency managed to plod on and ended successfully 
notwithstanding the distraction caused by the election and the real risk of a 
disappointing finale.  
Small State Presidencies 
Before the analysis of the Maltese Presidency can proceed further, it is 
important to dwell briefly on the role of small country Presidencies of the 
Council of the EU in the Union’s external relations, a subject which has 
always been complex and controversial. Before the appointment of Javier 
Solana as the first High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) in 1999, and during the debates leading to the ill-fated 
Constitutional Treaty and then the Lisbon Treaty, there was a general 
mistrust of Small States’ ability to lead the EU’s external relations dimension 
even though the records did not show that the larger EU member states really 
outshone them in this respect. Up to a certain extent this mistrust can still be 
felt today, though the situation has changed radically as a result of the Lisbon 
Treaty changes. External relations have almost been completely taken out of 
the hands of the six-month rotating Presidency and placed in the hands of the 
High Representative and the President of the Council.  As a result, the 
rotating Presidency has lost most of its ability to influence policy-making 
while it has become relatively easier for the larger EU member states to 
shape the EU’s foreign policy by focusing their influence on these two top 
officials appointed by the European Council. Although the smaller EU 
Member States can still influence, if not also to a certain extent frustrate the 
EU foreign policy-making process since decisions are taken by unanimity, 
they tend to rely more on achieving their foreign policy objectives through 
the CFSP than the larger EU member states for whom the EU is just one of 
several “arenas” where they can act with a modicum of independence.180 
Given these complications, any analysis of Malta’s six-month Presidency 
and the EU’s foreign policy is very challenging. It is important to keep in 
mind the dualism that persists between the Union’s external relations and 
the national foreign policies of the Member States. Broadly speaking, 
national foreign policies constrain the development and operation of the 
EU’s external policies, but not the other way around. There is no pain 
associated with blocking consensus on EU external relations, particularly in 
the CFSP and its component the Common Defence and Security Policy 
(CSDP) or in pursuing national goals regardless of the Union’s interests. The 
Court of Justice simply has no role in the CFSP. For a small country EU 
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Presidency with its characteristic lack of resources, managing 27 other 
Member States in this domain raises several difficulties. 
The second major observation concerns the structural change that has been 
brought about by the Lisbon Treaty since it went into effect in 2009. Before 
the ratification of the Treaty, the Member State holding the Presidency of the 
Council of the EU used to Chair the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) composed of the Foreign Ministers of the Member States. 
This is what gave the rotating EU Presidency policy shaping opportunities. 
The Lisbon Treaty split the functions of this Council configuration and 
created the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and the General Affairs Council 
(GAC). FAC is chaired by the “two-hatted” High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is also a Vice President of 
the Commission. 
The Lisbon Treaty also gives the EU its own legal personality. It has created 
a permanent Presidency of the EU Council (which is composed of the Heads 
of State and/or Government of the Member States) and the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) with its uneasy relationship with the 
European Commission. Given time the EEAS may also develop into a 
powerful policy shaping institution, if it has not already done so. The rotating 
Presidency used to form part of the “Troika” which played a crucial role in 
the EU’s diplomacy, but the Lisbon Treaty dispensed with that as well when 
the permanent Presidency of the European Council and High Representative 
took over the international responsibilities formerly exercised by the rotating 
Presidency.  
The final observation concerns the global context in which the EU’s external 
policies are pursued and which make life even more hectic for small states. 
The ongoing strengthening of communications, the increase in inter-regional 
trade and the multiplicity of global interdependencies have in certain 
instances weakened national governments’ control over their own borders 
and territories and has led to the phenomenal growth in importance of “non-
state” actors in world politics. The globalization of world politics has blurred 
the dividing lines between “domestic” and “foreign” policies. One 
consequence of this is that it is no longer possible to distinguish clearly 
between health, education, the environment, law and order, migration and 
terrorism as internal, purely “domestic” policies from trade, development, 
security and the traditional concerns of foreign policy as different, exterior or 
international policies. It is evident, and even recognised by all stakeholders, 
that what happens “out there” affects the lives of people at home, and what 
happens at home shapes national outlooks about foreign policy, forcing 
governments to adopt stances and responses in the EU’s external relations 
policy-making processes. 
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The latter point complicates our analysis of Malta’s Presidency because in 
the same breath as we claim that the Presidency’s role in the EU’s foreign 
affairs has been weakened considerably since the Lisbon Treaty’s 
ratification, Malta’s Presidency was involved in several decisions on matters 
which appear to be of an internal or “domestic” policy nature, but which 
have a clear direct impact on external relations. There are many examples of 
policies that have this duality – global warming, migration and terrorism 
being three of them. But in the analysis carried out in this chapter, the 
problem has been simplified for us because at the start of the Presidency 
following the Vella-Mogherini meeting, the Presidency’s main objective in 
external relations were listed as migration and the Mediterranean. The 
“Mediterranean” was also a vague reference which could include a lot of 
things. 
The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) 
Before carrying forward the analysis, we need to clarify one further issue, the 
mechanics of the FAC. The Foreign Ministers of the Member States of the 
EU meet in the Foreign Affairs Council chaired by Federica Mogherini, the 
High Representative. At times the Council brings together the Ministers of 
Defence to discuss security and defence, development ministers and trade 
ministers. When FAC discusses trade policy, it is presided by the EU 
Member State holding the EU rotating Presidency, in this case Malta. The 
FAC is also responsible for the bilateral Association and Cooperation 
Councils which are held periodically between the EU and its partner 
countries. The meetings of the FAC and related events which took place 
during Malta’s Presidency are listed in Diagram 1. Several meetings took 
place at Ministerial and Senior Officials level in Malta and Brussels, but the 
eye catchers were: the FAC meeting of 6
th
 February 2017 which met in 
Brussels and which led to the formation of the Quartet on Libya composed of 
the United Nations, the League of Arab States and the African Union and the 
EU; the Informal Trade Ministers meeting of 3
rd
 March 2017 chaired by Dr 
Chris Cardona, Minister for the Economy, Investment and Small Business 
which was also attended by European Commissioner for Trade Cecilia 
Malmström; and the 26
th‒27th April 2017 meeting in Malta of European 
Defence Ministers which was followed a day later by a Gymnich meeting of 
Foreign Ministers.  
On behalf of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, George Vella, co-Chaired the EU-
KYRGZ Republic Cooperation Council (6
th
 March 2017); the EU-Angola 
Ministerial Dialogue (7
th
 March 2017); co-Chaired the EU-ECOWAS 
Ministerial Dialogue (4
th
 April 2017); the ACP-EU Council of Ministers (4
th
-
5
th
 May 2017); the EU-Tunisia Association Council (11
th
 May 2017); and the 
EU-Tajikistan 6
th
 Cooperation Council (15
th
 May 2017).   
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It must also be kept in mind that Mogherini’s portfolio does not only cover 
FAC. As Vice President of the European Commission she is also in charge of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, Enlargement, Humanitarian Aid and 
Crisis Management, International Cooperation and Development as well as 
Trade. The High Representative is also involved in the external aspects of 
Climate Action, energy, transport and migration. In June 2016, Federica 
Mogherini unveiled the EU’s “Global Strategy” to replace the European 
Security Strategy launched by Javier Solana in 2003 and the strategy marked 
its first anniversary towards the close of Malta’s Presidency. 
The Best Laid Plans – Migration and Development 
The easiest way to assess Malta’s performance in external relations is to 
compare what was stated in its Presidency Programme with what was 
achieved, while taking into account related circumstances and contexts. In its 
Presidency Programme, Malta did not present very ambitious objectives, but 
working within the strictures of the Lisbon Treaty, pledged to support the 
work of the High Representative.  
One of the policy priorities identified was Migration. On the external 
dimension of migration, the Presidency Programme stated that: “Addressing 
the External Dimension of Migration will require the continued resolve of the 
EU and Member States to maintain a comprehensive approach deploying the 
full range of the EU’s policies and instruments. The implementation of the 
new Partnership Framework with third countries will be further pursued as 
tasked by the European Council in December 2016, as well as actively 
contribute to the ongoing negotiations of the Global Compacts in the follow-
up to the adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and 
Migrants”.181 
The Maltese Presidency Programme stressed a nexus linking development 
and security and another one linking migration-development.
182
 The 
approach pursued during the Presidency of linking migration and 
development aid, was inspired by the decisions taken during the EU-Africa 
Summit held in Malta in 2015 and the establishment of the Emergency Trust 
Fund for Africa.
183
 The EU-Africa Valletta Summit had agreed on an Action 
Plan which was to be financed from the Trust Fund. The Action Plan sought 
among other things to mainstream migration in development policies, 
develop a system of legal migration and reward states, mainly in Africa, 
which cooperated with the EU on restraining illegal migration and in 
implementing socio-economic programmes intended to eliminate the root-
causes of irregular migration in the longer-term. It was in the context of the 
                                                             
181 Government of Malta (2016) p. 14. 
182 Government of Malta (2016) p. 17. 
183 European Commission (2015); Pace (2016). 
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Valletta Summit that the security-migration-development nexus was 
sharpened into an EU policy instrument. 
Migration in the Central Mediterranean was the subject of the informal 
European Council meeting which took place in Malta on 3
rd
 February 2017. 
These types of meetings normally end with a summary by the President and 
a statement or declaration instead of an official conclusion. The Malta 
meeting ended with the Malta Declaration on the external aspects of 
migration, particularly the Central Mediterranean route linking Libya with 
the rest of Europe.
184
 The Declaration focused on the importance of 
stabilizing Libya by training and equipping the security forces there, 
disrupting the smugglers’ business model, improving reception centres for 
migrants, but also looking beyond Libya’s borders by stepping up 
information campaigns in the countries of origin and assisted return 
activities. It was a good sign that Malta went straight to the point on its 
most central objective it wanted to achieve in external relations.  
To complete the circle, Malta’s Presidency worked to ensure that the EU’s 
new development policy would be in line with this approach. Malta had pre-
announced this at the very start of the Presidency when it declared that one of 
its main priorities would be to achieve agreement on “a new European 
Consensus for Development” in order to “provide a new shared vision of how 
the EU institutions and Member States will work together to achieve the 
Sustainable Development Goals”.185 The “new” consensus was proposed by 
the European Commission in November 2016,
186
 FAC approved it in on 19
th
 
May 2017 and the strategy was signed by the EU Member States and the 
Institutions on 7
th
 June 2017.
187
 The European Consensus on Development is 
not legally binding, but it provides the framework for the EU and its Member 
States’ development aid efforts in the context of achieving the UN’s 2030 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and more. Malta’s Presidency 
worked assiduously and succeeded in closing this dossier.  Indeed, this 
success can be recognised as one of the main achievements of Malta’s 
Presidency. Not only, but the adoption of this Consensus marked the fact that 
for the first-time the EU has put in place a framework for a common EU and 
Member States approach that goes a long way to strengthen the relations 
between the EU and its Member States with the developing countries. 
Malta had also tried to reach agreement on the External Investment Plan 
(EIP) to help in the financing of projects to achieve the SDGs and deal with 
the root-causes of migration, but this only came into effect in September 
2017. 
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The New Consensus on Development has been criticised by several 
international non-governmental organizations working in the developmental 
field for linking development and security – in other words for tying aid to 
compliance in controlling irregular migration.  
Malta’s Presidency also tried to heal internal EU rifts on migration by 
proposing a “cash solution” to the problem that many Member States 
continue to adamantly refuse to accept the relocation of refugees from Italy 
and Greece. The main line of the proposal was to give Member States a sum 
of €60,000 per refugee which they accept to relocate and to fine Member 
States by the same amount for every refugee which they refuse. The fine 
could also be paid in kind through the provision of material help and 
expertise. A three-year phasing in period was also proposed for the 
scheme.
188
  The proposal failed to gain approval by Council mostly because 
the Member States refusing to resettle refugees were liable to pay several 
millions in cash or in kind. For example, Poland which refused its share of 
6,182 refugees would have had to pay around €37 million in fines. 
The Mediterranean Region 
On the other objective to be pursued during the Presidency, regarding the 
Mediterranean region, several FAC meetings which took place in the first 
half of 2017, focused on the trouble spots of the region particularly Syria and 
Libya. The initiative in this case was more in the hands of the High 
Representative Mogherini. (Vide Diagram 1) 
Of most immediate interest to Malta, was the establishment of the Quartet on 
Libya composed of the UN, the Arab League, the African Union and the EU. 
The Libya Quartet met twice during Malta’s presidency. It is too early to 
judge how the Quartet will fare in its objective and this is certainly an issue 
which must be followed in the future. 
Some other Mediterranean initiatives considered as of a lower ‘high politics’ 
level but which are nevertheless significant for the region were on maritime 
affairs. Cooperation in the maritime sector is a functional and pragmatic 
approach that was prioritized in Malta’s Presidency objectives. This policy 
initiative does not fit well in the CFSP quadrant, but it is extremely relevant 
for the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, another area of special priority for 
Malta’s Presidency 
A MedFish4Ever Ministerial Conference held in Malta ended with a 
Ministerial Declaration on 30
th
 March 2017.The Conference forms part of 
what is referred to as the Catania process which was started in February 2016 
by Karmenu Vella, the Maltese Commissioner in charge of the Environment, 
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries at a meeting in the Sicilian city that gave it its 
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name. The Malta meeting was attended by the European Commission, eight 
EU Mediterranean states (Spain, France, Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Croatia, 
Greece, Cyprus), seven of the EU’s Mediterranean partners (Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey, Albania, Montenegro), FAO, the General 
Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean, the European Parliament, the 
EU Mediterranean Advisory Council. The aim of the Catania process is to 
safeguard fish stocks in the Mediterranean by managing fishing, collecting 
data, eliminating illegal fishing and encouraging small scale fishing and 
aquaculture.
189
 The initiative which is based on EU soft law [ministerial 
declarations as opposed to legally binding instruments],
190
 falls within the 
scope of the EU’s integrated maritime policy and the “Blue Growth” 
initiative. Such initiatives rarely capture attention, but being of a 
functionalist, or “soft” nature, they link EU and non-EU states into a 
cooperative relationship of mutual benefit and strengthen mutual 
understanding. Under the aegis of the much-castigated EU’s Barcelona 
Process, the Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean, 
the EU has launched several such initiatives in the region over the last two 
decades. In most instances this type of cooperation is resilient to the vagaries 
of regional instability and political shifts.  
A month later another informal Ministerial meeting met in Malta to discuss 
“Blue Growth” 191  which refers to the expansion of maritime and coastal 
economic activities such as tourism, fishing, aquaculture, shipping, etc. in a 
sustainable way). The EU had published a “Blue Growth Strategy” in 2012. 
At the end of the Malta meeting, the Valletta Declaration endorsed by the 
ministers, not only listed a series of positive initiatives and achievements but 
called on the Council “to endorse the declaration as a substantial component 
of the Union’s priorities for Jobs, Growth and Investment and the 
forthcoming Presidencies, in close cooperation with other EU Institutions, to 
take appropriate initiatives and set milestones, taking this declaration as a 
basis, to further develop and implement the 2012 EU Blue Growth 
Strategy”.192 Blue growth also serves as a soft policy approach to strengthen 
cooperation between the states on both shores of the Mediterranean Sea, as is 
                                                             
189 European Commission (2017b). 
190 European Commission (2017c). 
191.The documents published by the European Commission on Blue Growth include the 
following: Initiative for the sustainable development of the blue economy in the western 
Mediterranean (19/04/2017): Framework for action; Report on the Blue Growth Strategy: 
Towards more sustainable growth and jobs in the blue economy (31/03/2017); 
Communication from the Commission: Innovation in the Blue Economy: realising the 
potential of our seas and oceans for jobs and growth ‒ COM(2014) 254/2 (13/05/2014); 
Marine Knowledge 2020: roadmap accompanying the document; Communication from the 
Commission: Blue Growth opportunities for marine and maritime sustainable growth 
(13.09.2012). They are available at  
https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/blue_growth_en (accessed on 02.01.2018). 
192 Government of Malta (2017c). 
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exemplified by the initiative for the sustainable development of the blue 
economy in the western Mediterranean.
193
 
Enlargement and Turkey 
During Malta’s EU Presidency no major progress was recorded on the 
enlargement front. In a speech to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament (AFET), Minister for Foreign Affairs George Vella had 
placed a lot of emphasis on maintaining the momentum on enlargement.  Dr 
Vella referred to the transformative power of the EU and the effect that this 
could have on the Balkan countries and Turkey. He also argued that the EU 
must see enlargement in the context of the competition it was facing from 
other powers in its neighbourhood. The minister proposed that “Enlargement 
is a key contributor in shaping the Union”.194  
A substantive part of Minister Vella’s presentation to AFET focused on the 
EU’s relations with Turkey. While stressing the EU’s well-aired concerns 
about the political situation in Turkey, he urged the Union to upgrade and 
modernize its customs union with that country. However, no progress was 
made on this proposal which is still being discussed by the Council. In the 
meantime, in his State of the Union speech delivered some three months after 
the end of Malta’s Presidency, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker 
ruled out the possibility of Turkey joining the EU in the foreseeable future, 
adding that it (Turkey) had been taking giant strides away from the EU for 
some time. He was referring to the deteriorating political and human rights 
situation and the imprisonment of journalists in Turkey.
195
 
The EU-Tunisia Association Council 
As already indicated, during Malta’s Presidency, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, George Vella, co-chaired a number of important meetings on behalf 
of the High Representative Federica Mogherini. One of these meetings was 
that of the EU-Tunisia Association Council, particularly in view that Tunisia 
is one of Malta’s important neighbours and a country which has enjoyed 
long-standing relations with the EU. It was in Tunisia that the Arab uprisings 
were triggered off and it is the only country in the Arab world that has made 
great strides in advancing in its road to democratic transition.  
The EU-Tunisia Association Council met in Brussels on the 11
th
 May. The 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia, Khemaies Jhinaoui, participated 
and Co-Chaired the meeting. Important to note also that the European 
Commissioner for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 
Johannes Hahn, also participated in the meeting. The discussions covered 
the latest political and institutional developments and progress made in the 
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process of democratic transition in Tunisia. Views on the situation in Libya 
and on security and counter-terrorism were exchanged. 
Like most Mediterranean rim countries of both the northern and southern 
shores, but for different causes and reasons, Tunisia has suffered economic 
disruption that has left it with several problems particularly high 
unemployment rates. For demographic reasons, Tunisian young people are 
the more adversely affected by unemployment. During the Association 
Council meeting, the dialogue focused on this pernicious aspect of the 
unemployment problem – namely youth unemployment, education, 
employability and participation in public life. 
The Council discussed the priorities of the EU-Tunisia partnership, namely: 
namely support for socio-economic development, trade relations as well as 
migration and mobility.
196
 
Conclusion 
In this brief appraisal of Malta’s Presidency and the external relations of the 
EU, we have focused on a few major objectives in Malta’s pre-Presidency 
Programme. Reference was made to the decision-making structures and the 
constraints placed on any Member State heading the Presidency of the 
Council of the EU in the field of foreign policy. These constrains are more 
acute in the case of small Member States which have much more limited 
human resources as well as sources of information on which to rely. Yet, 
Malta’s Presidency has shown that if a Member State puts its mind to it, 
organizes its limited resources well and focuses on the most urgent and 
burning issues, then it can make headway. 
The main task of the Presidency is not to solve all the issues confronting the 
Union at any time, in any case six months are insufficient for doing that, but 
to help the unfinished business on the EU’s agenda to cross the finishing line. 
To achieve this a Member State requires patience and diplomacy. A Small 
State can neither entice compliance by offering advantages nor force 
recalcitrant States through the fear of punishment. It has neither carrots nor 
sticks but a genuine desire, leadership and the political acumen in the search 
for a suitable and balanced compromise which often convinces bigger States 
to overcome their fears and suspicions.  
Malta’s success in moving the migration agenda forward owes much to its 
ability to remain focused. Indeed, neither the heated trans-Atlantic exchanges 
that reared their head as soon as the Trump administration took the oath of 
office, nor the ups and downs of BREXIT or the negative attitude of a section 
of the British press deflected the Maltese side from its objective.  It was also 
useful that Malta had achieved some experience on the issue of migration in 
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diverse ways: it had confronted the migration challenge for close to 17 years, 
had explored every nook and crevice of the EU’s legal structure in the hope 
of finding what is useful to help it confront the challenge in the EU 
institutions and had at times stood alone and isolated as other Member States 
failed to come to its rescue when the arrival of irregular migrants had become 
acute. The experience gained at the EU-Africa Summit of November 2015 
was also a useful springboard to the results achieved by the 2017 Malta’s EU 
Presidency. 
The analysis in this chapter has focused on the main objectives in the 
CFSP/external relations dimension which fall under the wings of the High 
Representative, the FAC and the EEAS. But by reference to two initiatives in 
the maritime sector, one of Malta’s six main Presidency priorities, it was 
shown how a Small State Presidency of the Council of the European Union 
can also play a distinct role in promoting regional understanding and 
cooperation. While the hard-foreign policy issues such as the Syrian and 
Libyan crisis stayed almost entirely in the hands of the High Representative 
and the FAC, the maritime initiatives took place in informal ministerial 
meetings unconnected with “High Politics” but perhaps equally or more 
fruitfully effect in promoting mutual understanding between States in the 
longer-term perspective. The modest steps taken in pushing the agenda 
forward within the maritime sector also shows the kind of role that Small 
States can play in shaping the international or regional agenda during their 
short EU Presidencies of the Council of the European Union.   
 
Diagram 1 - Foreign Affairs Council Meetings and Related Events during  
                      Malta’s EU Presidency 
DATE 
(2017) 
TYPE AND PLACE OF 
MEETING 
MAIN TOPICS DISCUSSED 
16
th
 January  FAC, Brussels. The first 
meeting which took place in 
the Europa Building which is 
the new seat of the European 
Council and the Council of the 
EU. 
Syria and the Middle East. The 
Council reiterated the EU’s full 
support to the UN-led process in 
Syria and the EU regional 
initiative on the future of Syria 
after the end of the conflict. The 
meeting also discussed the Middle 
East peace process. The council 
also reaffirmed its support for the 
democratic process in Lebanon. 
6
th
 February  FAC, Brussels. Libya was the main topic. The EU 
decided to join the United Nations, 
the League of Arab States and the 
African Union to form a Quartet 
to stabilise Libya. The council 
reaffirmed its support for a 
comprehensive agreement on the 
Middle East and the two state 
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solution. Situation in Egypt and the 
Ukraine was also discussed. 
2
nd
‒3
rd
 March  Informal Meeting of Trade 
Ministers which was held in 
Malta 
The meeting was chaired by Dr 
Chris Cardona, Minister for the 
Economy, Investment and Small 
Business. European Commissioner 
for Trade Cecilia Malmström 
attended the meeting. 
6
th
  March  FAC, Brussels. Western Balkans, Security and 
Defence particularly improvements 
in the CSDP missions. Guidance 
on strengthening synergies on 
climate change were also agreed.  
6
th
 March EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation 
Council, Brussels 
The Cooperation Council was 
chaired by Dr George Vella, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Malta. The Council discussed trade 
and development but the main 
focus was on political issues. The 
EU encouraged the Kyrgyz 
Republic to strengthen further 
competitive parliamentary 
elections and the rule of law, the 
fight against corruption and 
judicial reform. The EU called on 
the Kyrgyz government to 
guarantee the independence of the 
judiciary. The EU welcomed the 
rejection by the Kyrgyz Parliament 
of the "foreign agent law" as a 
recognition of the important 
positive role that the civil society 
traditionally plays in the Kyrgyz 
Republic. 
13
th
 March  EU-Algeria Association 
Council, Brussels. 
The meeting decided the EU-
Algeria Partnership Priorities and 
€40m worth of projects mostly in 
renewable energy. 
18
th
 March Libya Quartet, Arab League 
Headquarters, Cairo. 
The first Quartet meeting on 
Libya. 
31
st
 March EU-Moldova Association 
Council, Brussels. 
It was attended by Moldova’s 
Prime Minister Pavel Filip and 
discussed bilateral relations, the 
reform process in Moldova and 
security and defence policy. 
Moldova is negotiating a deep and 
comprehensive free trade area with 
the EU. 
3
rd
 April FAC, Brussels The Council adopted the EU 
Strategy on Syria. It also discussed 
Yemen and Libya. 
4
th
‒5
th
 April Conference, Brussels The EU, Germany, Kuwait, 
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Norway, Qatar, the United 
Kingdom and the United Nations 
co-chaired the Brussels 
Conference on Supporting the 
future of Syria and the region. 
26
th
‒27
th
 April Informal Meeting of Defence 
Ministers, Malta 
The meeting was hosted by Malta 
and was chaired by High 
Representative of the EU for 
Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy Federica Mogherini. The 
Secretary General of NATO and 
the UN Under Secretary General 
for Peacekeeping Operations were 
also present for part of the 
discussion. 
28
th
‒29
th
 April Foreign Ministers, Gymnich 
meeting, Malta 
Hosted by Malta, an informal 
meeting of all EU Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs who later in the 
afternoon met their counterparts 
from the candidate countries. 
11
th
 May  EU-Tunisia Association 
Council, Brussels. 
It was chaired by Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, George Vella 
representing Federica Mogherini. 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Tunisia, Khemaies Jhinaoui 
participated. The discussions 
covered the latest political and 
institutional developments and 
progress made in the process of 
democratic transition in Tunisia. 
Views on the situation in Libya 
and on security and counter-
terrorism were exchanged. 
15
th
 May FAC, Brussels. The focus was on Africa but 
Venezuela, Eastern Partnership, 
Security and Defence were also 
discussed. On Africa, the EU 
announced that it wished to 
refocus the relationship from aid to 
Partnership. 
23
rd
 May  Libya Quartet, Brussels. Second meeting of the Quartet. 
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Chapter 8 
A Small State at the Wheel: Malta’s Contribution to 
reaching the New European Consensus on Development  
Milan Pajic 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the contribution of Malta’s Presidency of the Council 
of the European Union to EU Development Policy, which culminated with 
the signing of the New European Consensus on Development (NCD) in the 
final days of its term.  
The essay analyses the processes, influences and demands behind the drive 
towards the NCD, and explores the role that Malta’s Presidency played in 
concluding the text. Considering that Malta does not have a long track record 
in development policy, it was interesting to assess how it managed to drive 
the process to conclusion within the term of its Presidency. This is even more 
relevant, considering the nature of the NCD, which is not a typical EU 
document (i.e. it is neither a legal act nor a Council conclusion), but a hybrid 
text of political importance concluded between the EU and its Member 
States. 
The paper also looks into small state influence in the EU, and provides more 
empirical evidence for the theoretical framework of actor-based 
institutionalism, while further validating the hypotheses on how small states 
can influence EU decision making. 
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Measuring the level of influence that a small member state exerts in the EU 
is a complex topic, mostly because there are diverse interpretations among 
scholars of the term “influence”, especially when applied to small states.197 
For this reason, the chapter rather looks at how Malta worked to promote its 
goals in EU Development Policy during its Presidency. 
The underlying theoretical framework is based on the paradigm of “actor-
centred institutionalism”, developed by Mayntz and Scharpf in their work 
“Gesellschaftliche Selbstregelung und politische Steuerung” [Social self-
regulation and political control].
198
 This concept effectively incorporates 
institutionalist and rational choice assumptions which state that institutions 
are a crucial factor in affecting the behaviour of states, which provide both 
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opportunities for, but can also restrict action.
199
 This approach was already 
used by several authors
200
 to analyse the influence of small states on the EU 
institutions and different policy areas.  
The hypotheses in this paper also incorporate an “actor-centred 
institutionalist” approach on small state influence which was developed by 
Baillie in her work on Luxembourg and the EU institutions.
201
 These 
hypotheses hold that a combination of factors relating to the EU set-up and 
the specificities of small states can contribute to them achieving their aims. 
Namely: 
(1) The EU decision making system itself gives small states many 
possibilities for representation and cooperation to gain from; 
(2) A small state might be specialised or have unique resources in a 
specific sector; 
(3) A state’s limited resources can allow it to exert more influence, 
because it is not seen by the bigger states as a threat, and has fewer 
vested interests which allows it to be an impartial coordinator, i.e. an 
“honest broker”;  
(4) The size of a small state’s administration creates internal cohesion 
and solidarity, reduces the lines of communication and facilitates 
decision making; 
(5) Cooperation and forming alliances with other countries gives small 
states more chances of safeguarding their interests. 
Methodology 
Since the NCD was concluded recently, the academic research on the topic is 
still sparse. Therefore, the empirical research consisted of primary sources 
(official publications), and third-party commentaries (NGOs and think 
tanks). The qualitative research consisted of elite interviews with the persons 
who were responsible for the drafting of the NCD in the EU institutions and 
the Maltese Presidency. Since there is no public record of the negotiations 
leading up to the conclusion of the NCD, interviews with officials provided 
the best way to learn what happened during the negotiations and to test the 
hypotheses outlined above, as well as assess the role that the Maltese 
Presidency played. 
Literature Review 
The available academic literature on the topic mainly concerns the previous 
European Consensus on Development from 2005, with the respective authors 
emphasising its importance in the evolution of EU Development Policy since 
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the late 1990s and early 2000s.
202
 They highlighted its symbolic meaning for 
EU Development Policy as the first time that all EU institutions and the MS 
“agreed on a common view and set of strategies to guide their policies and 
actions in the promotion of international development”.203  Moreover, this 
was also the first time that the EU developed its own direction on 
development policy, independently from the “Bretton Woods system” and 
the “Washington Consensus”. This impetus came after the EU was strongly 
criticised by NGOs and certain MS on the lack of its capacities and 
accountability in external aid programmes.
204
  
The literature on the NCD itself is mostly composed of contributions from 
NGOs to the European Commission’s public consultation on NCD as well as 
position papers on the draft text; papers by the most prominent development 
NGOs such as Oxfam,
205
 the European NGO Confederation for relief and 
development (Concord)
206
 and the Overseas Development Institute
207
 
outline what the NGO community would have liked to see in the final text 
of the NCD. Overall, they were positive on the vision set out in the NCD 
and its comprehensive approach, and their main demands were for stronger 
prioritisation of issues and the drafting of strategies for the implementation 
and financing of the vision outlined in the NCD. 
What is the New European Consensus on Development?  
The NCD created a common framework for European development 
cooperation which, for the first time, applied in its entirety to all EU 
institutions and each EU Member State (MS), unlike the European 
Consensus on Development (ECD) from 2005 which was divided in two 
parts: one applying to the European Commission and the other to the MS, 
and focussed on complementarity and coordination of EU development 
policy, and thus differentiating between EU and MS actions.
208
  
According to development policy academics,
209
 the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
210
 and certain civil society 
organizations,
211
 the ECD was a useful tool, fostering a shared and common 
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vision for EU and MS development cooperation and holding the EU and MS 
to account on their commitments.
212 
 
The update of the ECD was necessitated by the long period since its 
conclusion, and the many new developments that occurred since then, both 
within the EU
213
 and on the multilateral level.
214
 To accommodate these 
changes, the European Council proposed the modernization of the consensus 
on 12
th
 May 2016.
215
 The initiative came from High Representative/Vice 
President of the Commission (HRVP) Federica Mogherini and 
Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development Neven 
Mimica, who aimed to use it as “a tool to implement the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development”.216  
The Commission (COM) presented its proposal for a new European 
Consensus on Development to the Council and the EP on 22
nd 
November 
2016,
217
 and was preceded by a comprehensive public consultation.
218
 At the 
start of its Presidency in January 2017, Malta ambitiously took it upon itself 
to steer the file to conclusion within its tenure.
219
 After a last-minute attempt 
by one MS to alter the text of the NCD (see below), the final agreement was 
reached by EU foreign ministers at the Council meeting on 19
th
 May 2017.
220
  
In essence, the NCD sets down a blue-print on how the EU and its MS will 
conduct their respective development policies and implement the SDGs, up 
to 2030. It also recognises the strong links between development and other 
policies, such as peace and security, humanitarian aid, migration, the 
environment and climate change.
221
 
According to an EU MS diplomat, the NCD is a “very important document”, 
likened to a “constitution for EU Development Policy”;222 and in the words 
of a development policy practitioner, “the consensus will shape how some 14 
billion Euros a year is spent for the next decade”.223 This was also underlined 
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in an interview with a development policy academic who stated that the NCD 
provides a basis on which the European Parliament and the European public 
can measure the EU and its MS achievements in Development Policy.
224
 
Despite the comprehensive nature of the NCD and the public consultations, it 
was received quite critically by NGOs and Non-Governmental Development 
Organisations (NGDOs).
225
 While most commended it for making a 
reference to their specific areas of interest, some of the more influential 
NGDOs (like Concord
226
 and Oxfam
227
) disapproved of the fact that the final 
text included language on tackling migration and linking it to security; 
Oxfam emphatically stated that “EU governments have chosen to put their 
own political objectives ahead of those of development.”228 Unsurprisingly, 
all the EU and MS officials interviewed said that the criticism was 
unfounded, citing that only three points (39, 40 and 41) out of the 123 in the 
NCD concern migration. Secondly, the topic of migration and security 
touches on the difficult debate of ensuring security before development can 
take place. Nevertheless, while tackling migration does not form part of the 
SDGs, ensuring security is one of the main goals, and it is enshrined in SDG 
16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. Overall, it is difficult to argue that 
the references to tackling migration in the NCD were not included for 
national political purposes, while the NGDO concerns with the migration and 
security nexus will only materialise if the EU starts shifting resources from 
eradicating poverty to funding security contractors, however this paper will 
not go into that debate. 
Starting Positions 
Maltese Presidency Priorities 
Historically, Maltese involvement in overseas aid was mainly carried out by 
the Catholic Church which included aspects of missionary work, poverty 
alleviation but also political engagement.
229
 Traditionally, Malta was 
perceived as a net beneficiary of aid,
230
 and it was only in 2004 that it 
included a development policy heading in the national budget.
231
 With the 
country’s entry into the EU, it started building its capacities in this regard, 
like many other new EU MS.
232
 In 2006 development assistance policy was 
outlined as one of the twenty areas under the Strategic Objectives of the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
233
 Subsequently, the 2013 Guiding Principles of 
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Malta’s Foreign Policy mentioned that Malta will “take a more participatory 
role in the field of humanitarian and development assistance”.234 However, it 
was only in 2014 that Malta  elaborated on its development policy goals,
235
 
by outlining ten priorities for action through the years 2014 to 2020, 
highlighting areas such as democratization, good governance, migration and 
asylum.   
With the rise in the numbers of undocumented migrants arriving to its shores, 
curbing immigration was a top policy challenge for the Maltese Government 
ever since it joined the EU in 2004. According to the ex-Foreign Minister, 
Michael Frendo, “the link between migration and development was 
important from the start of Maltese [Official Development Assistance]”.236 
The importance given by Malta to the development/migration nexus is also 
shown in its Presidency priorities,
237
 which stated: “Malta wants to push for a 
holistic approach to migration, including both the internal and external 
aspect”.238 Although development policy as such did not feature among the 
top six priorities of its Presidency, concluding the NCD was nevertheless a 
main priority in the National Programme of the Presidency.
239
 However, in 
this instance, it also was linked to migration, where Malta explicitly wished 
the NCD to focus on the “migration and development nexus” in order to 
“achieve a comprehensive and balanced approach that addresses the root 
causes of migration and forced displacement.”240 Overall, it seems that Malta 
wanted to address the multifaceted causes of migration in all the possible 
policy areas, and NCD provided such a platform. 
Therefore, at the moment of starting negotiations on updating the NCD, 
Malta did not have a strongly set agenda like other MS with a long track 
record in development policy. Moreover, the fact that it held the Presidency 
also meant that it had to be seen as a “neutral broker” in order to build 
consensus between the different EU institutions and the MS,
241
 which 
constrained its possibility to push for any specific foreign policy or 
development interest. However, Malta did see an opportunity to conclude the 
NCD file within its term, and according to Maltese officials, “give it the 
visibility that this important EU policy deserves, in front of [EU] partners”.242 
This attitude is also typical in the Council, since Presidencies generally try to 
conclude as many dossiers as possible during their term. 
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Priorities of the European Commission and Parliament 
Along with the Council, both the European Commission and the European 
Parliament (EP) also wanted to update the EU’s development policy to take 
into consideration the recent developments. There was a tacit agreement 
between the COM and the EP that the NCD must be finalised by the 
European Development Days (EDD)
243
 that were to be held in June 2017.
244
 
Although the two institutions had similar overarching goals, they disagreed 
on the technical level of how stringently the EU should keep the MS to their 
commitments on development policy. For example, while both institutions 
wanted to have stronger language on Sexual and Reproductive Health and 
Rights (SRHR), the EP was adamant to keep the MS’s commitment to 
dedicate 0.7% of their Gross National Income to Official Development 
Assistance (ODA).
245
 
Priorities of the Council of the EU 
While it would be difficult to outline the priorities of each EU MS in this 
chapter, given their various approaches to development, diverging priorities 
(including geographical ones) and vested interests (many with a long ODA 
history), one has to consider that the issue of migration has been very high on 
the political agenda of most countries over the past few years. The influx of 
refugees and migrants from Europe’s southern and eastern dimensions and 
the terrorist attacks within the EU, propelled strong public sentiment in the 
EU. Thus, similarly to Malta, addressing the complex migration/development 
nexus was also a political priority for the other MS. This is reflected in the 
COM’s proposal,246 which already included language on migration, and thus 
pre-empting the political priorities of the MS, including Malta. 
At this point, it is important to note that Malta adopted the COM’s proposal 
as the base document for discussions in the Council, showing that the COM 
had taken in advance many of the MS preferences and red-lines into 
consideration. This also provides evidence that, from a small states’ 
perspective, building on work undertaken by institutions with more resources 
is often a necessity.
247
 
Reaching the Consensus: How the talks progressed 
The hybrid nature of the NCD left the institutions and especially the Maltese 
Presidency without a blue-print to follow, which increased the initial 
complexity of how to deal with the dossier. As already mentioned, the 
COM’s proposal was the basis for negotiations at the level of the Council 
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Working Party on Development Cooperation (CODEV), chaired by the 
Presidency. CODEV consists of officials in charge of development policy 
from the MS Permanent Representations to the EU who meet on a weekly 
basis. The text was then to be adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council. An 
issue that added to the complexity was that in CODEV, the MS came to a 
decision by unanimity, meaning all MS had to agree with the text in its 
entirety. 
On the side of the EP, the lead negotiators hailed from the main parties: 
Bogdan Wenta (Poland) from the European People’s Party (EPP), and 
Norbert Neuser (Germany) from the Socialists and Democrats (S&D). The 
EP’s negotiating position was based on a resolution penned by the two.248 
Secondly, since there was no previous set-up for concluding a hybrid text 
like the NCD, the Maltese Presidency decided to apply the Community 
Method to the discussions. This entailed basing the inter-institutional 
negotiations on the COM proposal as well, while the Council and the EP 
provided their feedback after internal consultations. This also meant that 
from the beginning, the inter-institutional negotiations were held in an 
informal trilateral format (with a rotating chair), composed of representatives 
from the EP, COM, and the Presidency representing the Council and being 
its penholder. Such a set-up allowed the stakeholders to save time since all 
parties involved were familiar with the Community Method and its 
processes.
249
 
The negotiations progressed smoothly overall, with the major disagreement 
between the EP and the Council being on the 0.7% GNI threshold for ODA. 
Considering that many EU MS were still recovering from the effects of the 
financial crisis, and some have never before achieved such a high level, they 
were unwilling to agree on a strong language in the NCD urging them to 
meet the threshold.
250
 The EP eventually decided not to push for this 
commitment due to strong resistance from the Council and other political 
reasons, namely, it did not wish to appear imposing on MS following the UK 
vote to leave the EU.
251
 
After a relatively short but vigorous period of negotiations (discussions were 
held between January and May 2017), an agreement was reached at the 
tripartite level on the symbolic date of 9
th
 May 2017 (Schuman Day).
252
 
However, there was an unexpected setback at the final stage in the Council of 
Ministers; although the Hungarian representatives in CODEV agreed to the 
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text in its entirety, the Hungarian Government did not wish to “endorse an 
EU development strategy that cites immigration as something positive”.253 
This threat of a veto resulted in a flurry of political activity that involved the 
top levels of the EU institutions and the Presidency. According to sources, 
the HRVP Federica Mogherini, Commissioner Neven Mimica and the 
Foreign Minister of Malta, George Vella, held urgent talks with the 
Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó, to iron out a compromise. In 
order to keep the consensus and address the Hungarian concerns, the parties 
agreed to remove “unnecessary repetitive language on migration”, and insert 
a reference to the Lisbon Treaty’s language on migration (Article 79(5) 
TFEU).
254
 Agreement was reached in the Council on 19
th
 May 2017.
255
 
It is important to note that the negotiators also praised the EP for playing an 
exemplary role at this moment,
256
 that is, it swiftly gave its approval to the 
newly amended language. Although the EP and its co-rapporteurs “deplored” 
the last-minute changes by the Council, they considered that many of EP’s 
demands were taken up and there were many positive elements in the NCD. 
Thus, they recommended the EP to endorse the compromise,
257
 and allow it to 
be ready for signature. The NCD was signed during the EDD on 7
th
 June 2017 
by the Prime Minister of Malta, Joseph Muscat on behalf of the Council and 
EU MS, the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, the 
HRVP Federica Mogherini, and the EP President, Antonio Tajani. 
How Malta contributed to reaching the NCD 
Analysing how Malta contributed to reaching the NCD provides an opportunity 
to verify the hypotheses on small state influence in EU decision making outlined 
earlier.
258
 
Initially, the fact that Malta held the Presidency, gave it considerable 
influence on driving the process forward as the Chair of CODEV and 
penholder of the document. In line with hypothesis (1), “the EU decision 
making system”, in this case: the rotating nature of the Presidency, provided 
Malta with possibilities for representation and cooperation with other MS 
and EU institutions. What facilitated Malta’s work to an extent was that all 
three EU institutions were aligned in the large part on what they wanted to 
achieve. However, it was up to the Presidency to push the document through 
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to completion in the specified time-frame. To do so, the Presidency increased 
the number of Council meetings from one, to a minimum of two per week.
259
 
Secondly, although Malta did not have a history of development policy 
expertise, it did have a unique resource (2) in this case, it was the high 
quality and competence of its negotiators. Notably, Malta’s experienced 
CODEV chair was also its delegate during the ECD discussions in 2005, 
which was helpful for the negotiations on the NCD as well. This was 
confirmed by all the persons interviewed for this research: they unanimously 
stressed that it was Malta’s human factor that contributed to reaching the 
consensus. Apart from the high competence of Malta’s representatives, the 
interviewees singled out their energy and dedication to concluding as many 
files as possible during Malta’s Presidency. A good example of this is that 
during Malta’s term, the Council came to around a dozen conclusions on 
development policy, while on average it is four or five.
260
 
From the interviews, it was also clear that Maltese negotiators had a good 
understanding of the functioning of EU’s institutions and the legislative 
processes, as well as of the text in question. According to a COM official, the 
decision by Malta at the outset of the negotiations to use the Community 
Method proved crucial; This saved time and allowed the negotiations to be 
held in a structured manner, which resulted in their ultimate success. 
The quality of Malta’s negotiators was also showcased in their understanding 
of the prevailing mood in the different institutions, on which the timeframe 
of the discussions was conditioned. For example, Maltese Presidency 
withheld discussing certain COM proposals until the timing was better and 
the likelihood of accepting them by the MS was higher. Likewise, the skill 
of Malta’s negotiators was showcased during the discussions in CODEV on 
references to the OECD guidelines on the implementation of the SDGs.
261
 
Since there was no agreement between the states on the issue, Malta 
decided to drop the direct reference to the guidelines, while it included an 
indirect reference to cooperation with the OECD, in order to reach 
consensus.
262
 
Malta also managed to keep the balance and build trust in the Council 
meetings, which was important given that the Presidency did not have a strict 
Council mandate for the talks. Namely, both the COM and the EP had their 
initial proposals, or “negotiating mandates” as one MS diplomat put it, while 
Malta had no such document in CODEV where it would hold the other MS to 
account on what they could negotiate. Malta’s leadership in the Council on 
securing compromises at this moment was crucial and ensured that the 
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Council was on track during the deliberations and did not get mired in 
political deadlock. Malta’s CODEV chair was apt in reaching agreements in 
the Council on the positions by using various negotiation techniques, such as 
regularly breaking off sessions or scheduling informal gatherings when it 
was clear that compromises could not be found in the official CODEV set-
up.
263
 
Thirdly, the interviews have showed that Malta was considered by all the 
parties as their main ally, while at the same time they praised its role as an 
“honest broker” (3) between the various institutional and MS interests. This 
shows that they did not perceive Malta as a threat or as having any hidden 
interests, and is in line with a Presidency’s role as a “neutral broker”. 
According to Maltese officials, building trust was essential for their work in 
this aspect as well, and they achieved it through open dialogue and 
transparent procedures. Moreover, Maltese negotiators fulfilled their duty 
in finding compromises between the different interests and putting forward 
realistic proposals, palatable to all the stakeholders. Also, Malta did not 
pressure the other parties to push through a specific agenda item. 
According to a MS official interviewed, the Presidency Chair of CODEV 
was continuously engaged in ensuring that neither side, nor institution, put 
forward proposals that would not be accepted by the others. A good 
example of this is the discussion on SRHR, where certain MS did not wish 
to include it in the NCD while the EP, the COM and other MS did. Here, the 
Presidency found a solution by proposing previously agreed language (such 
as from Council conclusions).
264
 
Malta’s crucial role as an “honest broker” can best be seen in the discussions 
in the Council on the issue of migration itself; according to Maltese officials, 
the Presidency worked tirelessly in CODEV to bridge the gap between MS 
who see migration as positive and those who wanted to introduce the notion 
of conditionality between readmission and development aid. The Chair 
continuously insisted that this was the “European Consensus on 
Development” and not the “European Consensus on Migration” in order to 
dissuade strong language on migration. This also shows that concluding the 
NCD was Malta’s highest priority. 265 
Fourthly, the top levels of the Maltese Government were also ready to get 
involved in brokering the deal during the Hungarian veto. This proves that 
the small size of the administration (4) allowed Malta to promptly respond to 
unexpected challenges. Malta’s Permanent Representative to the EU Marlene 
Bonnici got involved in the political discussions in COREPER, while the 
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Maltese Foreign Minister talked directly with the EU institutions to his 
Hungarian counterpart to broker the final deal. 
Finally, the Maltese interests regarding migration have come to be shared by 
many other EU MS, so it is difficult to say if the NCD would have included 
language on the link between migration and development if this had not 
happened, especially when one considers that the COM proposal already 
included language on the topic. Nevertheless, this confirms that a small state 
needs alliances (5) to push through a desired outcome. 
Conclusion 
In the words of the Member of the EP, Norbert Neuser: “I am not sure that 
any other presidency would have managed, or willed, to do what Malta has 
done to conclude the NCD.”266 
This sentiment aptly summarises Malta’s contribution and dedication to 
building consensus between the EU and it MS on the future of EU 
Development Policy. This chapter provided ample empirical evidence of 
how Malta helped reach the NCD, such as through its highly skilled 
representatives and its apt use of EU’s institutional set-up. 
The EU’s institutional set-up itself gave Malta a leading role as the 
Presidency of the Council of the EU, which allowed it to push through its 
main goal of concluding the NCD within its term. However, looking at 
whether Malta pushed through any of its policy priorities in the NCD is 
more difficult since tackling migration, which has been Malta’s priority 
since accession, is not only an issue for Malta anymore, but for all EU MS. 
Overall, it should not be undermined how Malta managed to harmonise the 
various approaches to development, diverging priorities and vested 
interests of the other states, many with a much longer history of overseas 
development assistance, all within a framework of unanimity at the Council 
and continuous pressure from the EP and COM for stronger commitments. 
Despite all of this, Malta managed to leave its footprint on EU 
Development Policy, and conclude a text that will guide EU development 
policy actions and budgets and those of its MS for years to come. 
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Chapter 9 
Neptune’s Turn:  
Maritime Policy during the Maltese Presidency 
Roderick Pace 
It was not surprising that Malta included initiatives in the maritime sector 
in its six-month presidency priorities. As an island state at the centre of the 
Mediterranean Sea, Malta could hardly sidestep the sector. The justification 
for its inclusion was couched in much broader political terms: that the EU 
was increasingly becoming dependant on the seas and hence the need to 
further strengthen the maritime sector under the EU Integrated Maritime 
Policy (IMP). In the words of the “Maltese Priorities”, the oceans offered 
“a diverse spectrum of innovative research and commercial activities that 
could be developed into high value-added job opportunities in line with the 
Blue Growth Initiative towards growth and competitiveness”.267 In this 
respect, the Maltese Priorities mentioned two concrete steps: international 
ocean governance aiming to secure “political endorsement on the way 
forward on a more coherent, comprehensive and effective EU policy to 
improve the international ocean governance framework and the 
sustainability of our oceans”; and the launching of the Western 
Mediterranean Initiative (Government of Malta, 2017). 
In its appraisal of the performance of the Maltese presidency of the Council 
of the EU in the maritime sector, the newspaper Politico gave Malta a 10/10. 
The same source described as a “crowning achievement” a political 
agreement reached on technical measures to limit fishing (Politico, 2017). 
This agreement was reached on 11 May 2017, when according to a Council 
statement, “the Agriculture and Fisheries Council agreed on a common 
position on a proposal for new rules on the conservation of fishery resources 
and the protection of marine ecosystems, often referred to as ‘technical 
measures’.”268 The decision is intended to permit the modernization of 
existing rules on how and where fishermen fish and regulate the landing of 
fisheries resources, technical specifications of fishing gear and measures to 
protect depleted fish species.
269
 
This chapter assess the work of the Maltese Presidency of the EU Council in 
the maritime sector. It will not dwell on the technical decisions reached, 
many of which became EU law after the Maltese presidency, but will focus 
instead on other achievements that strongly impact future EU policy 
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development such as Ocean Governance. Ocean Governance covers several 
activities such as the legal framework based on treaties, customary 
international law, general principles considered the norm by many states as 
well as decisions of international courts to mention a few. It includes policies 
pursued at global and regional levels, their implementation, governing 
institutions, environmental protection of the oceans, economic activity on the 
seas and much more.  
As a small state with rather limited diplomatic and financial resources 
which it could dedicate to the Presidency, Malta managed to achieve 
significant results in coordinating the development of maritime policy 
during its Presidency, certainly more than just the conclusion of difficult 
technical dossiers which is also an achievement in its own right: it laid the 
ground work for far reaching maritime policy developments if the 
initiatives approved during the presidency are followed through. How can 
we explain this? My initial take is that Malta felt quite at home in maritime 
policy because its very existence depends so much on the maritime sector 
and over several decades it has gathered enough experience and knowledge 
to help it navigate this policy framework well. The second reason is that 
over the years, Malta has managed to accumulate a reservoir of expertise in 
the maritime sector which helped it in no small way in achieving its 
objectives during the presidency. 
Ocean Governance 
In March 2017, Malta’s foreign minister, Dr George Vella, expanded further 
on the Maltese ambitions in the maritime sector during a speech he gave at 
the International Maritime Law Institute (IMLI) at the University of Malta. 
Minister Vella said that apart from Blue Growth, Malta was aiming to secure 
a political endorsement at the level of the EU, on how to proceed on 
international ocean governance “in ensuring the sustainable use of oceans 
and how best to develop a more coherent, comprehensive and effective EU 
policy to improve this framework”.270 He also stressed the importance of the 
Western Mediterranean Initiative, progress on nautical tourism, the 
prioritisation of maritime transport in the EU agenda grounded in the 
accepted principle that the sector is a global industry regulated at world level. 
The Minister also said that Malta wanted to prioritise other objectives such as 
ship safety, the protection of life at sea, living and working conditions, health 
and safety standards of seafarers.
271
  
A few weeks later, on 24
th
 March 2017, the Council of the EU adopted 
conclusions on “International ocean governance: an agenda for the future of 
our oceans.”272 It is important to highlight here, that a Joint communication 
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by the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
and the European Commission on “International ocean governance: an 
agenda for the future of oceans” which was published on 10 November 2016, 
had paved the way for the Council declaration. This type of declaration is of 
a non-binding nature but gives policy directions and a framework to guide 
future EU action in this field. Hence, though the progress made during 
Malta’s EU presidency may be underrated because the groundwork was 
prepared before the Maltese presidency, it is nevertheless important that the 
dossier was successfully closed. 
The 2017 Council declaration is significant because it identifies a number of 
fronts on which the EU and its member states need to take urgent action, 
beginning by stepping up their efforts to protect the oceans from adverse 
pressures. The declaration makes several major policy proposals which are 
already deeply rooted in the EU law, (the acquis communautaire) policies 
and practice. The declaration: 
 upholds UNCLOS and all treaties and initiatives concluded at the 
multilateral level to protect the oceans;  
 stresses the need for all EU member states to abide by them; 
 highlights the importance of the social dimension, particularly 
support for jobs in the maritime sector; 
 calls on the Commission to propose initiatives to the Council to 
develop Ocean Partnerships with key international partners, as a 
means of improving global governance and policy coherence vis-à-
vis the oceans;  
 encourages the EU and its member states to use development aid to 
strengthen global governance of the oceans in a sustainable and 
integrated approach;  
 calls for more effort to strengthen maritime security; emphasizes the 
need to address climate change effects on the oceans and protect the 
ocean environment by controlling pollution. In this case, it 
emphasized the need to prevent marine litter, banning micro-plastics 
and stopping illegal or unregulated fishing;  
 highlights the protection of biodiversity; 
 proposes the boosting of marine and maritime research and 
innovation activities in Horizon 2020 and its successor programme. 
 
The declaration opens a broad front that requires a lot of energy to implement 
and several policy initiatives in the different sectors mentioned in the coming 
years. But in the end, most of the policies and measures listed have to be 
implemented by governments who are notoriously dexterous for slipping 
their legal harness. This applies to the EU member states who have a very 
bad history when it comes to the unsustainable exploitation of fishery 
resources and to the non-member states over which the EU has no 
jurisdiction to compel them to adhere and implement agreed measures. 
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Strengthening research and innovation – and cooperation with civil society as 
the declaration proposes, can increase knowledge about the problems posed 
and help mobilise international public opinion to pressurize governments 
into action. The role of public opinion is itself complex with several 
ramifications as we find in a resolution on ocean governance approved by 
the European Parliament on the 16
th
 January 2018 which stressed: 
“that improving transparency, public accessibility of information, 
stakeholder involvement and the legitimacy of UN organisations, 
including public accountability of country representatives at 
international bodies such as the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) and the International Seabed Authority (ISA) is a matter of 
priority in addressing existing shortcomings in the governance 
framework.” 273 
Ocean governance has a special place in Malta’s history. In 1967, just three 
years after gaining independence from the United Kingdom, Malta’s 
Permanent Representative at the UN, Arvid Pardo, made a statement at the 
UN General Assembly calling for the resources of the oceans of the deep sea 
bed to be declared as the “common heritage of mankind”.   
The proposal led to the start of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
culminating in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). The common heritage was meant to prevent an anarchic 
scramble for the resources of the deep seabed, which could only benefit those 
states which had the power and technological capabilities to take advantage 
of the situation. Later, in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 
deep sea bed was defined as “the area” comprising the “seabed and ocean 
floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”.274 Pardo 
had passionately argued that declaring the natural resources of the deep 
seabed as Common Heritage of mankind would help bridge the economic 
gap separating the developing and developed States and thus reduce the 
propensity for international conflict. A 1970 UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
Resolution further elaborates the operational principles of “the area”, mainly: 
(i) “non-appropriation” meaning that no “states or persons, natural or 
juridical, and no “state shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign 
rights” over it; (ii) all activities within it were to be governed by an 
international regime which was yet to be established;  (iii) all exploitation of 
resources was to be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole;  (iv) 
“the area” was to be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes; (v) benefits 
were to be shared equitably by all states and (vi) states were to protect the 
marine environment and conserve the natural resources of the area.
275
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Malta also participated in the 1975 UN Environmental Programme’s (UNEP) 
Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) for the Protection of the Mediterranean 
Sea against pollution which was based on the Barcelona Convention for the 
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution signed that same year. 
Concluded between the European Economic Community and sixteen 
Mediterranean littoral states, MAP grew out of UNEP’s Regional Seas 
Programme and was intended to serve as a model for similar plans for the 
other oceans. In 1995, MAP was replaced by the Action Plan for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment and the Sustainable Development of 
the Coastal Areas of the Mediterranean (MAP Phase II). Malta participated 
in this initiative from the start. A Regional Oil Combatting Centre (ROCC) 
was established in Malta in 1976 and in 1989 it was transformed into a 
Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the 
Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC). 
The EU has seen a steady and consistently growing interest in a holistic 
approach to the maritime sector since 2007 when the European Commission 
published the ‘Blue Paper’ setting out the parameters of an integrated 
maritime approach.
276
 The integrated approach is based on the notion that the 
EU can reap better results by coordinating its maritime policies in order to 
exploit the many and diverse resources of the oceans while at the same time 
safeguarding their long-term sustainability. This major step forward in the 
EU’s maritime policy occurred under the guidance of European 
Commissioner Joseph Borg (2004‒2010). Commissioner Borg had indicated 
two priorities at the start of his stint as Commissioner: setting the European 
Union on the path towards a European Maritime Policy which would 
increase the coherence and co-ordination between the EU’s sea-related 
policies and activities, “extend and optimise the range of benefits that (are) 
derived from maritime activities without threatening the integrity of the 
resource base: the sea itself.”277 The second objective which was closely 
linked to the first was to secure “the ecological, economic and social 
sustainability of the European fishing and aquaculture industry”.278 
The current EU Commissioner for the Environment, Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries (2014‒2019), Karmenu Vella, summarizes his priorities in an 
antonymic way which however show continuity with the efforts of his 
predecessors: protecting Europe’s environment while maintaining 
competitiveness; creating sustainable jobs while safeguarding resources; 
implementing the new Common Fisheries Policy and “leading the task with 
the EU’s global partners, of defining the management and governance of 
(our) planet’s oceans.”279 However, beyond this, there is a point to be made 
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that physical geography can mould the political culture of a state in a certain 
way so that certain forms of behaviour tend to recur. The fact that Malta is an 
island explains its maritime “bent”. But it also shows that to a greater extent 
than is immediately apparent, that its political culture has been conditioned 
by this fact of its physical geography which may explain policy continuity in 
the maritime sector.  
The Blue Economy 
The Blue Economy has become the cornerstone of EU maritime policy and 
not surprisingly the concept has also been gaining interest in research and 
academic analysis, though it has not so far made perceptible inroads. The 
definitions of Blue Growth vary a lot, according to what they include and 
leave out, but a familial resemblance has already emerged that safeguards its 
integrity, namely that the diverse definitions have not rendered the concept 
vague, ambiguous and useless as an analytical tool. Peter Ehlers said that the 
Blue Economy covers “the traditional maritime industry: maritime 
transportation as the core of maritime industry, including port services and 
shipbuilding, as well as fisheries, and also the exploitation of oil and gas 
from the seas. These sectors are still gaining in importance.”280 However, he 
also highlights the European Commission’s identification of five newer areas 
of activities that hold a lot of promise for further growth of the Blue 
Economy, namely aquaculture, coastal and maritime tourism (blue tourism) 
marine biotechnology (blue biotechnology), ocean energy (blue energy) and 
Seabed mining. Many of these are already key important contributors to 
Malta’s economy, with tourism alone contributing just under 15% to Malta’s 
GDP in 2017, and 26% if the indirect and induced effects are taken into 
account.
281
 
The Blue Economy is predicted to continue expanding in the next 15 years. 
However, it should not be assumed that it will generate only positives. 
There are bound to be unintended consequences, as well as costs. Many of 
the sectors have reciprocal negative effects: the development of offshore 
activities affects maritime transport, coastal development restricts coastal 
fishing; acqua culture, coastal and marine tourism, marine renewable 
energy and recreational fisheries compete for limited coastal space. In a 
word, the development of the Blue Economy can further stress the 
Mediterranean ecosystem and the outcome of these developments cannot be 
predicted with precision.
282
 With a rapidly expanding population around the 
Mediterranean coast and the effects of climate change the pressures can 
only increase. The other problem is that when confronting Mediterranean 
challenges, the EU cannot operate alone but must secure the active 
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cooperation of the non-EU Mediterranean states. Of itself, this produces 
additional political challenges that require time and effort to implement. 
Much to its credit, the Maltese Presidency did not focus exclusively on the 
beneficial effects of Blue growth. During the Presidency, the European 
Commission organized a Ministerial Conference in Malta on sustainable 
fishing in the Mediterranean which took place on the 29
th
 and 30
th
 March. 
This conference managed to secure the participation of 22 ministers from the 
23 littoral states. The conference endorsed the Malta MedFish4Ever 
Declaration, another piece of soft law which however, was the only possible 
accord that could be secured from this multilateral initiative. Again the 
importance of this declaration is that it establishes a set of political and 
policy objectives which need to be monitored for compliance in the years to 
come. Over 90% of Mediterranean fish stocks assessed are over-exploited, 
and despite recent efforts the situation is not improving. Managing fish 
stocks is complicated by the fact that many of them are shared with non-EU 
countries. The Declaration will be useful in the EU’s diplomatic efforts 
towards the sustainable and balanced management of Mediterranean fish 
stocks to convince all the littoral states of the urgent need of its 
implementation. The Malta meeting followed other gatherings on the same 
problem which took place in Brussels (April) and Catania (February) the 
previous year, both of which were addressed by Commissioner Vella. 
The European Ministers responsible for Blue growth met in Valletta on 20
th
 
April 2017. This was an Informal Ministerial meeting which did not focus 
exclusively on Blue Growth but also on ocean governance, innovation and 
nautical tourism. It was co-chaired by Commissioner Vella.  The final 
Declaration adopted by the ministers dwelt mainly on the “positives” of the 
Blue Economy, but attention was also drawn to certain worrying aspects that 
required more work such as “the value of healthy and productive oceans for 
the blue economy”, the need to maintain sustainability and improve ocean 
governance.
283
 Sustainability was the key word of the declaration, appearing 
no fewer than 16 times in the document. 
The ministers called on the EU Member States “to identify potential gaps and 
challenges, mainly those posed by climate change and insularity, to ensure 
that the outermost, peripheral, coastal and island regions are offered adequate 
growth opportunities and benefit from all the relevant funding streams 
without prejudice to any future discussions. Innovative actions in those 
regions should respond to those challenges and inefficiencies by facilitating 
access to markets and services such as e-health, water adequacy, energy 
efficiency, promotion of circular economy, as well as research to increase the 
                                                             
283 Valletta Declaration, 2017. 
 
113 
 
 
knowledge base on relevant strengths and weaknesses, including on coastal 
erosion, desertification and ocean acidification.”284  
The declaration is useful because it is a springboard for the further 
development of the EU’s 2012 Blue Growth Strategy.285 It maps out a 
number of policy initiatives and further studies that the EU needs to embark 
on in the future to ensure that the conditions for blue growth are strengthened 
and the environment and ecosystem of the oceans, including the 
Mediterranean, are safeguarded. It encourages action to meet other serious 
challenges, some of them already known, such as the need for marine spatial 
planning and measures against the negative effects of climate change. It 
underlines the importance and role of innovation and research, skill 
improvement of the workforce, the circular economy, the role of regional 
authorities, the strengthening of business and trade links.  
The Blue Economy in the Western Mediterranean Basin 
On the 19
th
 April 2017, the Commission published a Communication on the 
sustainable development of the blue economy in the Western Mediterranean 
(European Commission, 2017). This communication was the work of 
Commissioner Vella and Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European 
Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations. For the proposed 
actions to be put into effect, the EU has to cooperate with non-member 
countries in the region. However, cooperation and dialogue between both 
shores of the Western Mediterranean is not a novelty.  
The creation of the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989 and the start of the EU’s 
New Mediterranean Policy in 1990 led to the launching of the 5+4 Dialogue, 
the brain child of French President Francois Mitterrand, involving France, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain on the northern shore and Algeria, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia on the southern shore. Malta joined this 
informal dialogue from 1990 as an associate member but became a full 
member soon after, for which reason the dialogue became the 5+5.
286
 It is 
perhaps the informality of this dialogue and the tenacity with which it has 
been supported by all the participating states at various stages that has kept it 
alive. The dialogue’s progress has not been linear and it has withstood 
several storms and friction. For example, problems between Algeria and 
Morocco over the Western Sahara have often rocked it. The imposition of 
UN sanctions on Libya in 1992 which lasted until they were lifted in 2004 
also raised serious obstacles as did the 2001 Gulf War. Regular ministerial 
meetings have more or less been the norm since the one held in Oran, Algeria 
in 2004. 
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The first summit of the heads of state and of government of the 5+5 took 
place in Tunis in 2003 and the second in Malta in 2012. Over the years, the 
dialogue has evolved and expanded its remit to include other areas in 
addition to the foreign ministers’ meetings, a process which began in 1995. 
Migration was added in 2002, an inter-parliamentary dialogue in 2003, 
defence in 2004 and tourism in 2006. In 2007 transport was also added, 
followed by education in 2009 and the environment in 2010.
287
 The last 
foreign ministers’ conference met in Algiers in January 2018. At the meeting 
it was decided that Malta would succeed France in assuming, for the next 
two years, the northern co-presidency of the 5+5 Dialogue, a position it had 
held in 2005. It is also relevant to observe that the 5+5 work closely together 
within the ambit of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) to which all the 
ten countries belong and in collaboration with the UfM’s secretariat. 
This brief foray into the 5+5 or as it is increasingly referred to, the Western 
Mediterranean Forum, was needed to show as succinctly as possible the 
several links of cooperation that link the countries on the two shores of the 
Western Mediterranean and why this sub-region has all the necessary 
conditions to successfully complete the proposed initiatives included in the 
Communication on the sustainable development of the Blue Economy in 
that sub-region. However, it would be foolish to believe that these links of 
interdependence are sufficient for the success of the project. The devil is 
usually in the details and it is these that will make or break the initiative. 
One thing is certain that the EU and its member states will have to sweat a 
lot to make it work. 
In the Communication the EU proposes several goals, actions and targets 
summarized in the diagram below. The targets are very ambitious and 
depend a lot on efficient implementation at national level. 
After the Maltese Presidency of the Council of the EU, the Western 
Mediterranean states meeting in Naples in November 2017 approved the 
governance and management structure of the initiative. It was decided that 
the political direction would continue to be provided by the ministerial 
meetings and that a WestMed Steering Committee be established to act as the 
main decision-making body. The Steering Committee is composed of one or 
two national representatives (it is up to the state concerned to decide how 
many to appoint), the European Commission and the UfM Secretariat.
288
 The 
Steering Committee is co-chaired by a member from a Maghreb state and 
another from the EU (European Commission, 2017b). 
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Conclusion 
Six months are not a century and it places natural limitations and restraints 
on a small country presidency like Malta’s. It is always difficult to assess 
the success or failure of a presidency in a particular policy area considering 
that many dossiers are initiated before the presidency begins and major 
political agreements achieved at Council level during the presidency may 
become hard law only after the presidency’s term has ended. This is 
certainly Malta’s experience in the maritime field. In our assessment Malta 
managed to do a lot and the “technical” agreement reached in limiting 
fishing in order to conserve fish species in the long-term merits a lot of 
attention because it managed to unblock a stalemate that had lasted for 
some years. 
On 22
nd
 March 2018, as a follow up on the MedFish4ever Declaration of 
2017, the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) on 
which 23 Mediterranean littoral states and the EU, including states of the 
Black Sea, are represented and which is authorized to adopt binding 
recommendations on the conservation and management of fishery resources 
in the region under its purview, issued a set of proposals whose objective is 
to restore and preserve healthy fishing stocks.
289
 According to a press 
statement issued by the European Commission, “The measures … cover, 
inter alia, a joint inspection and surveillance scheme for the Strait of Sicily 
and management plans for Turbot in the Black sea, Red coral in the 
Mediterranean and Blackspot seabream in the Alboran Sea. The measures 
also set out new fishing restricted areas in the Adriatic Sea and the Strait of 
Sicily.”290 Another objective of the proposals is to change and implement a 
number of EU legal instruments to implement the decision.  
However, moving beyond the practical management of fisheries resources 
and their conservation for enjoyment of future generations of consumers and 
the fishing industry, the Maltese Presidency also chalked important 
achievements in completing key Council declarations which serve as a 
springboard for future policy developments particularly in global governance 
and the Western Mediterranean. 
Approaches to the Blue Economy and blue growth – which lie at the heart of 
maritime policy – were also clarified further and boosted by the Maltese 
Presidency which was alert to the inherent challenges they posed. The 
traditional and newer forms of economic activities in the Blue Economy can 
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lead to benefits, but these sectors also create externalities to each other which 
need to be mitigated. Hence, for example, a more intensive use of coastlines 
increases competition for space and calls for spatial management. 
Unmanaged growth in the Blue Economy can lead to negative consequences. 
Lastly, the Western Mediterranean initiative was successfully launched 
which aims at creating a macro-region in that sub-region linking 10 countries 
from both shores of the Mediterranean Sea. This was another presidency 
milestone. 
Ocean governance, maritime policy and maritime affairs are of growing 
importance for the present and future of the world. The maritime sector is a 
complex one which can only be fully understood – if at all – by a cross and 
inter-disciplinary approach on several fronts tackling economic, 
environmental and political problems. The marine environment is 
increasingly being placed under enormous pressure by man-made, human-
induced problems stemming from misuse of resources and the negative 
impacts of climate change. As a maritime state, an island state, Malta was 
able to transmit clearly, diligently and successfully its sensitivities toward 
this sector and using its first-hand knowledge of the issue it was able to 
overcome the drawbacks of smallness and lead.  
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DIAGRAM  
GOALS, PRIORITIES AND TARGETS BLUE ECONOMY WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN 
GOALS PRIORITIES TARGETS 
A safer and more 
secure maritime 
space 
Cooperation between 
coastguards 
Full coverage of Automatic Identification System by 
2018 aiming to share more maritime traffic monitoring 
data at regional level;  
Border surveillance strengthened by involving 
neighbourhood countries in the Seahorse Mediterranean 
Network by 2018.  
Maritime safety and 
response to marine 
pollution 
A smart and 
resilient blue 
economy 
Strategic research and 
innovation 
Western Mediterranean countries included in the 
BLUEMED Initiative and in its Strategic Research 
Agenda by 2017;  
- 25 % increase in certified eco-ports and marinas by 
2022;  
- 20 % increase in sustainable aquaculture production 
value by 2022;  
- 20 % increase in off-season tourist arrivals by 2022.  
Maritime clusters 
development 
Skills development and 
circulation 
Sustainable consumption 
and production (maritime 
transport, ports, maritime 
and costal tourism, marine 
aquaculture) 
Better 
governance of 
the sea 
Spatial planning and 
coastal management 
100 % of the waters under national jurisdiction and 100 
% of coastlines to be covered by Maritime Spatial 
Planning and Integrated Coastal Management and their 
implementing mechanisms by 2021;  
- At least 10 % of the coastal and marine areas to be 
covered by marine protected areas and other effective 
area-based conservation measures by 2020;  
- 20 % reduction in marine litter on beaches by 2024;  
- Southern Mediterranean countries to be included in 
EMODNET by 2020;  
- All States equipped with adequate legal framework and 
human and technical capabilities to meet their fisheries 
control and inspection responsibilities as flag, coastal 
and port States by 2020;  
- 100 % of key Mediterranean stocks24 to be subject to 
adequate data collection, scientifically assessed on a 
regular basis and managed through a multiannual 
fisheries plan by 2020.  
 
Marine and maritime 
knowledge 
Biodiversity and marine 
habitat conservation 
Sustainable fisheries and 
coastal community 
development 
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Chapter 10 
The Parliamentary Dimension of the Council Presidency 
Kenneth Curmi 
Context and Definition 
Ask anyone about the European Union Presidency, and you are bound to be 
inundated with references to the executive. Indeed, at the very mention of the 
word “Presidency”, one imagines Ministers, cabinets and the Council of the 
European Union. Not surprisingly, given that the official name of the EU 
Presidency is the Presidency of the Council of the European Union.
291
 
One could say that the parliamentary dimension seeks to somewhat correct 
this by ensuring that the parliament of the Member State holding the 
Presidency plays an important role during this time. The parliamentary 
dimension also provides a chance for members of the executive and the 
European Commission to meet and discuss topics with parliamentarians.
292
 
Given that the parliamentary institutions are the representatives of the people, 
the parliamentary dimension’s lack of exposure is an unfortunate reality, and 
is symptomatic of the strong emphasis generally afforded to the executive, 
and, in the European context, the Council, which contributes to an unhealthy 
shift of power towards the executive, effectively weakening the necessary 
democratic hinge of parliamentary oversight.
293
 
The reality only adds to the irony, for the structure, process and objectives of 
the parliamentary dimension naturally overlap and reflect the executive 
                                                             
291 A telling semantic that goes beyond mere semantics: there is a Parliamentary dimension to 
the Council Presidency, and not two distinct dimensions (Parliamentary and Council) to the 
EU Presidency. It also ties well with Czachór’s own third summarizing point of the history of 
European parliamentarism up to the Lisbon Treaty, which states that “the provisions of the 
treaties and political structure of the Community and European Union have minimized the role 
and significance of the national parliaments, emphasizing the legislative and decision-making 
positions of the Council of the European Union.” (Czachór (2013) p. 9) and shows that 
remnants of this phenomenon remain even post-Lisbon. 
292 As happened during the meetings organised by the Maltese Parliament, with a long list of 
high-profile speakers, including First Vice-President of the European Commission Frans 
Timmermans, Vice-President of the European Commission for the Euro and Social Dialogue 
Valdis Dombrovskis, President of the European Parliament Antonio Tajani, High 
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-
President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini and Michel Barnier, the Chief 
Negotiator for Brexit negotiations with the UK, amongst others. 
293.Czachór addresses this issue in his paper, pointing out the late response by national 
parliaments and the European Parliament.  
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dimension: the two are not competing spheres by nature, but rather, as should 
be expected, complementary parts to a greater whole. 
In many ways, the parliamentary dimension mirrors the Council Presidency. 
Just as the latter, for instance, employs a collaborative structure comprised of 
three succeeding presidencies ‒ “Member states holding the presidency work 
together closely in groups of three, called ‘trios’.”294 ‒ the parliamentary 
dimension has its own trio.
295
 On 20
th
 April 2015, the Speakers of the Houses 
of the Parliament of The Netherlands, Slovakia and Malta, signed a 
declaration of cooperation between the three Parliaments for the period 
starting from January 2016 to June 2017 (the period of 18 months during 
which the three Member States would successively hold the Presidency).
296
 
In it, they pledged to (a) ensure effective communication and co-ordination at 
political and official levels across the three Parliaments with regard to the 
conferences, programmes and other relevant parliamentary activities related 
to the respective Presidencies; (b) ensure effective coordination with regard 
to co-operation with the European Parliament on issues that touch upon the 
Presidency Trio; and (c) ensure coordination regarding the effective 
communication of the outcome of conferences and other parliamentary 
activities to European citizens.
297
 
 
Meetings held during the Parliamentary Dimension 
The parliamentary dimension’s main objective is to provide a meeting place 
where Members of the parliaments of the EU, including the European 
Parliament, can meet and discuss subjects of relevance to the Presidency’s 
priorities. 
Just like the Presidency of the Council, the parliamentary dimension lasts for 
six months, during which a number of meetings are held in the country 
holding the Presidency and in Brussels. There is indeed a difference between 
the parliamentary dimension held during the first six months of the year and 
the one held in the last six, since some meetings are specific to one and are 
annually and exclusively held at the same time of year. 
                                                             
294 European Council web-page. 
295.“The Trio, based on the principle of rotation, ensures continuity and consistency in the 
work of the Council of the EU. The Trio defines a general agenda and implements a joint 
programme, while each of its members, in a predetermined order, presides over the Council of 
the EU for a period of six months.” Parliament of Malta (2017b). 
296 The declaration was signed by Mrs Ankie Broekers-Knol, President of the Senate of the 
Netherlands, Mrs Anouchka Van Miltenburg, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the 
Netherlands, Mr Peter Pellegrini, Speaker of the National Council of the Slovak Republic and 
Dr Angelo Farrugia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Parliament of Malta, meeting in 
the Camera dei Deputati in Rome before the start of the Conference of the Speakers of the 
European Union. 
297 Staten-General, Národná Rada, Parlament ta’ Malta (2015). 
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Beginning with the meetings which are held in common, we find, most 
notably, the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of 
Parliaments of the European Union, better known as COSAC,
298
 which is 
held bi-annually (together with a meeting reserved solely to the Chairpersons 
of the Committees, also held bi-annually). COSAC was established in May 
1989 in Madrid by the Speakers of the Parliaments of the EU Member States, 
with the first ever meeting taking place later that year in Paris. It has its own 
website,
299
 rules of procedure,
300
 modus operandi and secretariat.
301
 
Next up is the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic 
Coordination and Governance in the European Union, which also meets bi-
annually and “provides a framework for a debate and exchange of 
information and best practices in implementing the provisions of the Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union”.302 Whereas the conference is held during each Presidency, the 
format differs slightly according to the period during which it is held: “In the 
first half of each calendar year, the Conference takes place in Brussels within 
the so-called European Parliamentary Week, and it is co-organized and co-
chaired by the presiding national parliament and the European Parliament. In 
the second half of the calendar year, the Conference takes place in the 
Member State currently holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU and 
is chaired by the presiding parliament.”303 
Another meeting which is held both in the first and second halves of the 
calendar year is the Inter-parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP), which provides “a framework for the exchange of information and 
best practices in the area of CFSP and CSDP, to enable national Parliaments 
and the European Parliament to be fully informed when carrying out their 
respective roles in this policy area.”304 
The meeting of Secretaries-General of the European Union Parliaments and 
the Conference of Speakers of the European Union Parliaments, which bring 
together the Speakers of the national parliaments of the Member States, 
                                                             
298.The acronym stands for: Conférence des Organes Parlementaires Spécialisés dans les 
Affaires de l’Union des Parlements de l’Union Européenne. 
299 http://www.cosac.eu/ 
300.European Parliament (2011). 
301.This is composed of one Permanent Member, together with a member representing the 
European Parliament and a member from each of the Parliaments making up the Presidential 
Troika (not to be confused with the Trio). Thus, I am currently a member of the COSAC 
Secretariat, and will remain till the end of the Estonian Presidency, when I will be replaced by 
an Austrian member. 
More information at COSAC (2018). 
302 Národná rada Slovenskej republiky (2016). 
303 Ibid. 
304 European Union (2012). 
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including the President of the European Parliament, are both held annually. 
The Conference meets in the first half of the year, but is organised by the 
parliament of the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union during the second half of previous the calendar year.
305
 It is 
a “forum for the exchange of opinions, information and experiences among 
the Speakers, on topics related to the role of parliaments and the organisation 
of parliamentary functions, as well as for the promotion of research activities 
and common action, also with respect to the forms and instruments of inter-
parliamentary cooperation.”306  
The Meeting of the Secretaries-General is “a preparatory stage to the 
Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments. It elaborates the content and 
organization of the agenda of the Conference of Speakers and approves its 
underlying program framework.”307 
To the above-mentioned meetings should be added a number of inter-
parliamentary meetings and events, including bilateral visits, on topics 
chosen by the parliament of the Member State holding the Presidency.  
Overview of Inter-parliamentary meetings held during the 
Parliamentary Dimension of the Maltese Presidency 
 
During Malta’s six-month presidency of the Council of the European Union, 
five inter-parliamentary meetings were held under the parliamentary 
dimension. It is important to stress that objectives, results and achievements 
are harder to quantify when discussing the parliamentary dimension since it 
exists principally to provide a forum for debate and the exchange of best 
practices and ideas with the hope of influencing the executive. In the end, 
however, it is the latter which implements the priorities set by the 
Presidency.  
Meeting of the Chairpersons of COSAC 
The first inter-parliamentary meeting, inaugurating the parliamentary 
dimension of the presidency, was the Meeting of the Chairpersons of 
COSAC, held on 22
nd‒23rd January 2017 in Malta. It started with a meeting 
of COSAC’s Presidential Troika made up of the Chairpersons of the 
European Affairs Committee of the Maltese, Slovak and Estonian 
Parliaments, as well as the Chair of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs 
of the European Parliament. 
The agenda of these Troika meetings usually consists of the adoption of the 
agenda of the meeting of the Presidential Troika; the approval of the draft 
                                                             
305 Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments (2010). 
306 Ibid. 
307 Národná rada Slovenskej republiky (2017). 
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programme of the meeting of the Chairpersons of COSAC; the debate on the 
draft programme for the LVII COSAC; the approval of the outline of the Bi-
annual Report of COSAC; as well as the presentation of the letters received 
by the Presidency and other business to be discussed. 
The Troika meeting is in effect a limited and usually fairly brief meeting that 
presents the opportunity for the Chairs to discuss the meeting to be held the 
following day and ensure that any disputes are settled beforehand, especially 
with regard to certain procedural issues or special requests arising from 
letters previously sent to the Presidency or the Troika by other parliaments. 
The meeting is also used to voice or lobby certain interests: during the debate 
on the draft programme for the LVII COSAC, for instance, the European 
Parliament Chair Ms Danuta HÜBNER suggested that a speaker from the 
European Parliament be invited to the debate on migration.
308
 More 
importantly, the Troika discusses the draft Conclusions and Contributions, as 
drafted by the Presidency, and agrees on a compromise text in response to 
any amendments received by Parliaments/Chambers which is then presented 
during the meeting the following day. 
Letters received mostly consist of parliaments from non-EU Member States 
requesting participation at COSAC meetings, and parliamentarians of EU 
Member States requesting items to be put on the agenda. One particular 
letter, from Mr Vannino CHITI, former Vice President of the Italian Senato 
della Repubblica, asked for the organization of a visit for COSAC members 
to so-called hot-spots: places seriously affected by and struggling to cope 
with the effects of migration. This was the first of its kind, and a visit to 
Pozallo, Sicily, organised by the Italian Senate, eventually took place during 
the Maltese Presidency on 5
th‒6th May 2017. It is an example of concrete 
action arising from the parliamentary dimension of the Maltese presidency. 
The following day saw the Chairpersons from all the European Affairs 
Committees of the participating parliaments get together for a whole day of 
discussions. The meeting was addressed by the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, Hon. Angelo Farrugia, and the Chairman of the 
Parliament’s Foreign and European Affairs Committee, the Hon. Luciano 
Busuttil. The meeting was divided in two sessions: the first session focussed 
on the priorities of the Maltese Presidency, and was addressed by the Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister for European Affairs and Implementation of the 
Electoral Manifesto, Hon. Louis Grech, who referred to the challenges that 
the EU faced and the current times of uncertainty and noted that the 
Presidency theme was “rEUnion” with sustainability and restoring belief to 
the European project at its core; and the Minister for Tourism, Hon. Edward 
Zammit Lewis, who, inter alia, noted that the Maltese Presidency would 
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contribute further to the Digital Single Market Strategy, making a specific 
reference to the creation of a Digital Tourism Network while also striving to 
manage the Union’s external border better. This was met favourably by 
participants, who appreciated the fact that the Maltese Presidency had set 
migration high on its agenda. 
The second session focussed on the European Commission Work Programme 
2017,
309
 and was addressed by the First Vice-President of the European 
Commission, Mr Frans Timmermans. As is usual at these meetings, the 
sessions closed with a debate, whereas the Chair of the European Affairs 
Committee of the Presiding Parliament gave the closing remarks. The 
discussion here centred around the issue of institutional cooperation when 
setting the EU’s priorities, as well as the role national Parliaments had to 
play in this process. The EU’s legislative priorities in 2017, as agreed to by 
the Presidents of the three institutions, focused on: tackling inequalities; 
providing security and addressing internal and external threats; supporting 
the digital single market; making the EU economy sustainable; and 
implementing the Energy Union Strategy. The benefits of identifying 
priorities listed in the CWP early on were noted by Mr Bastiaan VAN 
APELDOORN, Chairman of the Standing Committee on European Affairs of 
the Dutch Senate. Notwithstanding some reservations expressed by a few 
speakers, a number of Members welcomed the CWP’s focus and ambition. 
Mr TIMMERMANS was critical with regard to the “green card” mechanism, 
and argued that this would go against existing treaty provisions and the 
respective institutional roles and competences assigned therein. 
Inter-parliamentary Conference on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
The Inter-parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination 
and Governance in the European Union under Article 13 of the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
Union (TSCG), is organised jointly by the Presidency Parliament and the 
European Parliament, and is co-chaired by both. It was held in the European 
Parliament in Brussels within the framework of the European Parliamentary 
Week that took place between the 30
th
 January‒1st February 2017. 
The Conference began with a plenary session on the Fiscal Compact, with 
the President of the European Parliament, Mr Antonio Tajani, and the 
Speaker of the House, Hon. Angelo Farrugia delivering opening statements. 
This was followed by another session dealing with the social dimension in 
the Economic and Monetary Union. An exchange of views took place in each 
session. 
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The following day saw a further two plenary sessions, the first dealing with 
national reforms fostering sustainable growth and chaired by Hon. Silvio 
Schembri, Chair of the Economic and Financial Affairs Committee of the 
Maltese Parliament. 
The last session focussed on the role of financial assistance programmes and 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in safeguarding the stability of the 
euro, and was co-chaired by Hon. Schembri and Mr Gualtieri, with keynote 
addresses delivered by Hon. Edward Scicluna, President of the Economic 
and Financial Affairs Council and Mr Klaus Regling, Managing Director of 
the ESM. Here it was argued that the project of the Euro had no recourse to 
institutional elements normally found in other federal currency structures, 
like the dollar, and the ESM therefore was vital in contributing to stability 
especially in its role in the broader European response to the financial crisis. 
It was also posited that structural reforms lead to growth and jobs, although 
within certain spheres, such as social policy, these were best pursued at a 
national level. 
Meeting of the Chairpersons of the Committees on Social Affairs 
The Meeting of the Chairpersons of the Committees on Social Affairs was 
held on 23
rd‒24th March 2017, though debating sessions were only held on 
the second day. The meeting was opened by the Speaker of the Maltese 
House of Representatives, and was followed by introductory remarks from 
the then Chairman of the Social Affairs Committee, Hon. Anthony Agius 
Decelis, and a speech by Ms Marianne Thyssen, European Commissioner for 
Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility.
310
 
The meeting itself was split into three sessions. The first session dealt with 
poverty and social exclusion and the way towards a more inclusive Europe. 
This item tied in with the second pillar of the Trio’s work programme: “A 
Union that empowers and protects all its citizens”.311 
The second session was dedicated to an exchange of best practices on how to 
tackle social exclusion, whereas the third session focussed on the Europe 
2020 policies and the way forward. 
Meeting of the Chairpersons of Economic and Environmental Affairs 
Committees 
The Meeting of the Chairpersons of Economic and Environmental Affairs 
Committees was held on 6
th‒7th April 2017. This meeting was also 
inaugurated by the Speaker of the House, followed by introductory remarks 
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311 Council of the European Union (2015) p. 12. 
126 
 
 
from the Chairman of the Economic and Financial Affairs Committee, Hon. 
Silvio Schembri. 
The meeting was once again split into three sessions, with the first session 
tackling the economic and social impact of climate change, thus tying in with 
the third pillar of the Presidential Trio programme.
312
 During this session, a 
suggestion was floated by Professor Simone Borg to establish an online 
forum bringing MPs and experts together, in order to share information, 
advice and best practices. 
The second session addressed the financial aspects of climate change, and 
focussed on the financial and non-financial costs of addressing the 
phenomenon, while investigating the cost of inaction (i.e. doing nothing) as 
opposed to the financial investment necessary to finance climate action. 
There was general consensus that, despite the current financial environment, 
it was preferable to ensure that climate action be financed properly, as not 
doing so would result in future, and possibly significantly higher, costs. 
The third session focused on non-state actors, and saw a Maltese company 
presenting their energy-efficient work related to design and engineering in 
the construction industry as a model of best practice. What is interesting to 
note is the academic involvement in this meeting, with most of the speakers 
hailing from university or industry, and NGOs. The inter-parliamentary 
meetings of the parliamentary dimension enable politicians to meet and 
discuss topical subjects with the people who are directly active and involved. 
Inter-parliamentary Conference for the CFSP and CSDP 
A more intense meeting was the Inter-parliamentary Conference for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP), held on 26
th‒28th April 2017 in Malta, which saw 
three days of discussion on the state of play of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, the European response to the instability and threats in the Southern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East and migration, amongst other topics. 
The Deputy Speaker of the House, Hon. Ċensu Galea addressed the meeting 
followed by the Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Maltese 
House of Representatives, Hon. Luciano Busuttil, and the Chair of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, Mr David 
McAllister. The Maltese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hon. George Vella, 
briefed participants on the state of play of the Neighbourhood Policy during 
the first session. 
The second session dealt with instability and threats in Europe’s 
neighbourhood. 
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The third session was an eagerly awaited exchange of views on the priorities 
and strategies of the EU in the area of CFSP and CSDP with the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and 
Vice-President of the European Commission, Ms Federica Mogherini, 
following opening remarks by the Minister for Home Affairs and National 
Security of Malta, Hon. Carmelo Abela. 
Three workshops were held in parallel on the final day: one on the EU’s 
Migration Policy in 2017 and beyond; the second on fighting propaganda and 
information warfare; and the third on the European Defence Action Plan and 
EU-NATO relations. 
The results of the workshop were presented in the last session, also adopting 
a set of conclusions which in its preamble regretted but respected the 
decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union. 
Amongst other things, the conclusions supported the establishment of a 
coordinated annual review on defence (CARD), as well as the strengthening 
of the EU’s hard power, and suggested that the EU should significantly step 
up its cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries while also 
supporting the EU’s stance vis-a-vis the “illegal annexation of the Crimean 
peninsula” by Russia.313 In its conclusions, the inter-parliamentary 
conference also condemned Russia for “vetoing numerous UN Security 
Council Resolutions on the conflict of Syria”.314 
The IPC invited the United Nations to authorise the start of the third phase of 
operation EUNAVFOR MED ‒ SOPHIA, though by November 2017 it was 
still reported that this was proving impossible.
315
 
With regard to migration, the IPC called for the establishment of a common 
European migration policy, and also welcomed the Malta Declaration,
316
 as 
well as the intention of the Maltese Presidency to present concrete plans to the 
Council for its implementation. 
Finally, with regard to the CSDP, both the intention to setup a Military 
Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)
317
 and the publication of the 
European Defence Action Plan
318
 were welcomed by the conference. 
One notable fact about this meeting was the mix of civil servants and 
Members of Parliament during the workshops, which was intended to 
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facilitate an exchange of views and bridge the gap between policy and 
decision makers, and officials working on the ground. 
Meeting of the LVII COSAC 
The last meeting held during the parliamentary dimension of the Maltese 
presidency was the LVII COSAC Plenary, which was held on 28
th‒30th May 
2017, and which brought together “chairpersons and members of the 
European affairs committees of national Parliaments of the European Union 
and observer countries, and members of the European Parliament”319 to 
discuss various topics, including, amongst others, a rundown of the 
achievements of the Maltese presidency and the future of the European 
Union in the context of Brexit. 
The Presidential Troika met on the first day to approve the agenda of the 
meeting, the programme of the Plenary, the presentation of the 27
th
 Bi-annual 
Report, and the draft conclusions of the LVII COSAC, and discuss any other 
business. The Presidency also briefed the Troika on the correspondence 
received. 
After a meeting of political groups, the COSAC meeting started on the 
second day with a welcome address from Speaker Farrugia, after which the 
agenda was adopted. The 27
th
 Bi-annual Report of COSAC was presented by 
the Permanent Member of the COSAC Secretariat. Later, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Malta, Hon. Vella, briefed participants on the work done 
and results achieved by the Maltese Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union. He noted that a Migration Media Award had been 
established to recognize and reward journalistic pieces reporting on 
migration. The Presidency had also steered the EU toward considering the 
future of western Balkan countries, something which the Bulgarian 
Presidency subsequently followed up on. The Maltese Presidency had also 
prioritised the single market, and great progress in the involvement of 
consumers and the establishment of key consumer protections laws had been 
made. 
The second session addressed the role of national parliaments in the future of 
the EU. The keynote speaker for this session was, once again, Mr 
Timmermans, together with the Vice-President of the European Parliament, 
Ms Mairead McGuinness, who called for deeper engagement between 
national Parliaments and national governments but also between the 
European Parliament and national Parliaments. 
During the debate that followed, many speakers emphasised the importance 
of involving national Parliaments in the EU decision-making process. The 
rapport with the citizen was also a recurring subject. Support for the “green” 
                                                             
319 Parliament of Malta (2017). 
 
129 
 
 
card was also expressed by some participants, and several others expressed 
their dissatisfaction with what they deemed to be an early deadline set for 
feedback on the Commission’s White Paper on the Future of the EU, to 
which Mr TIMMERMANS replied by assuring participants that the State of 
the Union address in autumn would not mark an end to the debate. Several 
speakers also addressed the “yellow” card raised in regard of the legislative 
proposal on the posting of workers.
320
 
Brexit was discussed in the third session.  The main speaker was Mr Michel 
Barnier, the Chief Negotiator for the Preparation and Conduct of the 
Negotiations with the United Kingdom, who reiterated the key role national 
Parliaments would play in forging unity of the EU 27 and, given that the new 
partnership would be a mixed agreement, referred to its ratification by 
national Parliaments. During the debate that followed, it transpired that 
transparency of negotiations was the biggest issue when it came to Brexit. 
The Blue Economy and the EU Integrated Maritime Policy was the subject of 
the fourth session, which was addressed by Mr Karmenu Vella, the EU 
Commissioner for the Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries.  
As is usual at these conferences, a meeting of the Chairpersons of COSAC 
was held at the end of the day. 
Migration was the main topic on the second day and the assembly was 
addressed by Minister George Vella who welcomed the Malta Declaration, 
adopted at the Informal summit of EU heads of states or governments on 3
rd
 
February 2017, as a step toward disrupting the business models of smugglers 
and human traffickers. This was followed by an address from Ms Maite 
Pagazaurtundúa Ruiz, Member of the European Parliament, as well as by Mr 
Lucio Romano, Vice-Chair of the Committee on EU policies of the Italian 
Senate, who reported on the visit to the hotspot in Pozzallo, Sicily. Twenty-
eight COSAC parliamentarians from 18 Member States had participated, in 
addition to 11 Italian MPs, a number of MEPS and representatives of four 
regional councils, while two other Parliaments were represented by their 
staff. The goal of the visit was to raise awareness and it also included a 
meeting with representatives of civil society held in Ragusa. 
Many speakers welcomed the Malta Declaration and the general 
consensus was that the migratory and humanitarian crisis called for a 
European response based on solidarity. In this regard, Ms Katarina 
CSEFALVAYOVA, from the Slovak Národná rada, thanked Malta for 
having picked up on the notion of “effective solidarity” put forward by 
the Slovak Presidency. A number of speakers called for actions to disrupt 
business models of smugglers and traffickers in migrants, while several 
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others stressed the need to differentiate between economic migrants and 
refugees. 
The Presidency Encounters Turbulence 
As the Presidency was coming to an end, a general election was announced 
and parliament was dissolved. This obviously had its implications on the 
running of the presidency, not least its parliamentary dimension: here, a 
peculiar situation cropped up just before the last meeting – the LVII COSAC 
– for the Maltese Parliament no longer had a European Affairs Committee 
Chairman.  
This meant two things: firstly, there was no Chairman to preside over the 
meeting, and secondly, and as a result of not having a Maltese delegation 
present at the meeting, there could be no Contribution presented by the 
Presidency for adoption. As the Speaker of the House, who retains his 
position till the reconvening of Parliament, explained during the COSAC 
meeting itself, despite these exceptional circumstances, “the Maltese 
Parliament remained committed to its obligations arising from Malta’s EU 
Presidency”, and it was decided that the Speaker would chair the LVII 
COSAC, and, instead of a political contribution, following consultation 
with the Troika, the Presidency proposed the adoption of brief conclusions 
free from political statements. 
Challenges faced during the Parliamentary Dimension of the Maltese 
Presidency 
It should come as no surprise that a small Member State holding the EU 
Presidency for the first time faces particular challenges, mostly logistical in 
nature. 
Finding a suitable venue for some of the meetings, proved to be a daunting 
task. Malta’s own Parliamentary chamber is understandably small, and 
whereas its infrastructure is adequate for day to day business, extraordinary 
meetings like the ones held during the Presidency need sizeable venues. In 
larger EU member states this is not an issue, as the meetings can be held in 
the national parliaments’ plenary hall. A meeting like the COSAC plenary 
involves upward of 250 participants, without counting auxiliary officials, 
caterers and interpreters. 
Providing interpretation may also prove problematic. The COSAC rules of 
procedure, for instance, dictate that interpretation in all of the EU’s official 
languages be provided during the plenary meetings.  
Size constraints proved particularly troublesome during the Meeting of the 
Chairpersons of Economic and Environmental Affairs Committees, as this 
basically incorporated two different committees (often with two different 
Chairpersons) but only two MPs per Parliament were invited. In the case of 
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bi-cameral chambers, the attendance was split (that is to say, an MP per 
chamber), and this could lead to problems since a chamber may have two 
different Chairpersons for the two Committees.
321
 Indeed, in a few cases 
chambers insisted on and sought a special arrangement so that two members 
from the same chamber could attend. This can be seen in the final list of 
participants
322
 where, for instance, the Belgian Senate had two Chairpersons 
attending, in addition to another Member from the Belgian House of 
Representatives. 
Ironically however, there were far less challenges of a political nature
323
, 
as the realities of a small country were surprisingly perceived as an 
advantage, rather than a weakness. This is attested by a number of 
interventions. Ms Danielle Auroi, a Member of the French Assemblée 
nationale had “underlined that Malta as a Mediterranean multicultural 
country could bring EU Member States together and be a bridge with 
Africa and the Middle East”.324 This sentiment was echoed by Ms 
Gabriela CREŢU, a Member of the Romanian Senat who also “expressed 
[her] trust towards small Member States holding the Presidency”.325 Even 
the Conclusions of the LVII COSAC noted “the fruitful discussions  held 
during the LVII COSAC and [thanked] the Maltese Presidency for putting 
on the agenda issues that are most relevant to the European Union at this 
critical juncture.”326 
Indeed, given the relative freedom of choice of topics, which is after all the 
point behind the concept of a 6-month rotating presidency, even small 
countries (and small parliaments) can make a difference by choosing topics 
in which they have an intellectual or experiential advantage, a point 
eloquently surmised by Hon. Zammit Lewis during the COSAC 
Chairpersons meeting, who stressed that “the Maltese Presidency was well 
positioned to understand the real issues on migration.”327 
Results of the Parliamentary Dimension of the Maltese Presidency 
From the above overview of the inter-parliamentary meetings held within the 
parliamentary dimension, the observer can quickly gather that, despite the 
lack of PR, the parliamentary dimension is an important side of the 
Presidency that enables heavyweights in the policy and decision-making 
sphere, including and indeed most often from the executive, to meet and 
                                                             
321 Indeed, this is usually the case, given that these two committees are usually at logger heads. 
322 Parliament of Malta (2017). 
323 Apart from the special context in which the COSAC Plenary was held; see above on page 
12. 
324 COSAC (2017d) p. 5 
325 Ibid. p. 4. 
326 COSAC (2017e). 
327 COSAC (2017b) p. 5. 
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engage in discussion in an open-forum environment enriched with input from 
experts and academia. That in itself is a remarkable achievement. 
But despite the difficult if not impossible task of quantifying results from 
such inter-parliamentary fora, one can indeed find concrete results of the 
parliamentary dimension. The visit to the Hotspot of Pozzallo in Sicily, 
which happened on 5‒6 May, and therefore during the Maltese Presidency, is 
one such example, for despite being mostly organised by the Italian Senate 
on the initiative of Senator Vannino Chiti, the idea was brought up at the 
COSAC meeting in Malta, and then formulated during a side meeting with 
the Chairperson of the Foreign and European Affairs Committee of Maltese 
House of Representatives, which supported the initiative in its capacity of 
Presidency Parliament, and indeed encouraged national parliaments and the 
European Parliament to participate. 
One cannot fail to mention, of course, the conclusions drawn up following 
the meetings themselves, and whereas it is true that, given the nature of inter-
parliamentary meetings, and the different realities that govern the oversight 
of the executive in different Member States, with the resultant different 
powers and mandates that parliaments have vis-a-vis the latter, these 
conclusions are not binding, they nevertheless serve two very important 
functions: (1) they steer local debates to ensure they reflect the European 
mood and what was agreed at European level; and (2) they serve as 
milestones enabling discussions to proceed smoothly from one Presidency to 
another, and ensure continuation by enabling Parliaments, especially those 
holding the Presidency, to pick up from where others have left off. 
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Chapter 11 
The EU and Relocation  
Petra Bishtawi 
Introduction 
The recent arrival of a large number of persons seeking international 
protection placed the matter of migration amongst the priority issues on the 
EU’s political agenda. The influx was, however, distributed very unevenly 
among member states as some of them took in a disproportionate number of 
asylum seekers
328
 as a consequence of a number of factors, including their 
geographical location or the state of their economies. 
The European Union advocates responsibility, solidarity and partnership. As 
stated in Article 80 of the Lisbon Treaty; “The policies of the Union set out 
in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the principle 
of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial 
implications, between the Member States.”329 Responsibility-sharing is 
therefore one of the key principles on which a common migration and 
asylum policy should be built in order to address the unequal distribution of 
asylum seekers. 
The EU experienced several important events in the migration and asylum 
area which significantly shaped the development thereof. One of them was 
the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, which entered into force in 2009 and 
introduced Qualified Majority Voting in the decisions taken in this field. 
Since then there has been no need for unanimous decision making, which led 
to another important event: the European Agenda on Migration of May 2015, 
which is the commission’s document addressing migration, based on four 
pillars (reducing the incentives for irregular migration, border management 
– saving lives and securing external borders, Europe’s duty to protect: a 
strong common asylum policy, and a new policy on legal migration). This 
document included a proposal (later adopted by the Council) on the 
relocation of refugees from some member states across the whole EU in the 
name of solidarity and responsibility-sharing, which contained a relocation 
key, based on four variables, aiming at reflecting the capacity of each 
member state.
330
 
This chapter discusses the impacts of the relocation scheme of the European 
Union, both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, the contributions of 
                                                             
328 Disproportionate in relation to the relative size of some member states. 
329 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
330 European Commission (2015). 
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individual member states in the field of protecting refugees and asylum 
seekers should be based on their respective protective capacity. Therefore, in 
order to improve the uneven distribution of responsibilities among 
the member states, the relocation scheme should apply the principle of 
protective capacity while assigning shares of responsibility to the member 
states. Thus, we assess the criteria used for allocation of quotas by the EU 
against factors reflecting the protective capacity and against responsibility-
sharing models proposed by various researchers.  
The practical impact is demonstrated by the changes in shares of responsibility 
assumed by member states. We will illustrate how the EU relocation scheme 
affects the numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in individual member states 
and to what extent it improves the situations of states facing a high degree of 
asylum pressure, such as Malta. 
Protective Capacity of States 
In order to address responsibility-sharing in the area of migration, we need to 
apply the concept of protective capacity of states. This can be regarded as the 
ability of a certain region or country to receive and care for people in need of 
protection. It is expected to reflect not only the degree to which there is space 
for people requiring international protection, but also whether economic 
conditions are adequate to provide for them and whether the entity is able to 
absorb them into the native population. 
Determination of the protective capacity of each member state is the key 
element because responsibility-sharing models allocate quotas to every entity 
taking part in collective care for people under international protection.
331
 
Such quotas are derived from protective capacity because the aim of any 
mechanism is not to put excess pressure on countries or regions, but 
to improve the distribution of responsibility. 
We consider an equitable protective capacity to be one built on three premises. 
These are the ability to care for, the ability to absorb and the ability to receive 
further refugees and asylum seekers. Each of these abilities needs to be reflected 
in the choice of variables that are to influence the protective capacity. Ability to 
care for is related to the economic strength of each country, which allows it to 
provide for the material needs of the refugees and asylum seekers. Regarding the 
ability to absorb, there are more options as to how one could integrate this into 
the model. This can be achieved by including population size (reflecting society), 
which can be complemented by size of territory (reflecting space). Alternatively, 
both these factors can be combined in the population density measure, although 
it is a relative indicator rather than one reflecting the actual size of each state. 
Furthermore, the unemployment rate variable relates to the ability to absorb, as it 
is concerned with the integration of refugees and asylum seekers in the labour 
                                                             
331 Quotas can be allocated both in monetary terms and in terms of numbers of persons under 
international protection. 
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market of the receiving country. The last of the three conditions is the ability 
to receive asylum seekers in terms of asylum reception systems. This is partly an 
economic issue, but it also relates to capacity and procedures associated with 
asylum and refugee status determination. In the event that a member state faced a 
large number of arrivals of asylum seekers in previous years, there may be a 
strain on the asylum system and a possible backlog of cases. The ability to 
receive is therefore negatively impacted by the previous numbers of refugees and 
asylum seekers in each state.
332
 
The relationships between protective capacity, the three abilities of states and 
individual variables are illustrated in Figure 1. The arrows signify the flow of 
influence.
333
 
Figure 1: Relationships between Individual Variables, Abilities, and Protective Capacity of a 
State. 
A number of responsibility-sharing models, which contained a determination 
of protective capacity of states, were introduced by various researchers. In 
this chapter we will work with four such models in order to access the 
distribution of refugees and asylum seekers proposed by the European 
Commission.  Firstly, the model proposed by Schuck will be used. He 
determines protective capacity solely by national wealth, represented by the 
absolute level of GDP of each country. This way, both economic strength 
and the size of a country are reflected.
334
 
The second model introduced by Czaika employs a set of five indices, which 
affect protective capacity in the same manner (all of them have equal 
weights). The first is based on GDP per capita and the second on population 
                                                             
332 Bishtawi, P. and Carammia, M. (2014) p. 9. 
333.The individual variables are very likely to be correlated to each other (positively in most 
cases). This correlation is not a problem for protective capacity determination, but it does 
diminish the importance of relative weights assigned to each variable. 
334 Schuck, P.H. (1997) pp. 279‒282. 
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density of states. The third index is a reflection of ethnic, linguistic and 
religious fractions in states’ societies. The next factor in this model is 
political freedom, which is composed of the measure of civil liberties and 
political rights, and the last variable assesses political stability.
335
 
Thielemann, Williams and Boswell, in their model, apply three criteria which 
are GDP per capita, population size and population density. These are used to 
determine three different versions of protective capacity, depending on 
different relative weights of each variable. The first one has the ratio of 
weights 50:25:25%, the second one 50:50:0% (excluding population density 
from the calculation), and the third 50:0:50% (eliminating population size 
from the formula).
336
 
The last model is the one offered by Angenendt, Engler and Schneider. The 
protective capacity is based on the five year averages of absolute levels of 
GDP, population size, national territory, and unemployment rate of the EU 
countries, with the ratio of their relative weights 40:40:10:10%. This is done 
to correct for short-term fluctuations and the fact that not all the variables 
have the same importance when determining the protective capacity of 
individual states.
337
 
Relocation Criteria of the EU Commission 
Protective capacity is, according to the EU Commission, calculated with the 
combination of four variables. These include GDP, population size, 
unemployment rate, and a five-year average of the number of asylum 
applications and resettled refugees per 1 million inhabitants. The ratio of 
relative weights of these variables is 40:40:10:10%.
338
 
The first dimension, concerned with the ability to care for refugees and asylum 
seekers, is reflected by member states’ GDP. It is given high importance, as it 
allocates 40% of the responsibility. This is exactly the same as what was 
proposed by Angenendt, Engler and Schneider. Thielemann, Williams and 
Boswell, and Schuck assign larger weights to economic strength. The former 
model assigns 50% and the latter 100%, since it is entirely based on this factor. 
Czaika, on the other hand, calculates protective capacity in such a way that 
GDP affects only 20% of it. 
In terms of the ability to absorb persons under international protection, the 
EU uses two variables. Firstly, population size with the relative weight of 
40%, and secondly unemployment rate, which determines 10% of member 
states’ capacity. This means that absorption carries a weight of 50%. In 
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336 Thielemann, E.R., Williams, R. and Boswell, C. (2010) p. 57. 
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relation to the theoretical models, this approach once again resembles that of 
Angenendt, Engler and Schneider, as it includes these two variables with 
exactly the same relative weights. However, Angenendt, Engler and 
Schneider also add the size of national territory, leading to an even higher 
importance of the ability to absorb refugees and asylum seekers. Thielemann, 
Williams and Boswell use population size and population density, however 
the relative weight of variables accounting for absorption is the same as that 
allocated by the Commission. Czaika’s model reflects this dimension by 
80%. 
The last of the three abilities is that which measures member state capacity in 
terms of receiving further refugees and asylum seekers. The EU reflects this 
by the “average number of spontaneous asylum applications and the number 
of resettled refugees per 1 million inhabitants over the period 2010‒2014”, 
with a weight of 10%.
339
 Such an ability is not accounted for by any of the 
above-mentioned researchers. 
It is commendable that the EU takes into account the numbers of refugees 
and asylum seekers that arrived in the past, since none of the existing 
theoretical models considered those. However, there are three points we 
would like to raise in relation to this part of the Commission’s formula. 
Firstly, it uses the numbers of asylum applications filed in member states and 
resettled refugees. Those asylum seekers who were previously granted 
refugee status and stayed in the country are disregarded. This means that only 
the flows of asylum are included. 
Secondly, the proposal puts little emphasis on the ability to receive further 
persons under international protection. The variable representing this 
determines only 10% of protective capacity. Furthermore, it is expressed in 
terms of numbers of refugees and asylum seekers per number of 
inhabitants. This means that the population size is reflected again through 
this factor, leading to enhanced absorption ability and an even further 
reduced ability to receive new refugees and asylum seekers. 
Finally, the use of a simple five-year average of the numbers of refugees 
and asylum seekers means that the incoming flow from five years ago has 
the same importance as that which took place a year ago. We can, 
however, assume that the asylum system does not have a backlog over 
such a long period of time, therefore, the strains brought about by these 
two flows are not entirely comparable. We believe that if an average 
value over a certain period of time is considered, it should be discounted 
accordingly so that more recent events have greater impact on the 
outcome.  
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To understand the motives behind the responsibility-sharing mechanism of 
the European Agenda on Migration, it is important to look at the explanations 
provided for the inclusion of each variable. In its proposal, the EU 
commission mentions two capacities of member states that need to be 
reflected in the distribution key: “the capacity to absorb and integrate 
refugees”.340 According to this document, population size reflects the 
capacity to absorb refugees, unemployment rate is associated with the 
capacity to integrate refugees, and GDP applies to both of them. The last 
variable is included to take into account “the efforts made by Member States 
in the recent past”,341 rather than relating to a certain ability. Therefore, it 
seems that the purpose of using this variable is to reward states’ contributions 
in previous years and to discourage them from underinvesting in their asylum 
systems, instead of focusing on their asylum systems being overloaded. 
From the Maltese point of view, the distribution proposed by the EU 
Commission is challenging. On the one hand, the relocation key applies the 
economic and population criteria, which leads to a smaller share of 
responsibility assigned to Malta due to its very small relative size. However, 
the unemployment rate variable increases the Maltese quota, because 
the country is doing relatively very well in this respect. 
In terms of the effect on Malta, the most important variable included in the 
formula is the number of refugees and asylum seekers in the past. This third 
dimension, concerned with the asylum reception systems of member states 
and their ability to process new applications, is especially significant for the 
state, which has faced large inflows of asylum seekers over the last several 
years and is still coping with high numbers of refugees and asylum seekers 
present on its territory. Unfortunately, the emphasis of the EU does not lie on 
this dimension. 
Relocation in Numbers 
The impact of relocation in practical terms is demonstrated by the numbers 
of refugees and asylum seekers and by the change in their distribution among 
the member states. Figure 2 provides the actual numbers of refugees and 
asylum seekers in EU member states in 2014, together with the numbers 
potentially allocated by the European Commission. The latter illustrates the 
hypothetical situation that would take place if the relocation key 
from the European Agenda on Migration was applied to the total number of 
refugees and asylum seekers present in the EU in 2014. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Refugees and asylum seekers in EU Member States (2014). 
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Source: Own calculations based on data available from EUROSTAT, UNHCR and the 
European Agenda on Migration. 
The data shows that the EU Commission assigned significantly smaller 
shares of responsibility to Germany (by more than 200,000 refugees and 
asylum seekers), Sweden (by almost 190,000 refugees and asylum seekers) 
and France (by nearly 150,000 refugees and asylum seekers).  
Member states that would in these circumstances be allocated higher 
numbers of refugees and asylum seekers than they provided for in reality 
include Greece (by close to 6,000 persons) and Malta (by a little more than 
1,000 persons), even though these two countries were considered as bearing 
disproportionate pressure. This means that if the European Commission 
applied its key to the total number of refugees and asylum seekers, relocation 
would take place in the opposite direction than it does in reality, for example 
from Germany to Greece. 
The most important practical aspect of relocation is the actual number of 
relocated refugees and asylum seekers. Under the EU arrangement, 26 
countries made relocation pledges. There have been 23 EU member states 
and 3 partner countries (Norway, Switzerland and Lichtenstein) which 
volunteered to take this commitment upon themselves, established bilateral 
agreements and joined the relocation scheme.
342
 All these countries together 
                                                             
342 The group of EU countries which did not take part includes Denmark, Greece, Hungary, 
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committed to accept 44,374 refugees and asylum seekers from Greece and 
Italy. 
The part of the process that took place in Italy has so far relocated 6,928 
refugees and asylum seekers to another 17 EU member states and 1,593 
refugees and asylum seekers to two of the partner countries. Another group 
of refugees and asylum seekers relocated from Greece consisted of 18,651 
persons moving to 21 different member states and 1,047 persons to the 
partner countries. Overall, this means that there were 28,219 relocated 
refugees and asylum seekers in total.
343, 344
 
Since there were over 600,000 asylum applications filed across the EU in 
2014,
345
 the relocation of about 28,000 refugees and asylum seekers only 
represents around 4.7% of the incoming number (let alone the refugees and 
asylum seekers arriving in the previous years). Therefore, in relative terms, 
only a very small portion of the total responsibility for protection of refugees 
and asylum seekers is being redistributed. This can hardly sufficiently 
alleviate the strain on some member states. 
When it comes to Malta, the country took part in the relocation process and 
pledged 164 places. So far it has accepted 47 refugees and asylum seekers 
from Italy and another 101 from Greece. Considering its small relative size 
and the high number of refugees and asylum seekers already present on its 
territory, Malta contributed significantly to EU responsibility-sharing.
346
  
Conclusion 
Migration and the international protection of persons seeking asylum is a 
topic of growing importance, and cooperation between EU member states is 
vital in order for them to adequately manage these large inflows. The 
European Agenda on Migration is both a recognition of and a response to 
this. 
In general, the relocation scheme successfully relates to each of the three 
abilities of states constituting protective capacity. However, a number of 
issues remain. Firstly, the relative weights of the three theoretical criteria do 
not reflect proportionally the abilities of states to assume responsibility for 
persons under international protection. The distribution key puts too much 
emphasis on the ability to absorb refugees and asylum seekers into member 
states’ societies, while not sufficiently considering the strain on their asylum 
                                                             
343 The numbers of relocated refugees and asylum seekers correspond to data from 14. 9. 2017. 
344 European Commission (2017). 
345 The number of asylum applications grew significantly to about 1,300,000 in 2015 and 
2016. However, this number was not known at the time of the creation of the European 
Agenda on Migration. 
346.Apart from the European responsibility–sharing mechanism, Malta also benefits from the 
US resettlement programme, through which 500 refugees leave the country every year. 
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systems and all the other matters linked to the reception of refugees and 
asylum seekers in previous years. Secondly, although the allocation of 
responsibility is “based on objective, quantifiable and verifiable criteria”,347 
the reasoning behind them, among other things, shows that previous efforts 
are being acknowledged and rewarded. Instead, protective capacity should, 
in theory, be a reflection of the protection member states are able to 
provide, rather than what remains for them to do. Finally, the numbers of 
refugees and asylum seekers, to which the distribution key is applied and 
that were up until now relocated, are relatively very low.  
Malta has been an active member state in terms of responsibility-sharing in 
the area of migration. It has been both promoting the idea of relocation of 
refugees and asylum seekers and also participating in the process by 
providing protection for refugees and asylum seekers relocated from Italy 
and Greece. 
Responsibility-sharing is a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, should 
these first phases prove successful, higher numbers of relocated persons 
should follow in the future so that the uneven distribution of responsibility is 
substantially improved. This, however, will be a question of political 
discourse, solidarity among member states, and their willingness 
to participate in responsibility-sharing. 
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